VZCZCXYZ0007
PP RUEHWEB
DE RUEHBUL #0414/01 0501335
ZNR UUUUU ZZH (CCY AD5F3479 MSI6978-695
P 191335Z FEB 08
FM AMEMBASSY KABUL
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2880
INFO RUCNAFG/AFGHANISTAN COLLECTIVE
RUEHZG/NATO EU COLLECTIVE
RUEHVEN/USMISSION USOSCE 0012
RHEHAAA/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/OSD WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC
RHMFIUU/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RUMICEA/JICCENT MACDILL AFB FL
RHMFIUU/COMSOCCENT MACDILL AFB FL
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 4393
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO 3726
UNCLAS KABUL 000414
SIPDIS
SENSITIVE
SIPDIS
C O R R E C T E D COPY CAPTION
STATE FOR SCA/FO PATRICK MOON, SCA/A, S/CRS, S/CT, EUR/RPM,
INL/CIVPOL
STATE PASS TO USAID FOR AID/ANE, AID/DCHA/DG,
NSC FOR JWOOD
OSD FOR SHIVERS
CENTCOM FOR CSTC-A, CG CJTF-82, POLAD
E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PGOV PREL PINS MARR AF
SUBJECT: USOSCE EXPLORES POTENTIAL ROLE FOR OSCE IN
AFGHANISTAN
REF: 07 STATE 105316
1. (SBU) Post welcomed the visit of Powell Moore and LTC Alan
Hester of USOSCE on January 28 - 30 for consultations on how
the OSCE might support U.S. and international objectives in
Afghanistan. Moore and Hester paid office calls on the
Ambassador, Commander of the Combined Security Transition
Command-Afghanistan (CSTC-A) Major General Cone and held a
series of roundtable discussions with Embassy, USAID and
CSTC-A personnel. The delegation also observed elements of
the 8-week basic police training course at the INL managed
Central Training Center (CTC), to provide context for
potential OSCE-managed training centers.
FIVE IDEAS
----------
2. (SBU) Over the course of the three-day visit, five areas
emerged for possible OSCE involvement in Afghanistan which
will require further elaboration, to include:
-- Regional economic integration: Ambassador Wood encouraged
efforts from USOSCE representatives on promoting economic
integration between Afghanistan and Central Asian OSCE member
states. As the only multilateral organization which includes
Europe, the Russian Federation and Central Asia, OSCE is
uniquely placed to help build regional free trade and
commercial ties among Afghanistan and the Central Asian
states. This in turn could help open markets between Central
Asia and South Asia - Afghanistan, Pakistan and India.
-- Customs training: Afghanistan has not fully exploited
customs as a potential source of revenue and currently needs
a national customs training center. USOSCE,s proposal to
provide customs and border police mentors and trainers for
Afghanistan,s northern border crossing points, if properly
coordinated with nation-wide standards, would be a step in
the right direction. But a recent study found that customs
revenue from the three northern neighbors accounts for less
than 20% of Afghanistan,s overall revenue since the majority
of Afghanistan,s trade takes place with Iran and Pakistan.
Post urges that, if the OSCE decides to engage on customs
training, it should address national and not just regional
requirements to build a nationally trained customs officials
cadre.
-- Afghan Border Police (ABP) training: Neither the Afghan
Government nor the international community have yet to
institute a comprehensive training program for border police.
One option for OSCE would be to establish a national border
police training center to train up to the authorized ABP
strength of 18,000 (there are currently about 10,500 in the
ABP ranks, about one third of which are untrained). This
would entail significant security and personnel expenses, but
would address a key unmet requirement. A more modest
alternative would be for the OSCE to establish a regional
training center in the north to serve as a counterpart to the
future border training facility in Kabul that Germany has
indicated it may open, and the INL-run Regional training
Center in Gardez that focuses on basic ABP training. Post
believes a northern border police training facility might
prove advantageous due to a comparatively safer security
environment and the proximity of OSCE,s ongoing border
management training project in Tajikistan. In creating a
regional center, OSCE should avoid locations that could be
perceived to support northern warlords or favor one ethnic
group over another.
-- Integration of border security and customs regimes along
the northern Afghan border among Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and
Tajikistan: The OSCE should focus on developing in depth
coordinated drug-interdiction among the border and customs
enforcement authorities and police of Turkmenistan,
Uzbekistan and Tajikistan. Afghan heroin flows through these
three neighboring countries into Europe triggering reverse
flows of money to criminals and insurgents in Afghanistan.
OSCE is uniquely well positioned to break that vicious cycle.
By enhancing Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan,s
ability to interdict heroin and drug profits outside
Afghanistan, OSCE would greatly assist the international
community's enterprise inside Afghanistan.
-- Niche training at a proposed National Police Training
Center: OSCE might consider sponsoring training at a future
Afghan National Police Training Center which CSTC-A and INL
are developing. The proposed center will grow from an
initial capacity of 1000 by fall 2008 to a capacity to train
2000 police personnel by 2010. While planning is still
ongoing, it is likely that some portion of the capacity can
be devoted to border police training programs. Under this
scenario, OSCE would be able to offer niche training courses
such as border police training without the potentially
prohibitive startup or security costs of creating a new
training center. OSCE might also take on the role of
providing human rights training at the ANPTC, a role
currently carried out by INL at the Regional Training Centers.
CAUTIONARY NOTE: COME PREPARED TO SUPPORT YOURSELF AND TO
ADD NEW RESOURCES
--------------------------------------------- ---------------
3. (SBU) If it decides to establish a presence in
Afghanistan, the OSCE must be prepared to provide for all its
security, lodging and logistical requirements. Operations in
Afghanistan require extraordinary expense and OSCE should not
expect security or logistical support from the United States
or other international actors without prior agreement.
Embassy Kabul would also oppose any proposal that would
reduce or further divide current levels of assistance by OSCE
participating states. Many European OSCE members dedicate
significant national resources to Afghanistan through
NATO-ISAF, EUPOL, EU, UN and other contributions; any OSCE
project here should be supported by new resources (e.g.,
ideally from member states, such as Kazakhstan, that are not
already heavily invested in Afghanistan). Finally, we would
urge that OSCE limit itself to technical training that will
not require that it have a seat in policy fora beyond what is
required to ensure an OSCE training effort is fully
coordinated with broader international community efforts; the
international community currently is struggling to gain
coherence and effective coordination, and adding another
international organization's voice to the discussion would
not promote greater unity of effort. USOSCE should take note
that the Embassy is reexamining the BMTF mission which might
result in greater USG focus on customs and border training.
The result of this change should be factored into the USOSCE
draft proposal and Embassy Kabul will keep USOSCE informed of
any changes.
WOOD