INDEPENDENT NEWS

Cablegate: Demarche Delivered: Japan's Response to Critical

Published: Mon 9 Jun 2008 12:31 AM
VZCZCXYZ0000
PP RUEHWEB
DE RUEHKO #1556 1610031
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 090031Z JUN 08
FM AMEMBASSY TOKYO
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4863
UNCLAS TOKYO 001556
SENSITIVE
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: KNNP TRGY PREL PARM IR MNUC AORC IAEA UNSC JA
SUBJECT: DEMARCHE DELIVERED: JAPAN'S RESPONSE TO CRITICAL
EQUIPMENT NEEDS FOR IRAN'S NEW IR-2 CENTRIFUGE DESIGN
REF: STATE 52030
1. (U) Please see action requests in paragraphs 3 and 4.
2. (SBU) ESToff delivered non-paper and photos in ref to
METI Security Export Control Policy Division Deputy Director
Atsushi Tanizawa and Deputy Director Yukio Yoshihiro May 29.
Tanizawa said Japan is complying with UN Security Council
Resolutions 1737 and 1803 regarding strict export control of
dual-use items to Iran. ESToff urged the officials to engage
in further outreach with Japanese companies and ensure they
are aware of critical commodities that front companies could
use to expand Iran's uranium enrichment efforts. The
Japanese firm Toray, for example, is a major carbon fiber
producer, which is a critical commodity Iran might seek for
its IR-2 centrifuge.
3. (SBU) The METI officials asked that ESToff forward a
letter in English (contained in paragraph 4) to Washington
agencies regarding GOJ efforts at enforcing export control
regulations. In addition, Tanizawa requested further
clarification of which specific countries Japanese companies
should be wary. In the past, METI has been very careful when
dealing with companies located in Dubai and the UAE because
it had found multiple front companies posing as legitimate
businesses, he said. The GOJ would appreciate any additional
information to convey to companies before conducting its
outreach.
4. (SBU) BEGIN TEXT OF LETTER.
Thank you for your information regarding Iranian centrifuge,
IR-2.
In accordance with UNSCR 1737 and 1803, we have been
enforcing strict export control toward Iran. It is our
practice not to grant any export licenses for NSG
list-controlled items to Iran. Furthermore we asked Japan
Customs to check all exports of industrial ovens to Iran.
When it comes to epoxy resins that you mentioned in your
non-paper, it is neither practical nor appropriate to check
all exports of epoxy resins to Iran since they are so widely
and commonly used for variety of civil applications.
Useful as your information (is) on epoxy resins, it is so
broad that we need more clarification. It would be truly
appreciated if you could provide us further information as
follows.
1) Concrete features or characteristics of epoxy resins
which may be required to bind carbon fibers used in
centrifuges.
2) Specific commercial names of epoxy resins, if any.
3) How does the Government of the United States control
epoxy resins (shipped) to Iran?
END OF TEXT.
SCHIEFFER
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