INDEPENDENT NEWS

Cablegate: Mexican Officials Discuss Cooperation On Energy

Published: Fri 18 Jan 2008 05:55 PM
VZCZCXRO6443
PP RUEHCD RUEHGD RUEHHO RUEHMC RUEHNG RUEHNL RUEHRD RUEHRS RUEHTM
DE RUEHME #0138/01 0181755
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 181755Z JAN 08
FM AMEMBASSY MEXICO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0174
RHMFIUU/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEAHLA/DEPT OF HOMELAND SECURITY PRIORITY
INFO RUEHXC/ALL US CONSULATES IN MEXICO COLLECTIVE
RUEHSP/AMEMBASSY PORT OF SPAIN 0176
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 MEXICO 000138
SIPDIS
SENSITIVE
SIPDIS
STATE FOR WHA/MEX, WHA/EPSC, AND S/CT
DHS FOR A/S STEPHAN
DOE FOR IA LOCKWOOD AND WARD
DOE FOR A/S KOLEVAR
E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: ENRG EPET MX
SUBJECT: MEXICAN OFFICIALS DISCUSS COOPERATION ON ENERGY
INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION
Introduction and Summary
------------------------
1. (SBU) Representatives from the Department of Energy
(DOE), the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), and Embassy
Mexico met with Mexican Secretariat of Energy officials, as
well as Senior Executives from Pemex, the Mexican oil and gas
monopoly, and the Federal Electricity Commission (CFE) on
December 13 to discuss the July and September 2007 attacks on
Mexican pipelines, as well as possible areas of cooperation
between the U.S. and Mexico on Critical Energy Infrastructure
Protection. Raul Livas, Pemex's Chief Operating Officer,
speaking for Mexico said coordination between Pemex officials
and the Army and local law enforcement must improve, Mexico
needed to reevaluate the security threat posed by its
critical infrastructure facilities and plan exercises better.
Energy Secretariat officials requested that DOE and DHS
officials share the question set they used to evaluate
facilities. U.S. officials reiterated their invitation to
Mexican Energy Secretary Kessel to visit Sandia Labs to see
first-hand technological advances in U.S. Critical
Infrastructure Protection, and promise to consider the
Mexican requests. Both sides agreed to follow up the
discussion by conference call. End Introduction and Summary.
Conclusions
-----------
2. (SBU) Mexican officials outlined several of their
concerns. They told U.S officials they needed to coordinate
intelligence sharing between disparate organizations and
operating groups including Pemex, CFE, local police, the
federal police, and the Mexican Army (SEDENA) more
effectively. Mexican officials suggested they wanted work to
develop the protocols required to share information on
Critical Infrastructure Protection between these groups. As
a part of this concern, Pemex Chief Operating Officer Raul
Livas told the U.S. delegation that Pemex needed to find a
better way to work with local law enforcement, as well as
revamping contingency plans. Livas added that Pemex needed
help handling sensitive information about its facilities,
specifically, how and when to share that information with
local law enforcement. The forces protecting facilities are
segmented. There is a need to give "operating information"
to those protecting the facilities. Second, SENER and Pemex
officials agreed that Mexico needs a nationwide evaluation of
facilities looking specifically at security concerns rather
than looking at security through the safety optic as had been
done previously. Finally, all sides wanted to plan exercises
more effectively to better highlight the coordination between
Pemex and CFE.
3. (SBU) Responding to the Mexican delegation's concerns,
the U.S. delegation noted that U.S. officials would welcome
additional meetings on the topic of infrastructure
protection. They reiterated the U.S.'s earlier invitation to
Mexican Energy Secretary Georgina Kessel to visit Sandia
National Laboratory in New Mexico to learn more about U.S.
technical advancements in infrastructure protection. The
U.S. side also noted that it would like to discuss
reconciliation of security and safety, and would be available
to share experience with Mexican officials on enlisting the
cooperation of private sector organizations and other actors.
Finally, U.S. officials also suggested discussing the
transformation of the energy industry and the effect of that
transformation on critical infrastructure protection in North
America.
4. (SBU) While the Mexican delegation was not in a position
to agree, it suggested that U.S.-Mexican discussions on
Critical Energy Infrastructure Protection could also include
examining the DOE's Critical Infrastructure model from a
systemic point of view. Such an examination would help
Mexican officials better understand U.S. methodology. The
Mexican side also requested that the DOE/DHS group share the
list of questions that U.S. assessment teams use, as well as
brief them on U.S. methods in evaluating a facility. U.S.
officials pledged to review these requests and respond.
5. (SBU) At the conclusion of the meeting, both sides
agreed that next steps would include follow-up conference
call to discuss direct contacts in various sub-sectors of
MEXICO 00000138 002 OF 003
critical infrastructure protection, as well as an exchange of
ideas on how best to move forward.
Background Discussion
---------------------
6. (SBU) Following a brief presentation by Eric Puype, Chief
of the Vulnerability Assessment Branch in the Protective
Security Coordination Division Office of Infrastructure
Protection of DHS on an earlier U.S. assessment of a Pemex
and CFE facility, Raul Livas said that increased discussion
of critical infrastructure came as Mexico reacted to the
pipeline attacks of July and September 2007. Livas called
those attacks a "wake-up" call, as they showed that
terrorists could and would target Mexican infrastructure.
After 9/11 the Mexican government had developed a list of
critical infrastructure, classifying facilities according to
the importance of the functioning of the Pemex "system,"
though not their overall effect on the economy. He added
that most termed critical infrastructure in Mexico was
guarded by the military (SEDENA). The July and September
2007 attacks -- against unmanned facilities -- changed the
apparent nature of the threats that the government faced.
Almost all of Mexico's critical infrastructure was
government-owned and controlled through the Executive Branch;
nevertheless, private facilities must also be involved in any
new security protocols.
7. (SBU) Livas added that Mexico had to reassess its
internal policies, and direct resources to protecting
unmanned facilities. Emergency response had originally been
planned as a safety, rather than as a security measure, with
a bias in contingency planning towards safety, with security
measures incorporated into the safety plan as an
afterthought. The situation was complicated by the fact that
the word "seguridad" in Spanish means both security and
safety. The result was, according to Livas, that not enough
attention was paid to security in contingency planning. In
general Livas felt that Pemex was "very vulnerable" to
attacks. He was conducting an overall look at redundancy at
Pemex system-wide including at inventory levels as well as
alternate routes.
8. (SBU) Livas described the July and September attacks as
"worse on clients" than on Pemex itself. Attackers were able
to stop economic activity. Pemex had not previously looked
at the effect on overall economic activity and communities,
but only at the risk suffered by Pemex, Pemex officials would
now have to do that analysis. The analysis would have to
look at the overall consequences and the probability of
different types of attacks.
9. (SBU) Responding for the U.S. delegation Puype noted that
the DHS/DOE methodology considered recoverability. Private
facilities had to be part of the security protocols.
Security must be the responsibility of everyone. U.S.
officials must cooperate at all levels, Army, Local Law
Enforcement, etc. He said the entire U.S. is moving into
improved intelligence and security policy.
Comment
-------
10. (SBU) While Pemex and SENER officials seemed truly
interested in DHS/DOE methodology and expertise, and we
believe want to follow up, SENER remains woefully
understaffed to take on its traditional function of
overseeing Mexico's oil and gas and electricity monopolies
and this added task of overseeing critical infrastructure
protection. Working against any significant further
cooperation on energy infrastructure protection is the
attention demanded by upcoming debates on energy reforms,
Pemex and SENER's likely inability to interact with the Army,
which is ultimately responsible for protecting energy
facilities, and the difficulty of closer cooperation with the
U.S. on a sensitive national security issue. Nevertheless,
the active participation and involvement of one of Pemex's
most senior officials does underscore the seriousness with
which the attacks were taken. Ongoing efforts by DOE to
coordinate interagency response on critical energy
infrastructure (recent exercises and work in Trinidad and
Tobago) may help to pull together a more concerted response
in Mexico.
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