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DE RUEHBR #0848/01 1721927
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R 201927Z JUN 08
FM AMEMBASSY BRASILIA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 1921
INFO RUEHRG/AMCONSUL RECIFE 8161
RUEHRI/AMCONSUL RIO DE JANEIRO 6288
RUEHSO/AMCONSUL SAO PAULO 2258
RHMFISS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC//J2/J5//
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RUEKDIA/DIA WASHDC
RHMFISS/CDR USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BRASILIA 000848
SIPDIS
DEPARTMENT FOR WHA/BSC AND PM/RSAT
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/19/2016
TAGS: BR MARR MOPS PREL
SUBJECT: ENHANCING POL-MIL ENGAGEMENT WITH BRAZIL
REF: A. A) STATE 57700
B. B) BRASILIA429
C. C) BRASILIA 175
Classified By: Ambassador Clifford Sobel, reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)
1. (C) Per instructions in ref a, post has remained in
discussions with the Brazilian MRE and MOD on how best to
proceed with building a fuller, more cooperative political
military relationship. When Poloffs asked MRE pol-mil advisor
Marcos Pinta Gama for his views on prospects for enhancing
our relations, he responded that there was great potential
for progress and that the situation today is vastly impproved
from when he returned to Brasilia six years ago. While Pinta
Gama's glass is half full, there is also an empty half
consisting of stalled initiatives and slowdown tactics that
have limited our engagement. Paragraph 2 lists several of
the key areas for developing our pol-mil relationship with
Brazil with comments on possible ways forward.
2. (C) Areas for Pol-Mil engagement:
-- Defense Cooperation Agreement. The DoD-MOD agreed text
was sent to the MRE in March where it remains. To move the
DCA even as far as the back burner will take high-level
intervention. Post recommends raising the importance of
completing the DCA at all opportunities, but the current MRE
leadership will likely remain opposed. Brazil's recent
signing of similar agreements with other countries provides a
precedent, but MRE opposition will likely continue.
-- Information Sharing Agreement. DoD has provided a draft
text for a General Security of Military Information Agreement
(GSOMIA) to the Office for Institutional Security (GSI) of
Brazil. There has been a holdup thus far over confusion
about the word "military" in the title. As Brazil does not
differentiate between military and non-military controlled
information, the proposal could be turned down on the grounds
that it is not compatible with Brazilian practice. Post has
been working with the Brazilian government to look past the
title and focus on defining how to share information in a
mutually beneficial manner. Pinta Gama confirmed that the
MRE will play a large role in any decision to move ahead with
an information sharing agreement (post recommends avoiding
the term "GSOMIA"). Although to date he has concurred
personally that such an agreement would be in Brazil's
intrest, his direct boss, Secretary General (vice minister)
Samuel Pinheiro Guimaraes, is likely to throw up road blocks.
Post recommends continuing to look for opportunities to
underline to the Brazilians the importance of improving
information sharing while pressing GSI for a constructive
response. The July visit of GSI head Gen. Felix to the U.S.
will be the first such opportunity.
-- Jobim Visit to SOUTHCOM. The July visit of Defense
Minister Jobim to Miami will provide an additional
opportunity to press the points above and highlight the
benefits to Brazil of a strong mil-mil relationship. In
particular, SOUTHCOM should highlight how completing a DCA
will open the door for broadening DoD-MOD cooperation through
implementing arrangements that would not require MRE
clearance. Other key issues for this trip will be reported
septel.
-- POL-MIL Bilats. Brazil has postponed the next round of
Pol-Mil bilats several times. The latest excuse for delay,
according to Pinta Gama, was to allow "time to reflect" on
Jobim's March visit to Washington. It seems unlikely that
Pinta Gama's boss, MRE SG Guimaraes, will approve a bilat
this year. As an intterim measure, post recommends looking
for an opportunity for PM AA/S Mull to visit Brasilia for
discussions with Pinta Gama and other officials. Doing so
will afford an opportunity to press for completion of the DCA
and information sharing agreement, while allowing for
discussion of technology transfer and other issues. Late
July (either just before or after the Jobim trip) or October
would be the best times for such a visit.
-- Defense Bilateral Working Group (BWG). In a familiar
refrain, the Brazilians have also postponed the BWG--in this
case, probably because of the workload generated by the
Minister's regional travel. The current plan is to hold the
BRASILIA 00000848 002 OF 002
BWG in October. Post will continue to press the MOD to
settle on this timetable. The BWG will provide the
opportunity to explore beginning a Defense Technology
Security Dialogue that will promote Brazilian understanding
of the security concerns that are behind our export controls.
-- Export Controls. We often hear the mantra from
Brazilians that "the U.S. doesn't transfer technology" used
as a reason for not having a better pol-mil relationship.
While the Brazilians' own experiences (over 90% of USML cases
approved) should argue against this, several high profile
difficulties raise the perception that our export controls
are overly strict when applied to Brazil. Post has made
efforts to clarify these problems, generally the result of an
exporter not following USG regulations and trying to blame
USG policy, but such efforts have not prevented these
problems being repeatedly raised with the Ambassador and
other Mission personnel. Post recommends that part of a PM
Assistant Secretary visit be a team from PM/DDTC, PM/RSAT,
DTSA and Commerce to brief the Brazilians on U.S. policies
and seek to clarify that the U.S. routinely transfers
military technology to partner states, but in accordance with
set procedures. We should also use Brazilian interest in
acquiring F-18 fighter aircraft (reported septel) as a means
to demonstrate that we have no difficilties transferring some
of the best U.S. military technology to Brazil.
-- Defense Industry Dialogue. As suggested in reftels, such
a dialogue would offer opportunities for partnership outside
of government lanes and should be encouraged where possible.
-- Professional Civilian Training. Post supports the idea
contained in reftel to seek means to provide professional
training to Brazil's nascent Defense Ministry Civil Service.
As the MOD is a comparatively new ministry, its civilian
employees lack the experience and professional skills needed
to make the Ministry effective. Post suggests seeking
appropriate USG resources and opportunities to increase MOD
professional expertise, perhaps through reciprocal visits and
exchanges of information. This could be an appropriate
subject for discussion at the next BWG.
SOBEL