VZCZCXRO2750
RR RUEHRG
DE RUEHBR #0343 0721304
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 121304Z MAR 08
FM AMEMBASSY BRASILIA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 1207
INFO RUEHRG/AMCONSUL RECIFE 7802
RUEHRI/AMCONSUL RIO DE JANEIRO 5912
RUEHSO/AMCONSUL SAO PAULO 1746
RHMFISS/CDR USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL//SCJ2-I/J5/HSE/DIA REP//
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
C O N F I D E N T I A L BRASILIA 000343
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
DEPARTMENT FOR PM, WHA
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/12/2018
TAGS: BR MARR PREL PTER
SUBJECT: 2008 U.S.-BRAZIL POLITICAL-MILITARY CONSULTATIONS
AGENDA
REF: SECSTATE 20259
Classified By: Political Counselor Stephen Liston
1. (U) Mission delivered the reftel agenda to Foreign
Ministry Special Advisor Marcos Pinta Gama who indicated that
Brazil would be prepared to host AA/S Mull for this year's
political military consultations April 15. Pinta Gama said
that he needed to consult other members of the Brazilian
delegation before providing specific comments on the proposed
agenda, but offered several preliminary thoughts on agenda
items.
2. (SBU) DEFENSE COOPERATON AGREEMENT: Pinta Gama claimed
that the MRE was awaiting an "official" version of the text
from the MOD. (Note: Poloff had visited the MOD three days
early and saw a copy of the memo that had been sent to the
MRE.) As yet there had been no internal discussion of the
DCA, so Pinta Gama was unable to offer any idea as to how
long MRE clearance might take.(Comment: MRE has had an
unofficial copy of the DCA since the Ambassador provided it
to U/S for Political Affairs Everton Vargas on January 11.
End comment.)
3. (SBU) GSOMIA/GSOIA: The MRE believes that a GSOIA would
be far more useful than a GSOMIA as it would have broader
application and would be more consistent with Brazil's system
of having one government agency in the lead for protecting
classified information. Pinta Gama said he strongly supprted
a GSOIA and recommended consulting with the GSI, Brazil's
information security agency on a way forward.
4. (SBU) SOFA: Pinta Gama was cautious on the idea of a
SOFA. He said he believed the one signed with France was
more limited than the SOFA the U.S. had proposed. The
problem, he stated, with the U.S. SOFA was that it would
confer "diplomatic-like" status on U.S. forces, and this
would be impossible under Brazilian law.(Comment: this is the
standard retreat of Itamaraty when faced with accords not to
their liking; the French were also told by Itamaraty that the
SOFA they sought would be unconstitutional. End comment.)
5. (U) NONPROLIFERATION: Pinta Gama welcomed further
consultations noting Brazil's "good credentials" with global
nonproliferation regimes. He cited the proliferation of
small arms and light weapons as the biggest threat to global
security.
6. (C) COMMENT: Pinta Gama, who is chief of staff to the
fervently anti-American MRE Secretary General (Deputy
Minister) Samuel Pinheiro Guimaraes, is also Itamaraty's
recognized pol-mil expert and designated liaison with the
MOD. A firm defender of Itamaraty's interests, he
nonetheless believes the bilateral consultations are useful
and notes that it would be positive to build upon the good
relations between the U.S. and Brazilian militaries. Despite
having accompanied Defense Minister Jobim to France in
February, he avoided the popular rhetoric trumpeting the
"strategic partnership" with France and was clearly
interested in Jobim's upcoming Washington trip as a possible
means of opening new possibilities for cooperation.
SOBEL