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DE RUEHBR #0843/01 1712037
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P 192037Z JUN 08
FM AMEMBASSY BRASILIA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1914
INFO RHMFIUU/HQ USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
RUEHRI/AMCONSUL RIO DE JANEIRO 6282
RUEHSO/AMCONSUL SAO PAULO 2252
RUEHRG/AMCONSUL RECIFE 8156
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 BRASILIA 000843
SENSITIVE
SIPDIS
STATE FOR EEB/CIP/TS: SLETT, DHAY
E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: ECON ECPS MARR PINR TSPA BR
SUBJECT: BRAZIL: SATELLITE PIRACY MONITORING HAS BEGUN--SLOWLY
SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED - PLEASE PROTECT ACCORDINGLY
REF: (A) GSarrano/DMay/SLett e-mails 16 June, 28 May 2008
(B) Letter to ANATEL 13 May 2008
(C) STATE 29253
1. (SBU) Summary: Following up on Ref. C demarche regarding U.S.
military satellite interference by Brazilian radio operators,
Brazilian telecommunications regulatory agency, ANATEL POC indicated
during a telcon on 9 June that monitoring will take place over the
next at least two months and then a plan to arrest and prosecute the
perpetrators will be worked out with Federal Police in order to
attack the problem comprehensively. Post believes this timeframe is
not ideal from USG perspective. Post recommends interagency
provide, if possible, information requested by GOB to assist its
investigation efforts (see para 8). End Summary.
2. (SBU) Econoff spoke with Nei Jobson da Costa Carneiro
("Jobson"), a Regulation Technician with the ANATEL division which
controls radio frequency spectrum, on 28 May and telephoned Jobson
again on 9 June. Until further notice, Jobson is our ANATEL POC on
this issue, tel. # is 55-61-2312-1751, cell 55-61-9117-7200.
3. (SBU) Jobson indicated ANATEL is taking this situation very
seriously and has developed a "synchronized, comprehensive plan of
action" jointly with ABIN, the GOB's intelligence agency, and the
Federal Police, up to and including possible arrest/judicial
processing of the perpetrators.
4. (SBU) During both telcons with Econoff, Jobson stressed that the
USG needs to have patience in order for the GOB to execute the plan
systemically and nationwide and truly resolve the problem long-term,
rather than provide a temporary solution. Previous experience has
shown ANATEL that approaching this type of interference on a
case-by-case basis does not resolve the issue for more than a few
months. Econoff indicated both times we understand that concern,
but also highlighted the importance to our military that this
problem be resolved ASAP.
5. (SBU) Econoff in both conversations with Jobson reiterated USG
offer of assistance (in the form of a team with specialized
equipment available to travel to Brazil at Brazil's invitation),
indicating that we have equipment and processes/methodologies which
perhaps could be of assistance. Both times, Jobson indicated that
the GOB would conduct its own monitoring, but conceded that it would
not be feasible as a 24/7 operation due to lack of resources and in
order to not draw excessive attention to the monitoring.
Nonetheless, offers of sending a USG team and equipment to assist
were not accepted at this point; nor were offers from Post to meet
with ANATEL and ABIN.
6. (SBU) Jobson indicated the GOB plan is to monitor the
transmissions "over the next two months or so" and try to track
patterns, thus making actual engagement with the perpetrators more
effective. He said they would be monitoring activity a couple of
days each week during this time period to see what kind of patterns
of frequency interference, if any, emerge. They will also be
investigating sales of equipment, including internet sales, to try
to cut off the suppliers that are contributing to the problem. The
"dossier" will then be shared with the Federal Police and Ministry
of Foreign Relations (MRE). The GOB's concern is that if they send
a team out into the field for a large-scale operation too quickly,
and they have not yet identified all the perpetrators, it would be
easy for the perpetrators to alert other satellite pirates about the
raid. This would lead them to temporarily suspend operations and/or
hide or destroy their equipment-only to have the problem re-emerge
at a later date.
7. (SBU) When asked if the GOB could share its monitoring plan with
the USG so that the USG might be able to supplement GOB efforts,
Jobson demurred, saying he would have to get permission from ABIN to
share the plan and was not confident the intelligence agency would
agree. That said, he encouraged USG monitoring above and beyond
what the GOB can do, saying the USG should feel free to do so and
share the information with GOB in order to assist them in
apprehending the perpetrators. Econoff committed to pass this
proposal to Washington.
8. (SBU) Action items for Washington: As mentioned in Ref. A,
Jobson said during both telcons that the USG could be very helpful
if we could assist the GOB as follows: a) Supply satellite photos
of the interference (pinpointing times, locations, etc. b) Provide
recordings of the perpetrators' voices and what was said to assist
in judicial processes down the road--processes that could help serve
as a deterrent in future. In addition, in more recent
BRASILIA 00000843 002 OF 002
conversations, Econoff was told that an update to the written
tracking information on interference to supplement the report
provided by the U.S. military which went up to Jan. 2008 might help
the GOB to determine any new or increased usage, if this information
can be provided. The GOB's intent, Jobson reiterated, is to arrest
and prosecute as many of the responsible persons as possible, both
to avoid a recurrence of interference by current perpetrators and to
serve as a more severe deterrent to future perpetrators.
9. (SBU) COMMENT: Post takeaway is that GOB is receptive to
receiving any further information on the interference that
Washington may have, but probably will not take direct enforcement
action for at least a couple of months pending its own monitoring.
To date, ANATEL has not/not been enthusiastic regarding the offer to
send a USG team to Brazil to assist. END COMMENT
SOBEL