VZCZCXRO7787
PP RUEHBZ RUEHDU RUEHGI RUEHJO RUEHMR RUEHRN
DE RUEHKI #0522 1641500
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 121500Z JUN 08
FM AMEMBASSY KINSHASA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8118
INFO RUEHXR/RWANDA COLLECTIVE
RUCNSAD/SOUTHERN AF DEVELOPMENT COMMUNITY COLLECTIVE
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHDC
RHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE
RUZEJAA/JAC MOLESWORTH RAF MOLESWORTH UK
UNCLAS KINSHASA 000522
SENSITIVE
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PGOV PREL MOPS KPKO CG
SUBJECT: SENIOR ADVISER SHORTLEY'S MEETING WITH DEFENSE MINISTER
CHIKEZ
REF: A. Kinshasa 463 B. Kinshasa 488 C. 07 Kinshasa 659
1. (SBU) Summary: AF Senior Adviser Tim Shortley and Defense
Minister Chikez Diemu reviewed progress on the Goma and Nairobi
processes and military reform June 2 in Kinshasa. Shortley
highlighted the Kisangani FDLR conference as a positive step, which
should also be used to pressure Nkunda. They discussed the idea of
sending CNDP troops to the Luberizi brassage center in South Kivu as
a way to start the process soon. Chikez called for weapons for the
FARDC. Shortley noted that uncoordinated efforts of donor countries
on the rapid reaction force and security sector reform are
unhelpful. End summary
2. (SBU) A/S Frazer's Senior Adviser Tim Shortley, joined by EU
Great Lakes Special Envoy Roeland van de Geer, discussed progress in
the Goma and Nairobi processes and reform of the Congolese army
(FARDC) with Defense Minister Chikez Diemu June 2 in Kinshasa. DCM,
A/DATT, and PolOff (notetaker) also participated in the meeting at
Chikez's office.
3. (SBU) Chikez said that the GDRC expects around 2,500 FDLR
members and dependents to disarm and relocate or repatriate as a
result of the process established at the May 26-27 Kisangani
conference (refs A and B). Shortley said the USG views the Kisangani
commitments as a positive step which, if successful, should be used
to pressure Nkunda to send a commensurate number of his troops to
brassage. Shortley cautioned against giving Nkunda the impression
that there will be a "one-to-one" ratio between the number of FDLR
combatants disarming and relocating and CNDP soldiers sent to
brassage. Chikez cited the necessity of a strong community-based
reinsertion and reintegration program.
4. (SBU) Shortley and Chikez discussed at some length the issue of
brassage centers for CNDP ex-combatants. Shortley emphasized that
sending some of Nkunda's troops initially to the Luberizi brassage
center in South Kivu (ref C) is a necessary enticement for Nkunda to
fully engage in the brassage process. Shortley said CNDP troops can
be sent subsequently to centers outside the region. Chikez
characterized the idea as a "favor" to Nkunda, but relented somewhat
after van de Geer suggested that sending ex-combatants to Luberizi
would only be a "first phase."
5. (SBU) Chikez claimed that, while a number of governments are
providing or planning FARDC training, what the Congolese military
needs most is weapons. He complained about the unwillingness or
inability of European Union member states to sell arms to the DRC,
and said he had written EU foreign policy chief Javier Solana for
assistance. He noted that President Kabila also plans to write to
Solana to approve the renewal of EUSEC's mandate.
6. (SBU) Shortley characterized the disparate efforts of donor
governments on the rapid reaction force and security sector reform
as unhelpful. He suggested that the U.S. and UK could partner to
provide training for the FARDC in an endeavor to concentrate
efforts. DCM noted that the USG is working to place a U.S. military
advisor at the defense ministry.
7. (SBU) Finally, Chikez reported that Kabila has agreed to send
one FARDC battalion and elements of the Presidential Republican
Guard to Dungu in Orientale Province to pressure the Lord's
Resistance Army (LRA). (Note: Separate reports place the number of
battalions at three. End note.)
8. (U) This message has been approved by Senior Adviser Shortley.
GARVELINK