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O 190909Z APR 08
FM AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6581
INFO RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL PRIORITY 8480
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 7742
RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI PRIORITY 3143
RUEHKP/AMCONSUL KARACHI PRIORITY 9587
RUEHLH/AMCONSUL LAHORE PRIORITY 5338
RUEHPW/AMCONSUL PESHAWAR PRIORITY 4071
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUMICEA/USCENTCOM INTEL CEN MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
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S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 ISLAMABAD 001615
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/19/2018
TAGS: PGOV PK PREL PTER PHUM PINR
SUBJECT: ANP COALITION PARTNER ASFANDYAR WALI KHAN COMMENTS
ON S. WAZIRISTAN DEAL
REF: A. ISLAMABAD 1586
B. ISLAMABAD 1609
C. ISLAMABAD 1614
Classified By: Anne W. Patterson, Reasons 1.4 (b), (d)
1. (S) Summary: On April 18, Peshawar Principal Officer Lynne Tracy followed up with Awami National Party (ANP) leader
Asfandyar Wali Khan about the GOP's plans to sign a peace agreement with tribal elders in South Waziristan. While Khan
thought the document ""was not bad"" and consistent with his party's other efforts to attempt dialogue, he made clear
that the agreement was drafted by Pakistan's military, not its ruling political parties, at least not the ANP.
Responding and accepting the USG's deep skepticism with providing room to the militants, Khan insisted that this deal
was different that that in 2006 in North Waziristan. This time, there would be true penalties and, moreover, the deal
would be struck with tribal elders not militants. He said there was value in weaning away these tribals.
2. (S) Commenting on Chief of Army Staff Kayani, he thought the General had so far played a ""positive role."" Khan
suggested that the USG push for the Home Secretary of the Northwest Frontier Province (NWFP) to take back authority over
the Federally Administered Tribal Areas' (FATA) security/policing and for the extension of the Political Parties Act to
the FATA. He said the ANP had a comprehensive plan to bring security and infrastructure to FATA and the adjoining areas
of NWFP. He also suggested international donors adopt specific geographic areas for development.
Lastly, he recommended that tribal leaders from border areas on the Afghanistan side of the Durand Line be allowed to
return home to lead their own tribes. Khan will leave April 24 for official meetings in Washington. End summary.
New South Waziristan Agreement
------------------------------
3. (S) Peshawar Principal Officer (PO) Lynne Tracy met April 18 in Islamabad with GOP coalition partner Awami National
Party (ANP) leader Asfandyar Wali Khan. Mission requested this meeting to ascertain to what extent Khan concurred, or
even sponsored, the plan to open negotiations between the GOP and South Waziristan tribal leaders. The outlines for a
negotiated peace agreement were briefed to the Ambassador late April 16 by newly-appointed National Security Advisor to
the Prime Minister Ambassador Durrani (reftel A). Ambassador subsequently discussed the issue with President Musharraf,
Prime Minister Gillani and Pakistan People's Party (PPP) leader Zardari (reftels B and C).
4. (S) Khan informed the PO that a draft agreement was presented by Chief of Army Staff (COAS) General Ashfaq Kayani at
a security briefing about two weeks ago to Zardari and other coalition partner leaders, including himself. Khan
confirmed that the document was not written by the political parties, at least not by the ANP. Khan revealed that
Durrani did consult him before the announced deal this week. On such matters, Khan claimed that Zardari deferred
completely to the ANP; ""I rule the rest of Pakistan,"" Zardari supposedly told Kayani at their security briefing.
5. (S) Khan argued that this agreement was different from the one in 2006 with North Waziristan, with which he
vehemently disagreed; this time, he insisted, the deal would be with tribal elders and not the militants. Additionally,
there would be penalties for individuals and even tribes that broke the peace and no land (whether within or outside of
Pakistan)
of a signatory tribe could be used to harbor foreign fighters. ""We will be the first to know if the agreement is
violated,"" Khan claimed. He also claimed a number of South Waziristani tribal leaders, including Ahmedzai Wazirs based
in the western part of the agency, were prepared to sign the peace agreement. He maintained that the agreement was only
with tribal elders.
6. (S) The PO expressed the USG's deep skepticism that this latest agreement would not be misused by the militants to
re-group and plan for action against the U.S. Khan said he understood the skepticism, but ""it is the best we can expect
ISLAMABAD 00001615 002 OF 003
under the circumstances."" Khan was quick to reiterate that the ANP did not author this agreement, implying that the
military had drafted it. ANP, he said, was focused on ""discussions"" with ""groups"" (NFI) in Buner and Swat, districts
within the ANP-led Northwest Frontier Province (NWFP), but was not engaged with groups in the Federally Administered
Tribal Areas (FATA).
7. (S) ""We want dialogue,"" so long as the militants first give up their guns and ""state action"" always remains an
option, Khan said. Asked what the ANP would do if the Pakistan Army refuses to conduct operations against militants if
the political parties determined this new agreement had failed, Khan threatened to pull his party from the governing
coalition.
8. (S) PO questioned how weakened South Waziristani tribal leaders would take on militant leader Baitullah Mehsud.
Mehsud was in South Waziristan only every three to four months, Khan said. He maintained that Mehsud had taken refuge in
North Waziristan with the Haqqanis and was spending most of his time in the Haqqanis' heavily fortified madrassa
(location NFI) which the government had been unable to take on.
9. (S) The GOP (and West) needed to enlist local tribal leaders to turn the tide against extremism, Khan commented.
The ANP leader advocated finding ""more Maulana Nazir's."" (Comment: Nazir is the South Waziristani militant who was
part of the Pakistani military's strategy of using ""indigenous"" forces in Spring 2007 to oust Uzbek fighters from
parts of the agency -- a campaign that produced mixed results at best.) The ANP only desired Pashtuns to return to a
more peaceful time when they were aligned with the GOP and the West. However, if the tribals were targeted by overt
direct foreign intervention, he warned that not even organized, popular parties, such as the ANP, would be able to
control the reaction. Instead, this new agreement, Khan thought, would at least wean away some of the tribal elders and
isolate the ""irreconcilables.""
The Kayani Connection
---------------------
10. (S) Responding to the PO's questions as to the exact role of the military in drafting this deal, Khan commented that
Kayani's ""body language was odd"" the day the draft was presented and that Kayani appeared ""resigned to anything we
wanted."" Khan quickly added that if this new attempt at dialogue was to work, all players -- the parties, the Pakistan
Army, the tribals, and the Coalition Forces in Afghanistan -- would have to support the strategy.
11. (S) Khan said that Kayani had so far played a ""positive role"" when he took over ISI, closing six militant
training camps identified by his party and removing ISI officers who had remained in the FATA too long. (Note: Embassy
does not have information on any such training camps being ""closed."") The ANP also got its candidate appointed as
Frontier Corps Commandant, Khan noted. The Prime Minister would soon recall Constabulary Forces back from the Baloch
belt, he added, as part of ANP's strategy of strengthening local security forces. While the Army needed to maintain its
presence in the FATA and to apply all the pressures at its disposal, the institution was admittedly in a weak position,
Khan said.
The Way Forward
---------------
12. (S) Khan said that, if the USG could advocate for any policy initiatives with the GOP, he recommended: (1) FATA
security/policing be taken away from the FATA Secretariat and returned to the NWFP Home Secretary; and, (2) the
Political Parties Act be extended to the FATA. On the former, he claimed bureaucratic logjams caused field delays on law
and order decisions which were taken all the way up to the NWFP governor; on the latter, who better than ANP workers, an
ally in the War on Terror, to go into the FATA, but current laws forbade political parties there. A simple executive
order would extend the law's reach, Khan said.
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13. (S) Khan provided the broad outlines of an ANP's comprehensive plan for donors that would focus on strengthening
local security forces/police, roads and dams -- all areas where improved conditions in the FATA were linked to
improvement in the NWFP. Khan warned that the plan would be costly, but added, ""in times of crisis, you have to be
ambitious.""
14. (S) Khan wanted to avoid ad hoc projects. Recognizing that the European Union was more hesitant to work in the
FATA, because of security concerns, Khan recommended that the international community divide up the region, adopting
specific geographic areas. Developing those districts of NWFP that adjoined the FATA would help with FATA development as
well.
Trouble Further North
---------------------
15. (S) Khan expressed concern about Afghanistan's northern border province of Kunar, noting the ""fierce resistance""
by militants there in recent months. He feared a ""spillover to this side."" He also said that a few governors of border
areas should be removed; instead, leaders like Haji Din Muhammad, from Jalalabad, should be brought back to run their
own tribal areas. Such leaders would be the only authorities accepted by the tribal societies.
16. (U) Khan will leave April 24 for official meetings in Washington.
17. (S) Comment: While the latest agreement in South Waziristan follows the political solution outlined by ANP, Khan
seemed somewhat hesitant initially in expressing his endorsement to us, going so far as to turn on a television to mask
our conversation, perhaps reflecting ANP reservations over a deal that appears to have been largely brokered by the
military rather than political forces. He was left in no doubt of our concerns over the possible impact of this latest
effort to isolate and bring militant activity under control.
End comment.
PATTERSON