VZCZCXRO4838
PP RUEHCHI RUEHCN RUEHDT RUEHHM
DE RUEHJA #0526/01 0740919
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 140919Z MAR 08
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8334
INFO RUEHZS/ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS PRIORITY
RHMFIUU/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 JAKARTA 000526
SIPDIS
SENSITIVE
SIPDIS
DEPT FOR EAT/MTS; EAP/RSP; INP; IO/T; PM/NE
DEPT ALSO FOR OES/STC; OES/EGC
DEPT PASS TO DOE/NNSA/OFFICE OF THE SECOND LINE OF DEFENSE
DEPT ALSO PASS TO DOE/NA-25
SINGAPORE FOR DHS/COAST GUARD/PPURGANAN AND SSTOERMER
E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: ECON ETRD EWWT ID KNNP KTIA PREL TRGY
SUBJECT: UPDATE ON MEGAPORT INITIATIVE IN INDONESIA
REF: A) STATE 13447 B) 04 JAKARTA 4840 C) STATE
107497 D) JAKARTA 01714
(SBU) Summary and Action Request: Indonesian Foreign Ministry
officials told us that the Government of Indonesia (GOI) is
still developing its position on the Megaports Initiative.
They presented to us a list of concerns, which they have
submitted to the Foreign Minister for his guidance on next
steps. Director for North and Central American Affairs Harry
Purwanto agreed to meet with Department of Energy (DOE)
representatives to further the discussion. ACTION REQUEST:
Embassy requests that DOE recommend a date for meeting with
the Indonesian Foreign Ministry in Jakarta to discuss
Megaports concerns if agreeable. End Summary.
Megaports Still Under Consideration But Concerns Remain
--------------------------------------------- ----------
2. (SBU) In a meeting with Deputy Director at the Directorate
for International Security and Disarmament Andy Rachmianto,
he said that the Foreign Ministry is coordinating with
interested ministries on this issue and that they had not
reached consensus. He shared the concerns of this group and
emphasized that they did not originate from the Foreign
Ministry alone, but from various agencies. He said that the
Foreign Ministry was a key player in the discussions,
however. Rachmianto told us that the GOI would take its time
in examining all initiatives presented by foreign nations and
that the USG should not expect a quick response. He added
that the Foreign Ministry office dealing with the Megaports
Initiative is understaffed.
- Rachmianto told us they had reviewed 2005-6 U.S. Government
Accountability Office (GAO) reports on the Megaports
Initiative and learned that the GAO had asked the DOE to
study criticisms about delays in cargo shipments from some
countries that had established Megaports programs.
- When a GOI study team visited the port in Surabaya, East
Java, they learned that it takes approximately 8-10 minutes
to scan a container using a general scanner and that the port
processes 12,000 containers daily. Tanjung Priok, the site
selected by DOE for installation of Megaports equipment,
processes 50,000 containers daily and the GOI worries that
Megaports may cause significant delays in cargo shipment
flows. He added that cargo shipments from Indonesia to the
U.S. are overwhelmingly consolidated in Singapore, which is
already equipped with Megaports scanners.
- Rachmianto said that Indonesia is neither producing nor
exporting nuclear materials; therefore, the country is not a
high risk for nuclear proliferation. He said Indonesia is
importing nuclear materials for peaceful purposes under very
special arrangements managed by their nuclear regulatory
agencies.
- He said that dual use nuclear materials present a special
problem. According to him, the detection of these materials
depends heavily on intelligence, particularly in determining
whether the use is licit or illicit. If the shipper had
proper documentation and could demonstrate a legitimate use
of dual use nuclear materials, then the GOI would not
interfere. He said that the obligation to share data under
the Megaports Initiative is problematic because, according to
GOI intelligence agencies, it may require sharing classified
information related to dual use materials with the USG.
- Rachmianto said that currently there is no legal regime for
dealing with the trafficking of nuclear materials in
Indonesia unless there is a clear connection to terrorism.
- He said that the Indonesian Customs agency is starting to
use gamma ray scanners to detect radioactive material so the
need for other types of nuclear material detection equipment
was reduced. He did not know where the scanners were
manufactured, but said that customs officials were scheduled
to attend training in the U.S.
3. (SBU) Minhajudin Napsah at Indonesian Customs Directorate
of Prevention and Enforcement told us that the gamma ray
scanners referred to by Rachmianto are the Mobile Vehicle and
Cargo Inspection System. He described it as a gamma ray
system designed as a tool to conduct non-intrusive
inspections of the contents of trucks, containers, cargo and
passenger vehicles for explosive devices and contraband. The
JAKARTA 00000526 002 OF 002
manufacturer is Safety and Security Instruments of San Diego,
California.
4. (SBU) Purwanto and his Deputy Trini Gunarti told us in a
meeting on March 11, 2008 that they would welcome a meeting
with DOE representatives to discuss the GOI's concerns.
Purwanto said it was his personal opinion that the objections
to the Megaports Initiative were not political in nature, but
involved practical considerations. He mentioned as an
example that Indonesia has no law to criminalize trafficking
of nuclear materials. He inquired about an invitation for
GOI officials to visit Bangkok to observe an implemented
Megaports program.
5. (SBU) Embassy is prepared to facilitate further
discussions on this issue between the GOI and DOE
representatives.
HUME