VZCZCXRO8651
RR RUEHGI RUEHMA RUEHROV
DE RUEHNJ #0124 0910706
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 310706Z MAR 08
FM AMEMBASSY NDJAMENA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 6122
INFO RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE
UNCLAS NDJAMENA 000124
SIPDIS
SENSITIVE, SIPDIS
DEPARTMENT FOR AF/C AND AF/SPG
ADDIS ABABA ALSO FOR USAU
E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PREL PGOV KPKO UN AU CD SU
SUBJECT: AMB BRIEFS U.S. DIPLOMATIC STRATEGY TO DEBY ADVISOR;
ADVISOR REQUESTS INFO ON MILITARY AIRCRAFT
REF: NDJAMENA 00119
1. (SBU) This message is an action request. See para. 5.
2. (SBU) Implementation of the Dakar agreement has not advanced and
Khartoum continues to instigate violence in both Chad and Sudan,
Presidential Advisor on International Affairs Yousef Abba Saleh told
Ambassador Nigro on March 28, 2008. Referencing the Sudanese
military's bombing campaign in Darfur and its efforts to undermine
the effectiveness of the UN-AU peacekeeping force by rejecting
certain troop contributing countries, Saleh called for determined
international condemnation of Sudan's actions and for the
strengthening of EUFOR and UNAMID's mandates to control cross-border
activity. He also blamed Khartoum for using the "Janjaweed" to
augment Chadian rebel forces intent on overthrowing President Deby's
Government.
3. (SBU) Ambassador Nigro expressed U.S. agreement with Saleh's
analysis and said that the USG is pursuing a three-track diplomatic
strategy to promote peace in the region. First, the U.S. has asked
both Sudan and Chad to cease support for rebel groups and has put
Khartoum on notice that the international community expects it to
abide by the Dakar agreement and will hold it accountable if rebels
topple the Chadian Government by force. Second, the U.S. is working
toward coordinated action within the UN Security Council to address
Chad-Sudan tensions. Third, U.S. officials in Sudan, Chad, and
Washington have spoken directly to Chadian and Sudanese rebel
leaders to press them to disarm and to engage in peace negotiations
with their respective governments. "This situation cannot be
resolved with arms but through a political path," said Ambassador
Nigro. He added that the U.S. supports Chadian Ambassador Bachir's
recent indication that Deby intends to constitute a new, more
inclusive government and understands that Chad hopes to advance an
"internal dialogue" with opposition elements. Saleh expressed
appreciation for the U.S. approach.
4. (SBU) Saleh informed Ambassador Nigro that President Deby wished
to see him within the next week. He also reiterated Chad's interest
in purchasing C-130s from the U.S. Since the visit of Deputy
Secretary Negroponte in May 2007, the U.S. has not provided an
SIPDIS
update on the possibility of this sale, noted Saleh. Ambassador
Nigro replied that the U.S. is examining Chad's request and that
there is at least a two to three-year delay in delivery of C-130s.
He reminded Saleh of General Ward's suggestion, during his July 2007
visit to N'djamena, that Chad consider purchasing C-27s and promised
to provide the Government with more details on these aircraft.
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Action Request
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5. (SBU) As Ambassador Nigro is leaving on official travel on the
evening of March 29, he may meet with President Deby earlier the
same day. President Deby is likely to inquire on the status of the
C-130 purchase. Post requests: A) The Department provide
specifications on the C-130 versus the C-27 in relation to Chad's
legitimate need for military transport aircraft; estimates of the
delivery dates for both aircraft; and the cost of both aircraft as
soon as possible and B) If C-27s will not meet Chad's legitimate
needs in lieu of C-130s, the Department assist in suggesting to the
Chadians a suitable alternative. End action request.
NIGRO