VZCZCXRO0146
OO RUEHDBU RUEHDT RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHPB RUEHPW RUEHROV RUEHSR
DE RUEHFR #4357/01 2991050
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 261050Z OCT 07
FM AMEMBASSY PARIS
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0920
INFO RUCNAFG/AFGHANISTAN COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RUEHXK/ARAB ISRAELI COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RUCNARF/ASEAN REGIONAL FORUM COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RUEHXD/MOSCOW POLITICAL COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RUEHZG/NATO EU COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RUEHBO/AMEMBASSY BOGOTA IMMEDIATE 0455
RUEHCV/AMEMBASSY CARACAS IMMEDIATE 0521
RHEHAAA/WHITE HOUSE WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS IMMEDIATE 2102
RUEHIN/AIT TAIPEI IMMEDIATE 1338
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 11 PARIS 004357
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
FOR THE SECRETARY FROM THE AMBASSADOR
NSC FOR NSA HADLEY
DEPT ALSO FOR EUR, NEA, SA, EAP, PM, E, EB, G, WHA, AND AF
EO 12958 DECL: 10/23/2017
TAGS PREL, OVIP, NATO, UNO, YI, RS, IR, IS, LE, FR
SUBJECT: PRESIDENT SARKOZY’S FIRST OFFICIAL VISIT TO THE
U.S.: POLICY COORDINATION WITH A SELF-CONSCIOUSLY INDEPENDENT FRANCE
Classified By: Ambassador Craig R. Stapleton for reasons 1.4. (b) & (d) .
1. (SBU) Introduction and Summary: The Nicolas Sarkozy who arrives in Washington November 6 is in robust political
health. He completely dominates the politics of France. All the levers of institutional power in a highly centralized
state are at his disposal. He remains committed to a revitalization of France, through a reform of policies and laws
that have acted as a break on French economic growth. The challenge now is to put his ideas and programs into effect.
Off to a quick start this summer, with the implementation of a first series of reform measures, Sarkozy is now beginning
to feel the full force of French resistance to change. His public support as reflected in the polls is high, but has
slipped of late. The political impact of the first direct challenge, last week’s national transportation strike, is not
yet clear, but strikes in other sectors are threatening, raising the possibility of the kind of crisis atmosphere
Sarkozy had hoped to avoid, given his electoral mandate and professed openness to dialogue. The image of a well-oiled,
disciplined machine has suffered, as Sarkozy has repeatedly rebuked members of his team, including his own Prime
Minister, raising questions about a thin-skinned and authoritarian personal style. The concentration of power and
decision-making in the Presidency has made for uneven decision-making and follow-through. The prospect of slower
domestic and international economic growth and a tight GOF budget have narrowed his room for maneuver. His appointment
to the cabinet of women and minority representatives and the more populist style of his Presidency have been
well-received, but his omnipresence and hyper-activity risk overexposure and Sarkozy-fatigue. Finally, freshly divorced
from Cecilia, he is deprived of someone who (by his own account) was crucial to his personal equilibrium and served as a
valued political sounding board.
2. (SBU) While not central to his Presidential campaign, Sarkozy has quickly asserted French leadership in Europe and
staked out new positions and a role for France on the most pressing international issues. He believes that a
relationship of trust and close cooperation with the U.S. enhances France’s ability to make an impact -- toward the
achievement of what are in most cases common objectives. After five months in office he (and his foreign minister,
Bernard Kouchner) have begun to make their mark. They have overseen a dramatic shift in French policy on Iraq, reversed
declining French support in Afghanistan, have set in motion a possible “return” to NATO, toughened France’s approach to
Iran and also Russia, and promised a new one toward Africa. The top foreign policy issue for Sarkozy is the environment,
which he has embraced as a headline issue, linking foreign and domestic policy. Sarkozy and Kouchner also assign
priority to Kosovo, Lebanon, and Darfur. Sarkozy’s decision to assist the Dutch in Afghanistan is the latest
illustration of a willingness to push a cautious bureaucracy and military and to break the mold of Chirac-era policy.
Despite, and perhaps because of, convergence with the U.S. on key issues, and the dramatic improvement in the tone of
the relationship, Sarkozy has identified specific areas of disagreement with the U.S.
3. (C) We continue to believe that Sarkozy represents an important opportunity. Energetic, in full command at home, he
is determined to make a mark on the international scene. As distinct from Chirac, who advocated multi-polar containment
of U.S. hegemony, Sarkozy is well-disposed personally to the U.S. He wants close policy cooperation with us, but in a
relationship that gives France its full due as an independent player. “Alliance, not alignment” is the way he usually
puts it, although he is not beyond striking a more defiant pose, as recently in Moscow, when he stated publicly that he
would not be a “vassal” of the U.S. He will also continue to highlight differences on selected issues --
PARIS 00004357 002 OF 011
such as the environment, GMOs and Turkey’s relationship with Europe -- as demonstrations of France’s independent policy
course. His emphasis of French independence makes less controversial at home both the warming up of the bilateral
relationship and the bold policy decisions in such areas as Iraq, NATO, and Afghanistan. A distinct French approach,
supportive on many issues, but not in lock-step, is in our interest. A partner with the international bone fides that
France retains, as a leading European power close to but proudly independent of the U.S., is one that can enlarge our
ability to effect positive outcomes internationally.
4. (U) In addition to setting the scene for Sarkozy’s first official visit to Washington, this message iterates the
state of play in a long list of issues where opportunities and challenges abound in U.S.-France relations. End Summary
PART ONE: SARKOZY FIVE MONTHS INTO HIS PRESIDENCY
5. (SBU) Nicolas Sarkozy’s visit to Washington follows an exceptionally long “state of grace” (as the French call a
political honeymoon), one that only began to peter out in October, the fifth month of Sarkozy’s Presidency. Through the
summer and well into the new French political year that begins in September, Sarkozy seemed incapable of a political
misstep. His poll ratings set records both vertically (level) and horizontally (durability). For a politician long
attacked as an extremist and a divider, this was no small feat.
6. (SBU) Sarkozy’s success is attributable to several factors. While Candidate Sarkozy ran a hard right election
campaign geared to winning over the 15-20 percent of the votes that Jean-Marie LePen’s National Front had captured in
recent years, President Sarkozy quickly made clear he wanted to be a President of all the French, not just the political
right. He also made clear that his ambition would not be satisfied with his election to the Presidency. He was
determined to use the office to get France moving again -- unleashing its economic potential, allowing it to surmount
long-term budgetary, financial and social challenges. He would do this by making good on his program of concrete reform
measures, which had received a mandate from the French electorate.
7. (SBU) Immediately after his election in May, Sarkozy embarked on a policy of inclusiveness (“ouverture”), bringing in
leading figures of the opposition, including the Socialist Party (such as Foreign Minister Kouchner), the non-Gaullist
center-right, and civil society. In addition, he shattered the white-male cast of previous French governments with his
appointments of women and minorities, including to key ministries. On the strength of his electoral mandate, and with
this inclusiveness as cover, Sarkozy moved swiftly, and with virtually no Socialist opposition, to implement his reform
program, moving five major pieces of legislation through Parliament by early October. Sarkozy seemed well on his way to
proving that France could embrace change, and that he could imprint on it the “culture of results” that would be the
basis for less painful, self-renewing change in the future.
8. (SBU) Over the past few weeks, shadows have entered this unnaturally bright picture. Current polling suggests that
while support for Sarkozy remains at historically high levels (in the low 60’s, depending on the poll), there has been a
slow erosion in his standing, which has perhaps accelerated in the past few weeks. In the first serious push-back
against a key reform, French public transport unions engaged in a country-wide strike on October 18 over the generous
pensions available to public transport workers. Sarkozy
PARIS 00004357 003 OF 011
insists that this time unions will not be able to scuttle this or any other part of the government’s reform program --
while continuing to stress the need for dialogue, not government fiat, as the mode of action. However, international
economic uncertainty affords Sarkozy far less room for maneuver as he seeks to reduce both government expenditures and
taxes to unleash economic activity, while not fatally exacerbating France’s already alarming debt situation.
9. (SBU) Sarkozy’s unexpected willingness to compromise on several of his reform measures may signal recognition of the
hard economic realities. However, he risks diminishing this image of determination and command -- key components of his
political success thus far. Sarkozy appeared critical of both his Finance Minister and his Prime Minister in turn when
the former called for “greater rigor” in state spending and the latter described the state as “bankrupt” in
parliamentary hearings. Sarkozy, fearing that alarmist pronouncements could undermine the public’s confidence, risks
creating an impression of friction and hesitation at the top. Sarkozy’s close personal association with policy reform
has reduced his ability to cast aside the Prime Minister or other officials should his policies lose public support.
10. (SBU) The transport unions are but one of the constituencies Sarkozy will offend in shaking the French economy loose
from policies that have held back growth and bloated public spending. As he pushes for reforms that make it easier to
fire workers, shrink the size of the state (whose spending represents 52 percent of GDP) by cutting the civil service,
and open up retail markets to more competition, he can expect further pushback from well-entrenched constituencies.
Sarkozy has set in motion a series of negotiations on these issues that ultimately could lead to important systemic
change. But the real impact will only become clear once the negotiations conclude -- probably in early 2008 -- and the
government is forced to make politically difficult decisions.
11. (SBU) France’s broader economic environment will not make the reform process any easier. Having promised the
electorate measures that would bring an extra percentage point of growth to the economy, the Sarkozy government finds
itself at a delicate point in the business cycle. The government has already scaled back earlier 2007 growth estimates,
and most private sector economists believe the government’s 2008 estimates are inflated. Although the fiscal stimulus
from tax cuts passed this summer may give the president a short-term boost, he is unlikely to enjoy the political
benefit of a strong growth environment in which to pursue his supply-side reforms. He has also promised the French
people increased purchasing power, which will be hard to achieve. Some of this he blames on the strength of the dollar.
12. (SBU) Sarkozy is keen on unleashing market forces to reinvigorate the French economy, but he is less than
laissez-faire when it comes to restructuring French industry. The French state owns a far smaller share of the economy
than was once the case, but it still has effective control of energy and other key sectors. Sarkozy’s industrial policy
seems to be based on facilitating the emergence of key French firms as leaders in their industries in Europe and
globally. While European experience with national champions industrial policies is shaky, the French have done
comparatively well of late. Sarkozy does not hesitate to reduce state ownership in these deals. The merger of Gaz de
France with Suez creates a European giant in gas and energy but also reduces the French stake in its gas company from 80
percent to 30 percent.
13. (SBU) At the macroeconomic level, Sarkozy has been highly critical of the European Central Bank’s tight money,
strong Euro policy and he is all but ignoring previously
PARIS 00004357 004 OF 011
agreed Eurozone commitments to brining budgets back into balance. In both cases, Eurozone partners have little recourse
and France can ride for free on the budget discipline of its partners, at least for a while. In the meantime, the
President’s approach plays well at home, and often appears designed for domestic consumption.
14. (SBU) The U.S.-French economic relationship remains robust, with over $1 billion in commercial transactions per day
taking place between the two countries’ firms. During President Sarkozy’s visit, CEOs from some of the most important of
these will meet, for the first time in several years as the French-American Business Council (FABC) to exchange views on
policy priorities. U.S. firms have been almost unanimously positive about the Sarkozy government. Nonetheless there are
a number of regulatory unknowns that could potentially impact U.S. commercial interests. Among these are the GOF’s
evolving views on genetically-modified organisms, IPR in the digital environment and pricing policy as it relates to
pharmaceutical spending.
15. (C) On permanent overdrive and intense in the best of times, Sarkozy’s recent divorce raises questions about his
ability to maintain his equilibrium and focus. Sarkozy has himself spoken of his dependence on Cecilia -- “my source of
strength and my Achilles Heel,” as he put it. During their separation in 2005, a highly irritable, darker Sarkozy came
into view -- the same one that reappeared at the Lisbon Summit the day after the announcement of the divorce. How much
Cecilia really anchored him, personally and politically, should soon become evident, but we are betting on Sarkozy’s
ability to bounce back.
16. (C) Notwithstanding the debate swirling around him and his slight decline in the polls, Sarkozy’s political health
remains strong. He controls all the main levers of power: the Presidency, the Parliament, the dominant political party,
and the omnipresent agents of the French state. The opposition Socialists are in disarray, incapable for the moment of
taking unified policy positions. Sarkozy is in a position to reassert French leadership in Europe and in international
affairs generally. He (and Foreign Minister Bernard Kouchner) have also begun to make their mark, unevenly, on French
policy. The foreign policy equivalent of his domestic “rupture” are his Iraq, Iran, Afghanistan, and possibly NATO. On
Iraq, Sarkozy and Kouchner have made a dramatic difference, offering political support and associating France with
reconstruction efforts -- and prompting surprisingly little opposition or criticism. On NATO, Sarkozy has challenged his
bureaucracy -- and the U.S. -- to find a way to fashion a win-win approach for NATO and ESDP that would entail a full
French “return” to NATO, although the specifics of Sarkozy’s conditions have not yet been worked through. Sarkozy will
be calculating the political cost of any shift on NATO, knowing that he would be breaking a foreign policy consensus
that has long enjoyed the support of the Gaullist right, much of the center, and all of the left. Other issues already
showing Sarkozy’s imprint include: Russia, where he is less willing to accommodate and is increasingly concerned about
Russian intentions and objectives; the Middle East, where he has introduced a new emphasis on Israel’s security into the
inhospitable ground of France’s “politique Arabe”; and, Africa, where Sarkozy appears intent on finally making a break
from France’s post-colonial reflexes and relationships. Other high priority issues which Sarkozy will also want to
discuss include his top issue, climate change, along with Iran, Kosovo, Burma, Darfur, counterterrorism and climate
change. Sarkozy’s approach to these and other international issues of concern to both France and the U.S. are discussed
in the second section of this cable.
PART TWO:
PARIS 00004357 005 OF 011
KEY POLICY ISSUES: WHERE THEY ARE AND WHERE WE WANT THEM TO BE
17. (C) The White House has already publicly enumerated key topics on the visit agenda: Afghanistan, Iran, Middle East
Peace, Lebanon, Darfur, Burma, Kosovo, counterterrorism, and the promotion of democracy. Herein follows a snapshot of
where the French are on each of them and on some additional areas, and where we would like to move them. Our list is
topped by thee priority policy issues -- Iraq, NATO, and Russia -- sufficiently sensitive not to have been publicly
highlighted in the White House announcement, along with Afghanistan, followed by climate change, which will likely be
highest on Sarkozy’s list.
18. (C) Iraq: The sudden and dramatic French decision, days following the President’s meeting in Kennebunkport, to break
with previous policy and reengage with Iraq has uncertain paternity -- with both Sarkozy and Kouchner claiming credit.
Following Kouchner’s three-day visit to Iraq in August, the GOF has already hosted both President Talibani and FM
Zebari. Last week, Sarkozy told Talibani that France wanted to help Iraq across the board -- politically,
diplomatically, educationally, and culturally. French assistance will not include any commitment of French troops in
Iraq, but it could include training for Iraqi security/police units as well as counterterrorism forces. The French have
promised other, initially symbolic measures such as opening a diplomatic office in the northern city of Irbil and aid
for a hospital in the same area. Kouchner has already pressed the EU to become more active in multinational efforts at
reconstruction, which France would like the UN to head up. Any U.S. diplomatic conference or initiative could garner
French support: Kouchner plans to attend the upcoming ministerial meeting in Istanbul of Iraq’s “neighbors.” In fact,
the French are just starting to figure out how they can best help Iraq, especially to relieve what they see as a harsh
humanitarian situation. Sarkozy would likely be open to detailed discussion on this topic: Given his and Kouchner’s
identification with the new policy, and abiding lack of enthusiasm in at least parts of the bureaucracy, he is in fact
the best place to start. Regarding the U.S. role, Sarkozy and Kouchner do not share their predecessors’ fixation on our
continued troop presence. They understand and acknowledge the reality that a hasty pullout of U.S. troops would lead to
a worsening, not a lessening, of the violence with potentially grave implications for the larger region. We should push
Sarkozy to implement humanitarian and reconstruction programs in Iraq, starting with an already promised medical clinic
in the Kurdish north, as soon as possible.
19. (C) Iran: Sarkozy’s blunt language on the “unacceptability” of a militarily nuclear Iran, and the need to maintain
maximum pressure on the Iranian regime over its nuclear program has only been exceeded by that of his foreign minister.
The degree to which France has taken a public lead with the EU to press for additional European sanctions should the
UNSC be unable to act has been as impressive as has Sarkozy’s willingness to confront Russian President Putin over this
issue. French officials make the point that Paris has a “normal” diplomatic relationship with Tehran despite sharp
disagreements on the nuclear question. In this context, the French have particularly valued their quiet dialogue over
Lebanon, which has convinced them that, by contrast with Syria, Iran has no interest in renewed internal violence that
might accompany failure to elect a new president. Sarkozy has proven impervious to Iranian blandishments aimed at
softening France’s position or even to break it away from the P-5 1 group, much to Iran’s chagrin. The meetings with
Sarkozy offer an opportunity to bolster France’s tough line, and it can be expected that Sarkozy will want to get a
sense from the President of his analysis of our
PARIS 00004357 006 OF 011
ability to influence Iranian choices, and how best to maintain international pressure toward that end. Having just met
with Israeli PM Olmert to discuss the same issue, Sarkozy will be keen to understand the limits of our patience while we
pursue the diplomatic track, which, like us, France prefers to exhaust before considering military options.
20. (C) NATO: In one of his first acts as President, Sarkozy launched a defense “white paper” commission to review
France’s defense and security priorities; one component of the report (expected in March 2008) is a review of France’s
relationship with NATO. The defense white paper could set the stage for a possible full re-integration into the NATO
military command. President Sarkozy and Defense Minister Morin launched a public debate over a deeper French role in the
Alliance in September in two major foreign policy speeches. Sarkozy clarified that French rapprochement to NATO would be
tied to two conditions:
1) strengthening European defense structures by developing Europe’s own capabilities to plan and carry out defense and
security operations, and
2) seeking French representation in the highest “decision making posts of NATO.” The MFA and defense establishment
uniformly caution us against raised expectations, with some in the Sarkozy Administration (reportedly including Prime
Minister Fillon) concerned that abrupt moves toward NATO could be controversial domestically. All, beginning with
Sarkozy, argue that, at a minimum, ESDP needs to be strengthened in parallel. The idea seems to be that a French embrace
of NATO will ease U.S. concerns about a more robustly structured European defense, while progress on that front will
help ease opposition at home to France’s “return” to NATO. Sarkozy will likely use his speech before Congress to further
refine his public approach, casting France’s willingness to move ahead in terms of working with the U.S. as an
independent ally and partner (not automatically “aligned” to U.S. positions). We believe this visit offers an
unprecedented opportunity to identify with Sarkozy the common ground on which a mutually beneficial “bargain” on NATO
and European defense might be elaborated. In addition to addressing the substance of Sarkozy’s two “conditions,” we will
want to learn how open he is to modifying France’s narrowly military, Europe-focused vision of NATO, and whether he will
be on a sufficiently fast track to implement or in some way foreshadow elements of a “bargain” at Bucharest in April.
21. (C) Afghanistan: After a moment of hesitation during his Presidential campaign, Sarkozy now publicly highlights the
importance of French efforts in Afghanistan. France has recently stepped up military commitments by deploying 3
additional Operational Mentoring and Liaison Teams (OMLTs) to complement the 2,000 military personnel (ISAF and OEF) now
deployed (largely in and around Kabul). Significantly, Sarkozy recently responded positively to the Dutch Prime
Minister’s pleas for a French presence in Uruzgan, needed to secure parliamentary approval for renewing the Netherlands’
participation in ISAF. In agreeing to deploy a French OMLT, Sarkozy again demonstrated his willingness to move ahead of
more cautious advisors and a bureaucracy that prefers slow adaptation to bold moves. France has taken other decisions to
bolster its presence in Afghanistan including moving six French Mirage planes from Dushanbe to Kandahar. On September
10, the French and Germans reaffirmed plans to support the German-led EU police training mission in Afghanistan despite
delays. On July 30, SACEUR officially requested six medium-lift helicopters to provide rotary-wing support in ISAF (to
replace the U.S. helicopters which are scheduled to depart early 2008). France is considering still this request. We
should use the opportunity of the visit to persuade the French to broaden and deepen their efforts in Afghanistan,
including by standing up a Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT). We understand the Presidency favors this proposal,
while civilian leadership at the MOD opposes a French PRT. Sarkozy may echo recent MFA and MOD
PARIS 00004357 007 OF 011
calls for a more “comprehensive Afghanistan strategy,” integrating military support and civilian reconstruction, and
including a timeline for shifting the burden from the international coalition to the Government of Afghanistan.
22. (SBU) Environment/Climate Change: Climate Change: On his election day, Sarkozy called for a greater U.S leadership
role on climate issues. He will want to come out of his meeting with the President able to say that he again pushed the
President to lead. The Embassy, backed closely by Washington agencies, has impressed on not only Sarkozy and his staff,
but also officials across France that the U.S. has been leading and continues to lead in the fight against climate
change. We’ve impressed on them -- and Sarkozy should be told again -- that the U.S. has spent $37 billion in the past
six years -- more than any other country -- for climate science and energy research. We’ve developed new international
partnerships, part of a real strategy of international engagement to reduce carbon emissions. We’ve shown the French
that even with considerably greater economic and population growth than in Europe, we’re doing a better job at reducing
both energy intensity and carbon emissions. After the President’s Major Economies Meeting (MEM) in late September in
Washington, French officials offered to host the next meeting while expressing some disappointment with both the lack of
agreement on a post-Kyoto emissions goal and U.S. reluctance regarding market-based cap and trade measures. Areas of
potential conflict include concerns that a failure for a broad adoption of similar carbon reduction schemes will put
European industry at a competitive disadvantage and the possible French advocacy of a European imposed carbon tax on
imported goods. Despite extensive U.S.-French collaboration in developing next generation climate-friendly technologies,
the French also criticize what they see as U.S. over-reliance on yet-to-be-developed technologies (carbon capture and
storage, second generation bio-fuels, and advanced nuclear) to address emissions. France is skeptical that China and
India and other major emerging economies will take steps to reduce emissions unless the U.S. moves first. This is an
opportunity to convince Sarkozy that we take this issue seriously and have a concrete plan to make real progress.
23. (C) Democracy Promotion/Burma: Under President Sarkozy, the French position on Burma has converged with that of the
U.S. France vigorously condemned the regime’s crackdown on peaceful protesters; pushed through as UNSC president a
presidential statement supporting the democracy movement; supported toughening EU sanctions; and, bilaterally pressed
ASEAN members to take a tougher stand on Burma. FM Kouchner will have visited ASEAN countries and China in the week
before Sarkozy’s visit to Washington to push the Burmese leadership to reconcile with Aung San Suu Kyi and the political
opposition. While Sarkozy seems forward-leaning (he reportedly considered French disinvestment before being dissuaded by
advisors), thus far France remains unprepared to implement unilateral sanctions. Sarkozy, however, has urged French
companies to freeze future investments. In our efforts to work with France to promote democracy, we should appeal to
Sarkozy to redouble French efforts within the EU to push for tough sanctions against the Junta and for measures in
support of the democracy movement.
24. (C) Russia: During his first presidential visit to Russia on October 9-10, Sarkozy’s advisors were reportedly struck
by Putin’s defiant and distrustful attitude toward the U.S. and his “revisionist” desire to dismantle or undermine the
perceived anti-Russian institutional framework -- regional and international -- that has prevailed since the fall of the
Soviet Union. Sarkozy made little or no progress with Putin on a broad range of topics including Iran, missile defense,
Georgia and Kosovo. Sarkozy’s positions tracked with U.S. views except on Georgia, where he favors future status that is
short of NATO membership. Sarkozy’s visit to Moscow highlights a sea-change in Franco-Russian relations
PARIS 00004357 008 OF 011
from the Chirac era. Sarkozy has abandoned Chirac’s notion of Russia as a counterweight to the U.S., and does not shy
away from directly addressing difficult issues, including democracy, human rights and rule of law problems in Russia,
Chechnya and energy policies. Sarkozy, for example, took the unprecedented (for a French President) step of visiting
human rights activists while in Moscow. France is concerned about both Putin’s increasingly authoritarian style and
Russia’s increasing willingness to defy international opinion, as on CFE and Georgia. Sarkozy is also less willing than
Chirac to allow energy security and trade priorities to dominate France’s appoach. That said, the French never fail to
remind us of Russia’s relative proximity and France’s and Europe’s need to come to terms with a newly assertive Russia.
Sarkozy will want to address how the U.S. can work with France, in cooperation with its major European partners, to find
a new modus vivendi with Russia. We should use the meetings with Sarkozy to solidify a common approach of tough
engagement with Russia and highlight the need for the closest cooperation on four related subjects: Georgia, Kosovo,
Missile Defense and the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) treaty.
25. (C/NF) Georgia: In Moscow October 9-10, Sarkozy told Putin that France opposes full NATO membership for Georgia
(although we have been assured he did not address MAP for Georgia with him). High-level French interlocutors have
emphasized in recent meetings that France remains open to “something less than membership.” The GOF has maintained that
NATO membership “should not create new lines of division” and that territorial conflicts should be resolved prior to
membership -- and that Georgia does not meet these criteria. France is considering whether NATO could offer Georgia a
different kind of status and a different approach to regional security, possibly combined with incentives including
abolishing visas with the EU. While we are aware of reports that Sarkozy told Georgian President Saakashvili that he
supports MAP for Georgia, the GOF continues to oppose MAP which would, in its view, create additional tensions with
Russia and exacerbate Georgia’s problems with its separatist regions. It also talks about the need to define the
territorial limits of NATO and its Article 5 collective security obligations.
26. (C) Kosovo: This is an opportunity for the President to reaffirm Sarkozy’s commitment to an independent Kosovo.
Sarkozy has stated numerous times that he supports Kosovo’s independence and has instructed FM Kouchner to actively seek
EU consensus on the matter. The French also remind us from time to time that Kosovo is a European issue which Europeans
bear primary responsibility for solving. The GOF is pessimistic that Serbia and Kosovo will come to a status agreement
and is working closely with the U.S. and the Contact Group on post-December 10 actions. The French remain concerned that
while EU member-states may agree to not publicly oppose Kosovo’s independence, the EU may fail to reach consensus on a
legal basis for an ESDP mission in Kosovo. The GOF has accepted UNSCR 1244 as a basis for an international force in
Kosovo and agrees with the U.S. that it would not be advantageous to seek a new UNSCR. Sarkozy lobbied Putin in Moscow
for more Russian flexibility, but received no commitments. The U.S. and EU, Sarkozy will argue, must publicly
demonstrate that a good faith effort was made to come to an agreement. The French are not prepared to recognize
independence before the end of 2007 and are hopeful that the U.S. will assist in convincing the Kosovars that it is in
their interest to be patient with the EU. Sarkozy will likely ask that the U.S. work closely with Kosovar authorities to
take a coordinated (U.S, EU, Kosovo) approach to Kosovo’s now almost inevitable unilateral declaration of independence
(UDI), and avoid dramatic rhetoric that will further embarrass Serbia, encourage similar UDIs by Abkhazia and South
Ossetia, and put internal political pressure on EU states like Greece and Cyprus to publicly oppose Kosovo’s
PARIS 00004357 009 OF 011
independence.
27. (C) Missile Defense: The French agree that Russia’s objections to the planned system are politically driven,
reflecting a Russian view of its relationship with its former satellites that is at once “revisionist” but is also
informed by real fears of NATO encirclement. The GOF is interested in U.S. plans for NATO to adopt a complementary
system to protect the exposed southern flank of Europe from short- and medium-range threat, although it has warned that
there is “not one Euro” allocated to pay for such a system. Sarkozy will be interested in learning of the status of
U.S.-Russian discussions and our analysis of prospects for bringing Moscow around to support a cooperative effort. We
should urge Sarkozy to use his leadership position in Europe to promote understanding of the true nature and scope of
the MD initiative, one that in no way threatens Russia.
28. (C) CFE: The French government remains concerned over the Russian threat to suspend participation in the Treaty on
Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) in December and strongly supports a unified Allied position in support of the
U.S. “parallel actions” plan. FM Kouchner recently wrote to Secretary Rice to propose an informal CFE seminar in Paris
on
SIPDIS November 5-6 to promote constructive dialogue leading to a comprehensive political solution. These efforts are
seen as key to keeping allied solidarity and building pressure on Russia to recognize the consequences of pulling out of
a major arms control treaty. Despite these efforts, the French are increasingly pessimistic; Political Director Gerard
Araud was told recently in Moscow that “the decision was already made” by Putin and the MOD to suspend participation,
due in part to Russian views that it is “humiliating” to have flank limits imposed on Russian forces within its own
borders. We should welcome French initiatives to help resolve the CFE issue and continue our close collaboration.
29. (C) Lebanon: Sarkozy has not been as closely associated as FM Kouchner with French efforts to help Lebanon elect a
new president and emerge from its present political crisis, but he has played a key supporting role. Initially
unimpressed with the March 14 majority leaders he met, Sarkozy?s view of Saad Hariri has improved with subsequent
meetings. After their last session, Sarkozy authorized announcement of France?s tranche of more than $6 million for the
Special Tribunal, which France had been withholding pending a formal request for contributions by the UN
Secretary-General. Our close consultations with the French
SIPDIS over Lebanon continue, although we differ over tactics and the risks attached to any strategy that would allow
the majority to elect a president via simple majority. The French emphasize finding a “consensus” candidate acceptable
to all Lebanese and external parties and place more trust than we believe wise in Lebanese parliamentary speaker Nabih
Berri, despite his association with the pro-Syrian minority. While the French have revived limited contact with Syria to
discuss Lebanon, we do not believe they intend to go further at this stage. We will want to discuss with Sarkozy how to
keep pressure on the Lebanese to elect a president by the November 24 deadline without compromising the gains we have
made over the past two years in terms of reducing Syrian influence and reasserting Lebanese independence. We will want
to impress on him that the election of a President -- whether by majority of consensus -- by November 24 is a must; fear
of the repercussions of election of a President by a “mere” majority should not be ruled out if it is the only way to
prevent a void that the Syrians would only be too happy to fill.
30. (C) Middle East Peace Process: Sarkozy will want to hear about our efforts to convene a regional meeting in support
of Israeli/Palestinian efforts at achieving a two-state solution. The French have generally supported our efforts and
not tried to get out in front. They are,
PARIS 00004357 010 OF 011
however, eager to play some sort of role. Sarkozy has taken to using his bona fides as a “friend of Israel” to call on
it for more “creativity” and “gestures” toward the Palestinians in the run-up to the meeting. The GOF recently announced
its intention to host a donor’s conference for humanitarian assistance to help the Palestinian people -- as an end in
itself and in support of the political process. Sarkozy will mostly be in a listening mode, though as someone who has
sought since taking office to underscore his readiness to listen at least as attentively to the Israeli point of view as
the Arab one.
31. (C) France-EU: President Sarkozy was instrumental in re-activating the moribund political reform process in the
European Union with the June negotiation for a shortened “reform treaty” that will simplify some of the EU’s operating
procedures, while side-stepping efforts of deepened political integration that doomed the EU constitution in 2005. This
“reform treaty” was approved by EU leaders in Lisbon last week and is scheduled to be signed in December with
ratification over the course of 2008. Sarkozy has said publicly he wants France to be the first country to ratify the
simplified treaty; the process of parliamentary ratification will begin in December. The French will also take over the
rotating EU presidency from July-December 2008 and plan to focus on immigration, energy, the environment and European
defense during their term. While Sarkozy remains firmly opposed to EU enlargement to include Turkey, he has effectively
sidestepped this issue by supporting continued negotiations on the acquis communautaire that do not pre-suppose
membership. He also conditioned his position on EU support for a “Committee of Wise Men” to reflect “without taboos” on
the broader questions about the European future: i.e., what is the European identity, what should the EU’s borders be,
how to handle common issues, and how deep can political integration go.
32. (C) Colombia: Sarkozy promised during his presidential campaign to work for the release of Franco-Colombian FARC
hostage Ingrid Betancourt. He would sorely like to be able to achieve in a few short months what Chirac couldn’t despite
years of effort. In June of this year, the French pushed Colombian President Alvaro Uribe to release 200 FARC prisoners
in an effort to move forward negotiations for the release of FARC hostages. While the prisoner release did not achieve
the desired results, the French are now backing Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez’s offer to negotiate a hostage deal
between the Colombian government and FARC guerillas. Sarkozy invited Chavez to Paris in late November. The French admit
Chavez is a difficult political actor but accept a “bargain with the devil” to advance prospects for the release of an
iconic hostage. Sarkozy may ask us to return two FARC leaders in U.S. prison to a third country in order to obtain the
release of French hostage. We should ask Sarkozy not to take any steps that would result in separate treatment for
Ingrid Betancourt and put U.S. hostages in harm’s way.
33. (SBU) GMO Moratorium: When Sarkozy came into office not only did he create a ‘mega’ environment ministry, but he
also directed it to undertake a process, the ‘Grenelle’, involving all sectors of the economy to reshape French
environmental policies. Among the topics considered in the Grenelle was what to do about Genetically Modified Organisms,
a subject of considerable domestic concern in France. The result is that France is currently considering a moratorium on
biotech planting that would significantly undermine U.S. agricultural exports to Europe. We believe President Sarkozy
may support the politically popular moratorium in order to gain capital to use in his reform efforts.
34. (C) Darfur (and Chad, Central African Republic): Sarkozy demonstrated an immediate renewed interest in Africa
PARIS 00004357 011 OF 011
upon entering office, with France calling for and organizing the June 25 ministerial conference on Darfur, which served
to refocus international attention on that country. The French followed up with a ministerial meeting on Darfur on the
margins of the UNGA in New York in September and then hosted a broader Security Council session on Africa for
heads-of-state/government. France has been instrumental in organizing a separate Security Council-blessed EU-UN
peacekeeping mission in Chad and the Central African Republic (MINURCAT). Paris hopes to deploy this force as soon as
practicable. In addition, the French have firmly supported the deployment of the hybrid UN-AU force in Darfur (UNAMID).
We should thank Sarkozy for French leadership on Chad and the C.A.R.. Sarkozy may ask for enhanced U.S. financial
contributions to MINURCAT.
Please visit Paris’ Classified Website at: http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/paris/index.c fm
Stapleton