VZCZCXRO8993
PP RUEHDBU RUEHIK RUEHLN RUEHPOD RUEHVK RUEHYG
DE RUEHKV #2753/01 3100924
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 060924Z NOV 07
FM AMEMBASSY KYIV
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4262
INFO RUEHZG/NATO EU COLLECTIVE
RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 0007
RUEHDI/AMCONSUL DUBAI 0001
RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI 0008
RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL 0005
RUEHJA/AMEMBASSY JAKARTA 0003
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 KYIV 002753
SIPDIS
SENSITIVE
SIPDIS
Department also for EUR/UMB, EUR/PRA, and ISN
E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PARM PTER KCRM PREL KNNP UP
SUBJECT: UKRAINE: PSI Eastern Shield Exercise, October 29-31, Odesa,
Ukraine
REF: STATE 148432
SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED. NOT FOR INTERNET.
1. (U) Summary: Ukraine and Poland sponsored a Proliferation
Security Initiative (PSI) Eastern Shield demonstration, with
Romanian, Georgian, Moldovan, and Bulgarian participation, October
29-31 in Odesa, Ukraine. The demonstration, planned as the first
PSI exercise in the Black Sea region, employed a scripted scenario
in which the respective ministries and agencies of the participating
countries uncovered and interdicted the simulated illicit transit of
dual-use technology from the participating countries through
Ukraine. The Ukrainians demonstrated their capability at land, sea,
and air interdiction before observers from 26 countries, not all of
them currently PSI participants. The demonstration also provided an
opportunity to showcase the capabilities of the USG-funded GUAM (for
Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan, and Moldova) Virtual Law-Enforcement
Center (VLEC). The demonstration was the largest multinational
event that the Security Service of Ukraine (SBU, successor to the
Soviet-era KGB) and its Anti-terrorism Center (ATC) has organized to
date; SBU Director Nalyvaichenko and Ambassador Taylor participated
in the event and closing ceremony. End summary.
2. (SBU) Comment: The exercise achieved the main general goals, but
only partially achieved the specific agreed goals of the exercise:
to review law enforcement, customs, and border control procedures
relating to the control and effective interdiction of shipments of
dual-use chemical precursors and other WMD-related equipment and
supplies; to examine procedures for coordination among countries
when these items move across borders; to uncover and document
shortfalls in these procedures and recommend ways to
revise/strengthen/improve them; to exercise national decision-making
processes for interdicting WMD-related materials in the
participating countries; and to review information sharing
arrangements and determine ways to improve and make them more
effective and timely. Various defense attaches and other observers
from both Kyiv and Moscow-based embassies (Germany, UK, Belgium,
Sweden, Spain, the Netherlands) privately stated that the
demonstrations did not constitute an exercise and were artificially
constructed. The same sentiment was expressed by observers from
other countries (UK, Croatia, Japan, India, South Korea).
3. (SBU) Comment cont.: Polish MFA Security Policy Department
Deputy Director Tadeusz Chomicki, the chief instigator of the
exercise, observed, however, the exercise achieved its intended
general goals, which were not focused on testing the actual
coordination mechanisms but to foster connections between
governments, between counterpart agencies in participating
countries, and among non-proliferation agencies within each
government. In addition, the demonstration presented a limited
opportunity to demonstrate PSI principles and operations to
observing nations and to reach out to governments that have not yet
become PSI partners. With non-PSI countries South Korea and
Indonesia sending observers from their capitals, we would judge the
PSI Eastern Shield exercise to have been successful from this
perspective. (The United Arab Emirates also dispatched three
observers.) Chomicki, in a private conversation, indicated an
interest in holding a follow-on table-top exercise utilizing VLEC.
End summary/comment.
The Scenario and Program
------------------------
4. (SBU) The scenario demonstration began with a powerpoint
presentation of the detection by Polish intelligence services of
efforts to purchase steel tanks with a glass lining for transport to
the country, "Grey," in the Middle East. It proceeded as follows.
Initial intelligence indicates that a shipment will be transferred
imminently to a location in Ukraine. Ukrainian intelligence
established that the consignor is the Alena firm located in Odesa,
and further coordination with the intelligence and law enforcement
services of Bulgaria, Georgia, Moldova, and Romania develops
additional information about the links between Alena to Grey and the
other countries. The Mirea forwarding company, located in
Constantsa, Romania, provides shipping services for most of Alena's
cargo. An illegal shipment, without an export license, of tanks
from Poland to Ukraine is allowed to proceed. The shipment is kept
under surveillance as it crosses the Polish-Ukrainian border at
Mostyska rail crossing and proceeds to the Odesa-Sortirovochnaya
rail station. Merchant vessel Dana steams toward Odesa from
KYIV 00002753 002 OF 002
Constantsa, presumably to take on the Polish cargo and other
shipments originating in Moldova and Georgia. Moldova transmits
information to the SBU, using the VLEC network, that Alena's
representatives are proceeding by car to Odesa with purchases of
chemical components. Georgia also transmits information to the SBU
that two Alena representatives have chartered an aircraft to
transport chemical weapons precursors from Georgia to Odesa.
Finally, the Bulgarian intelligence service detects two Grey
citizens who are proceeding to Odesa with a large sum of cash.
5. (U) The elaborate scenario timeline allowed Ukrainian ministries
and agencies to discuss their ability to interdict illegal shipments
and respond to accidents. According the participant list, a wide
range of Ukrainian ministries and agencies besides the SBU were
involved: the Presidential Secretariat, the Cabinet of Ministers,
Ministry of Interior and Ministry of Interior Internal Troops, the
Ministry of Defense and uniformed services, Ministry of Emergency
Situations, MFA, Ministry of Transport and Communications, National
Security and Defense Council, State Border Guards Service, State
Export Control Service, and State Customs Service. On the first
day, observers viewed videotapes demonstrating how information was
transferred using VLEC and the procedures used to detect the illicit
rail shipment. On the second day, observers first watched an
anti-terrorist stop of a vehicle movement at Chornomorsky training
ground, culminating in the explosion of a mini-van and
first-responders handling of a chemical contamination. In the
afternoon, the observers saw a demonstration of SBU Alpha Troops
storming an aircraft after it had landed at the Shkolny airfield and
then toured an elaborate field hospital. On the third and final
day, observers saw Alpha Troops board the simulated Dana commercial
vessel, in reality a passenger ferry with the observers on board.
All live demonstrations highlighted Ukrainian efforts on
anti-terrorist consequence management tactics, techniques, and
procedures (TTP's).
Lessons Learned
---------------
6. (SBU) We are grateful to the Department's Nonproliferation and
Disarmament Fund (NDF), and especially to the NDF's John Conlon, for
the support provided that allowed the exercise to happen at all.
The bureaucratic hurdles that the Ukrainians overcame, however, were
an instructive insight into the progress that SBU, ATC, and other
Ukrainian agencies must still make in order to be able to cooperate
with other countries to the degree required for actual PSI
operations. The Ukrainians, for example, were unable to authorize a
representative to sign a simple Memorandum of Discussion and
Workplan, so that, ultimately, we resorted to an exchange of
diplomatic notes (a simpler procedure, surprisingly, for the
Ukrainians). The Ukrainians' ability to carry out relatively simple
procedures continues to be hampered by an extreme
over-centralization of authority. (Note: Per exchange of diplomatic
notes, the Counter Terrorism Center of the Security Service of
Ukraine will submit a report on the exercise outcome regarding NDF
costs associated with the exercise.)
7. (SBU) The Ukrainians also had difficulty with simple issues of
proper coordination. They failed to notify the Romanians in a
timely fashion, for example, that they would be unable to accept an
arrangement to have a Romanian Border Police vessel participate in
the exercise. They explained during the September Final Planning
Conference that insufficient time remained to obtain Ukrainian
government clearance for a police/military vessel to visit Odesa.
The Romanians nearly pulled out of the exercise, given their vessel
participation was agreed back in April during the mid-planning
conference held in Bucharest, but in the end, after consultations
with USG representatives, reluctantly agreed to accept the use of
the Ukrainian vessel in place of the Romanian one. We should note,
however, that the Ukrainians had no way of anticipating the May 29
decision to call pre-term elections for September 30, which made it
virtually impossible to obtain the required Cabinet of Ministers
decision to authorize a visit by a foreign military vessel to Odesa
port.
Taylor