VZCZCXRO3655
RR RUEHGI RUEHMA RUEHROV
DE RUEHNJ #0111/01 0851046
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 251046Z MAR 08
FM AMEMBASSY NDJAMENA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 6105
INFO RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE
RUEHNK/AMEMBASSY NOUAKCHOTT 0163
RUEHBP/AMEMBASSY BAMAKO 0900
RUEHGI/AMEMBASSY BANGUI 1483
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 NDJAMENA 000111
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
PARIS AND LONDON FOR AFRICA WATCHERS
DEPT FOR AF/C, AF/RSA, S/CRS AND PRM
E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PGOV PREL PREF MARR EAID PREF UN EU SU CD
SUBJECT: NEW SRSG FOR MINURCAT/EAST CHAD GIVES AMBASSADOR
PROGRESS REPORT, REQUESTS U.S. LIAISON OFFICER
REF: N'DJAMENA 108
NDJAMENA 00000111 001.2 OF 002
1. (U) This is an action message: See para 10.
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SUMMARY
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2. (SBU) New MINURCAT SRSG Victor Angelo briefed
ambassador 3/21 on progress since he arrived two weeks
ago, especially signing a Status of Mission Agreement
with the GOC, after having successfully for now resisted
GOC demands for higher pay and "international status" for
Chadian police and gendarmes. MINURCAT is authorized not
only 58 police trainers, but also 50 military liaison
officers, 102 UN security officers, and up to 145
locally-recruited assistant security officers. Angelo
said that he wanted to move MINURCAT to Eastern Chad as
soon as possible, despite unresolved logistical and
transportation obstacles. Angelo said that he regretted
that his mission's mandate was not broader, but that
after getting MINURCAT up and running, and overcoming
extreme GOC suspicion of its role, he might be able to
look at "helping Chad in other ways."
3. (SBU) Angelo requested that the USG consider assigning
a military liaison officer to MINURCAT, saying that an
American MLO would be of considerable utility to
MINURCAT's mission. Besides supporting the assignment of
military liaison officers, the Department should consider
assigning a civilian liaison officer as well, ideally an
S/CRS officer, which would not only underline U.S.
support but also enable the USG to learn from the
experience of the unique EU-UN enterprise to protect
Darfur refugees and IDPs in eastern Chad. End summary.
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NEW SRSG ANGELO
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4. (U) Ambassador met March 21 with new Speial
Representative of the Secretary General (SRS) for
MINURCAT in Eastern Chad, Victor Angelo. It was their
second meeting.
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STATUS OF MISSION AGREEMENT SIGNED
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5. (SBU) Angelo briefed Ambassador on the progress of
MINURCAT since he arrived two weeks ago. Angelo said he
had signed the Status of Mission Agreement (SOMA) with
the GOC that morning, after having resolved problems that
had blocked an agreement and avoided concessions to the
GOC on pay and "international status" for its police and
gendarmes. The mode of payment would be directly to the
police officer or gendarme (as UN rules required) not to
the GOC (as the GOC had wanted) but in the presence of
GOC officials and with their countersignature on the
voucher. GOC demands that their police and gendarmes be
paid more than UN rules permit and that they have
"international status" were rejected. The name of the
Chadian force itself -- originally to be called Chadian
Police to Protect Humanitarians -- was being changed to
respond to GOC objections that it also included gendarmes
and to NGO and IO objections to use of the word
"humanitarian." The new name would be announced
shortly.
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MINURCAT'S FORCE STRUCTURE
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6. (SBU) Angelo said that MINURCAT's eventual maximum
force structure was more robust and complex than perhaps
some had assumed. He was authorized not only 58 police
trainers, but also 50 military liaison officers, 102 UN
security officers, and up to 145 locally-recruited
assistant security officers. Angelo said he intended to
make MINURCAT as robust as possible given its ambitious
goals and the difficult circumstances it would work in.
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NEXT STEPS
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NDJAMENA 00000111 002.2 OF 002
7. (SBU) Angelo said that he wanted to move MINURCAT to
Eastern Chad as soon as possible. He would overcome
logistical roadblocks - UN lack of alacrity in
contracting for logistical services - by sending MINURCAT
personnel forward and seek logistical services locally.
Lack of sufficient air mobility was also a problem, given
the vast amount of geography that MINURCAT would have to
cover. Angelo said he was trying to recruit Europeans as
military liaison and security officers, to enhance
cooperation with EUFOR.
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MINURCAT'S MANDATE
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8. (SBU) Angelo said that he regretted that his mission's
mandate was not broader: He was restricted to MINURCAT
and eastern Chad. Angelo agreed with Ambassador's
analysis that the international community's attempt to
reinforce security in Chad vis-Q-vis external aggression
was linked closely to the need to strengthen the Chadian
state internally by increasing its legitimacy through an
opening of its authoritarian and ethnically-based
political system. Angelo said that it was important
first to get MINURCAT up and running, and second to
overcome extreme GOC suspicion of its role in Chad. Once
that were accomplished, he might be able to look at
"helping Chad in other ways."
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COMMENT
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9. (SBU) Angelo says he wants results and seems to be
getting some pretty impressive ones quickly. MINURCAT
should be deploying to its eastern Chad and Northeast CAR
operating area soon, following closely on the heels of
its EUFOR protecting force (reftel). We like Angelo's
idea of one or more U.S. liaison officers for MINURCAT
and wonder if, besides supporting the assignment of
military liaison officers, the Department would consider
assigning a civilian liaison officer as well, ideally an
S/CRS officer, to such duty. Assigning both civilian and
military liaison officers to MINURCAT would not only
underline U.S. support for it but enable the USG to learn
from the experience of the complex and conjoint EU-UN
enterprise to protect Darfur refugees, IDPs, and other
stressed Chadian populations in eastern Chad.
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ACTION REQUEST
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10. (U) That the Department support the assignment of a
military liaison officer to MINURCAT and consider
assigning a civilian liaison officer as well, ideally an
S/CRS officer.
NIGRO