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DE RUEHNE #1065 1061131
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O 151131Z APR 08
FM AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1333
INFO RUCNCLS/ALL SOUTH AND CENTRAL ASIA COLLECTIVE
RUCNIRA/IRAN COLLECTIVE
RUCNNSG/NUCLEAR SUPPLIERS GROUP COLLECTIVE
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 6862
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 4875
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 2642
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 5607
RUEHUNV/USMISSION UNVIE VIENNA 1453
RUEHDE/IRAN RPO DUBAI TC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
RUEIDN/DNI WASHINGTON DC
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 6290
RHMFISS/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA 7675
RHHMUNA/HQ USPACOM HONOLULU HI
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC
S E C R E T NEW DELHI 001065
SIPDIS
NOFORN
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/15/2028
TAGS: PREL PGOV IR IN
SUBJECT: IRAN'S AHMADINEJAD TO VISIT INDIA APRIL 29
Classified By: Charge d'Affaires, a.i., Steven White for Reasons 1.4 (B , D)
1. (SBU) This is an action request for SCA and NEA. Please see paragraph six.
2. (S/NF) A senior Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) official notified PolCouns on April 15 that Iranian President
Ahmadinejad will visit India on April 29. The official said she was providing the Embassy with this information prior to
the MEA informing even other agencies within the Indian government, and before the information was to become public. She
noted that Prime Minister Singh had rejected previous requests either to visit Tehran or for Ahmadinejad to visit India,
but has now finally accepted a visit from the Iranian leader.
3. (S/NF) Comment. Our interlocutor did not explain why the Indian government is accepting Ahmadinejad at this time,
but, in giving us the forewarning, was clearly aware of U.S. sensitivities over such a visit. As Post has reported,
India's policy on Iran has been to maintain seemingly healthy but low-key relations, while conforming with UN Security
Council Resolutions pertaining to Iran's nuclear development program. By accepting Ahmadinejad, the ""low-key"" part of
the relationship is removed.
4. (S/NF) Comment continued. In Post's estimation, the reason for agreeing to an Ahmadinejad visit at this time is to
appease the UPA government's domestic Left and Muslim constituencies, i.e., asserting the independence of India's
foreign policy, as well as its healthy relations with Muslim neighbors, at a time when the Communists are scoring points
with the electorate by criticizing the government for becoming too close to America (and Israel) at the expense of
Indian sovereignty.
5. (S/NF) Comment continued. It is conceivable that this could be part of a broader GOI plan, in typical Indian
give-and-take fashion of governance, to make a gesture to Left and Muslim constituents before going ever so slightly
forward with the civil-nuclear agreement. Post notes that one theory for when the government would move forward on
operationalizing the civ-nuke deal is after the current parliament budget session ends May 9, and that meeting with
Ahmadinejad would provide a level of political cover for entering into what is seen by critics here as an agreement to
cement Indo-U.S. relations. Post is urgently seeking a meeting with the MEA Joint Secretary responsible for Iran to seek
further clarity on this visit and raise concerns about Ahmadinejad and the Iranian government. End comment.
6. (S/NF) Action request for SCA and NEA: The Foreign Ministry official offered for the Indian government to pass any
messages the USG might want to give to Ahmadinejad during the April 29 visit. Post requests guidance, if any, on whether
the USG wishes to accept this offer and, if so, what the message would be.
WHITE