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DE RUEHLM #0600/01 1720728
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O 200728Z JUN 08
FM AMEMBASSY COLOMBO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8310
INFO RUEHKA/AMEMBASSY DHAKA PRIORITY 0962
RUEHIL/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD PRIORITY 7951
RUEHKT/AMEMBASSY KATHMANDU PRIORITY 6123
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 4450
RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI PRIORITY 2120
RUEHNY/AMEMBASSY OSLO PRIORITY 4423
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO PRIORITY 3523
RUEHCG/AMCONSUL CHENNAI PRIORITY 8557
RUEHBI/AMCONSUL MUMBAI PRIORITY 6002
RUEHON/AMCONSUL TORONTO PRIORITY 0693
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA PRIORITY 2827
RHHMUNA/HQ USPACOM HONOLULU HI PRIORITY
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UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 COLOMBO 000600
SENSITIVE
SIPDIS
DEPARTMENT FOR SCA/INS
E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PGOV PREL PTER PHUM MOPS CE
SUBJECT: SRI LANKA: SEVERAL TRACK 2 AND 1.5 INITIATIVES
UNDERWAY OR UNDER CONSIDERATION
1. (SBU) SUMMARY: Prominent Sri Lankans and interested
members of the international community are pursuing a number
of Track 1.5 and 2 initiatives to resolve Sri Lanka's ethnic
conflict. The One Text Initiative (OTI) appears to have
progressed the most. Other initiatives are either embryonic
or stalled. OTI brings together senior political leaders to
tackle difficult issues, such as access to humanitarian goods
and services, and language policy. In the long term, OTI
aims to build confidence and trust among stakeholders
necessary for future peace talks. Post's interlocutors on
these initiatives consistently emphasize that their efforts
should remain out of the media spotlight to keep Sinhalese
nationalists from pressuring the government to disengage.
Post will continue quietly to support these efforts and
encourage political leaders to remain involved. End Summary.
One Text Initiative
-------------------
2. (SBU) The aim of the One Text Initiative (OTI) is
two-fold. In the short term, OTI brings together senior
leaders of Sri Lanka's major political parties to tackle
difficult issues that are directly related to the conflict
(such as access to humanitarian goods and services, and
language policy). In the long term, through these exercises,
OTI aims to build confidence and trust among stakeholders.
Thus, when peace talks resume, OTI might serve as a parallel
process in which leaders can engage on difficult issues and
feed into negotiations.
3. (SBU) OTI began in 2004, but after a period of neglect,
was redesigned and restarted in October 2007. Director
Mangala Moonesinghe and Lead Facilitator Nick Lewer work to
keep all parties on board and facilitate discussions. The
main body, the Multi-Stakeholder Dialogue (or "Long Table"),
is composed of senior political party leaders, plus four
civil society representatives who attend in an observer
capacity. The Long Table includes several cabinet ministers:
Minister of Science and Technology and Chair of the All
Party Representative Committee Tissa Vitharana, Minister of
Constitutional Affairs D.E.W. Gunasekera, acting Minister of
Justice Dilan Perera, and Minister of Transport Dallas
Allahuperuma. Other members include: leader of the Tamil
National Alliance (TNA) R. Sampanthan, United National Party
(UNP) member and former Minister of Finance K.N. Choksy,
representatives from the Sri Lanka Muslim Congress and the
National Unity Alliance (the two largest Muslim political
parties), and representatives from the government's
Secretariat for Coordinating the Peace Process (SCOPP) and
the Peace Secretariat for Muslims (PSM). Members meet
monthly and are supported by party-nominated researchers.
4. (SBU) J.S. Tissainayagam, a columnist for the Sunday
Times, joined OTI as the TNA researcher and has since been
appointed to the Board of Directors. He is currently being
detained by the Terrorist Investigation Division of the Sri
Lankan police. On June 6, the Defense Ministry issued a new
detention order against Tissainayagam for an additional 90
days. The GSL maintains that he is under investigation for
unspecified terrorist links, but no charges have been filed.
OTI director Moonesinghe, this Embassy, and other foreign
missions have intervened repeatedly to try to get
Tissainayagam released - so far without success.
5. (SBU) The Long Table has chosen four themes within which
to approach specific issues: 1) access to humanitarian goods
and services, 2) official language policy, 3) human security
and human rights, and 4) lessons to be learned from failed
peace processes. A sub-group, or "Small Table" (composed of
the TNA, SCOPP, PSM, and Lewer), focuses on humanitarian
goods and services; one on language policy will soon be
convened. Small Tables may invite outside experts to assist
and produce by consensus a discussion document, which is sent
COLOMBO 00000600 002 OF 003
to the Long Table for comment. Ultimately, the Long Table
comes to a consensus agreement on the document -- hence, "One
Text." The process is intended to be fluid and flexible,
with many different sizes and types of groups convening.
Lewer reports that the GSL is sending senior ministers to
Small Table discussions. Eventually, OTI wants to have three
facilitators in addition to Lewer: a Tamil, Sinhalese, and
Muslim.
6. (SBU) The Norwegian, Swiss, British and Canadian Foreign
Ministries fund OTI. The U.S. is also providing $25,000 to
OTI to cover lease costs for its office. In a meeting on
April 23, Lewer told Ambassador that it would be helpful for
the U.S. to encourage support for OTI at high levels in the
GSL, but that the U.S. should do so quietly so that OTI
remains under the radar.
International Study Group
-------------------------
7. (SBU) In 2007, Dr. Paikiasothy Saravanamuttu, head of the
Center for Policy Alternatives in Colombo, and Norbert Roper,
then-country director of the Berghof Foundation, quietly put
forward a proposal for an "International Study Group."
Saravanamuttu is one of the most respected NGO leaders in Sri
Lanka. Roper, a German national, is a highly experienced
INGO executive who had to depart Sri Lanka in January 2008
when the GSL revoked his work visa.
8. (SBU) Saravanamuttu and Roper visited Washington in
February 2008 to speak with former Deputy Secretary Richard
Armitage about serving as head of an International Study
Group of eminent persons. Its objectives would be: 1) to
generate ideas on how international actors can support new
indigenous peace initiatives more creatively and effectively
than they did during the 2002 - 2005 Ceasefire Agreement and
2) to engage with the stakeholders in Sri Lanka in a discreet
and effective way to explore which options for new peace
initiatives are most realistic and promising.
9. (SBU) Saravanamuttu told PolOff on June 6 that he and
Roper intend to hold meetings in Tokyo and New Delhi in July,
at which they hope to decide who the Japanese and Indian
eminent persons will be. Norway supports the initiative, and
Saravanmuttu is hoping for funding from the U.S. Institute of
Peace, as well as Japanese foundations. Roper may also
arrange a meeting with EU representatives about the
initiative.
A Norwegian Effort
------------------
10. (SBU) Norwegian Ambassador Tore Hattrem briefed PolChief
on quiet efforts by former Norwegian Deputy Minister of
Foreign Affairs (2001-2005) and Secretary-General of
International Institute for Democracy and Electoral
Assistance (IDEA) Vidar Helgesen to implement a Track 1.5
initiative. Helgesen aims to bring together constitutional
experts from India and the LTTE Diaspora, and gradually
involve experts from southern Sri Lanka and eventually the
GSL. Helgesen's approach to the Indians met with a cool
reception, however. Minister of Tourism Milinda Moragoda
supports the idea and has said he plans to encourage India to
engage. Another obstacle to progress at this time is the
difficulty of access to Kilinochchi. For the last several
months, the GSL has not been permitting foreign diplomats to
go there.
A South African Effort
----------------------
11. (SBU) A group of South Africans, Roelf Meyer, Ebrahim
Ebrahim, and Ivor Jenkins, have been visiting Sri Lanka
COLOMBO 00000600 003 OF 003
occasionally since 2002. In the period after conclusion of
the 2002 Ceasefire Agreement, they had regular contact with
the LTTE through Anton Balasingham and Tamilchelvan. After
the CFA collapsed, the group's focus has been engaging
political parties in the south. Working with the
organization Inpact, they plan to select a group of Sri
Lankans from the south to visit South Africa, with the goal
of building a better relationship between the President's
UPFA and the principal opposition UNP.
12. (SBU) COMMENT: Post's interlocutors on the above
initiatives consistently emphasize that their efforts could
get derailed if they become politicized through media
coverage. If widely publicized, the Sinhalese supremacist
parties like the JVP and JHU would seek to derail these Track
1.5 and 2 initiatives, putting pressure on President
Rajapaksa and other government officials and political
leaders to back away from involvement. Ambassador and
Emboffs will continue to quietly support these efforts and
encourage political leaders to engage in them as much as
possible. Post sees attempts to engage Sinhalese
nationalists in the south as well as the Tamil diaspora
community as particularly important in laying the groundwork
for future productive negotiations.
MOORE