VZCZCXRO6561
PP RUEHBZ RUEHDU RUEHGI RUEHJO RUEHMR RUEHRN
DE RUEHKI #0586/01 1961601
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 141601Z JUL 08
FM AMEMBASSY KINSHASA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8197
INFO RUEHXR/RWANDA COLLECTIVE
RUCNSAD/SOUTHERN AF DEVELOPMENT COMMUNITY COLLECTIVE
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHDC
RHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE
RUZEJAA/JAC MOLESWORTH RAF MOLESWORTH UK
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 KINSHASA 000586
SENSITIVE
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PGOV PREL MOPS KPKO CG BE
SUBJECT: CNDP UNHAPPY WITH GDRC AMANI PROVINCIAL STRUCTURES DECREE
1. (SBU) Summary: U.S. Embassy Goma office and CNDP leadership met
July 11 to discuss CNDP concerns about the GDRC decree establishing
Amani program provincial commissions and CNDP roles in the
sub-commissions. The CNDP is concerned about the absence of
humanitarian structures and the level of CNDP participation, and
interprets the perceived shortcomings of the decree as indicative of
GDRC lack of commitment to the Amani program. U.S. Goma officers
countered that the CNDP issues are likely explained by oversight and
errors of omission on behalf of the GDRC vice a directed effort to
undermine the process. End summary.
2. (SBU) Rene Abandi and Bertrand Bisimwa of the National Congress
for the Defense of the People (CNDP in French) requested a meeting
with DCM Sam Brock and USAID Goma officer Nicholas Jenks at the
Ihusi hotel July 11. Abandi and Bisimwa explained that CNDP
president Laurent Nkunda had instructed them to meet with U.S.
representatives to discuss CNDP concerns about the government decree
("arrete" in French) naming individuals to the provincial structures
of the Amani Peace, Security, and Development Program.
3. (SBU) Amani program coordinator Apollinaire Malu Malu
distributed copies of the decree to all participants (including
CNDP) at the end of the Amani Program Joint Technical Commission for
Peace and Security (JTCPS) meeting July 10. Abandi did not have
time to study the document before he left for Kirolirwe and Malu
Malu departed for Kinshasa. Abandi took the decree to Kirolirwe
(CNDP headquarters) and discussed it with Nkunda and the CNDP
political and military leadership. Nkunda and CNDP leadership were
displeased with the decree itself and with Abandi and Bisimwa for
not protesting strongly to Malu Malu about the perceived failings of
the decree. Nkunda ordered Abandi and Bisimwa back to Goma to
discuss the decree with U.S. Goma officers. (Note: Abandi and
Bisimwa appeared shell-shocked during the meeting at the Ihusi, in
contrast with the confidence they usually display. End note)
4. (SBU) CNDP (Nkunda first and foremost) was dissatisfied with
three points: First, no provincial structures for the humanitarian
sub-commission were established. The structures that were
established are the provincial military committee, the disengagement
cell, the brassage cell, and the state authority cell. The
structures not established were the provincial humanitarian cell,
the internally displaced person (IDP) return cell, and the refugee
return cell. The decree is silent on these latter structures.
These structures are important to CNDP as CNDP and Malu Malu
apparently had reached an agreement that it was in the context of
these structures that the "political" discussions that CNDP wants
would be held.
5. (SBU) The second point of contention is that CNDP Colonel
Antoine Manzi was named to the position of "Secretary/Reporter" of
the Provincial Military Committee, but should have been named to be
"Secretary/Reporter" of a higher-level coordinating committee that
would supervise, at the provincial level, both the provincial and
humanitarian committees. This CNDP officer has been functionally
demoted, according to CNDP.
6. (SBU) The third point Abandi and Bisimwa made was that instead
of naming Nkunda explicitly as one of the members of the brassage
cell, the decree basically leaves the second CNDP seat on the cell
open, with the notation "a pouvoir" (translation: "to be filled") on
the list.
7. (SBU) CNDP interprets these concerns as a clear indication of
GDRC non-seriousness, lack of political will, take-it-or-leave-it
approach, and generalized disrespect for the Amani process and the
CNDP. According to the CNDP, the GDRC is deliberately ignoring the
humanitarian structures because they want to focus only on military
issues and do not care about IDPs and refugees and do not want any
real political dialogue with CNDP. In addition, per Abandi and
Bisimwa, the GDRC is disrespecting CNDP and Nkunda by not naming
Nkunda openly to the brassage cell and not using CNDP military
titles. CNDP asked for U.S. Goma office reaction to these points.
8. (SBU) At this point Nkunda called Abandi, who passed the phone
to Jenks. Nkunda said that the GDRC wanted them to surrender
whereas CNDP was interested in "joining" the GDRC vice surrendering
to them. He said that the GDRC had to understand that CNDP had
legitimate concerns that the GDRC was simply refusing to deal with,
and that they would need to adopt a different attitude. Nkunda
stated, "We are not cargo to be wheeled around willy nilly in
wheel-barrows." Jenks explained to Nkunda that the U.S. did not
completely share the radical position that CNDP was taking regarding
the structures as defined in the decree, and that there could be
benign explanations for what had been done or omitted. Jenks and
Nkunda agreed that Jenks would give uncensored reactions to CNDP's
concerns to Abandi.
KINSHASA 00000586 002 OF 002
9. (SBU) Jenks told Abandi that CNDP analysis was unnecessarily
radical and that it is not justified to see a nefarious plot lurking
behind what could be simple administrative errors. CNDP would be
ill-served to raise these concerns in public, as they need to be
seen as being cooperative at this point and working with the system
with all its faults.
10. (SBU) Jenks explained that it was unknown to the U.S. why the
GDRC did not create the humanitarian structures or changed the
status of Colonel Manzi's position, but it could have been simply
that they were focused on getting the military structures
identified. Jenks told CNDP that there could be a number of benign
reasons why this happened and that the best way to approach this was
to have the Facilitation contact Malu Malu for clarification.
11. (SBU) Jenks said that CNDP was being unnecessarily radical
regarding the nomination of Nkunda to the brassage cell and that it
is widely known that it would be difficult for the GDRC to name
Nkunda officially. The GDRC had quite elegantly opened the door for
his participation, while not designating him officially. And what
CNDP wanted, per their statements, was his participation on this
cell, which is attained.
12. (SBU) CNDP then raised the idea of putting out a short
communique describing their issues with the decree, and Jenks
countered that it would be better to let the International
Facilitation work on the concerns about the humanitarian
sub-commission structure and Colonel Manzi's position. Jenks asked
about CNDP participation in the establishment of Kimoka, North Kivu
as a neutral meeting place and CNDP responded that this did not
depend on them.
13. (SBU) Comment. CNDP's comments indicate the level of concern
they have about the commission structures and may reflect the
increasing influence of hard liners within CNDP. The Facilitation
will raise these issues with Malu Malu July 12. End comment.
GARVELINK