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Cablegate: Khartoum: Eusr Brylle Discusses Cpa, Darfur

Published: Tue 18 Sep 2007 06:32 AM
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UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 001464
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DEPARTMENT FOR AF A/S FRAZER, AF S/E NATSIOS, AND AF/SPG
ADDIS ABABA ALSO FOR USAU
E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PREL PGOV EUN SU ER
SUBJECT: KHARTOUM: EUSR BRYLLE DISCUSSES CPA, DARFUR
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Re-focusing on the CPA
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1. (SBU) In a September 17 meeting in Khartoum, EU Special
Representative for Sudan Thorben Brylle and CDA Fernandez
agreed that the Darfur crisis should not detract from
international attention on implementation of the
Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA). Brylle noted that his
current trip to Sudan had concentrated on North/South issues,
including visits to potential flashpoints such as Malakal and
Bentiu. CDA Fernandez said that the international community
must "multi-task" in pressing for both an end to the Darfur
conflict and sustained focus on the CPA.
2. (SBU) Characterizing the interaction between North and
South Sudan as an "unbalanced, symbiotic relationship,"
Brylle said that the National Congress Party (NCP) did not
want the CPA to collapse but was ignoring the proper
sequencing through 2011 that is stipulated in the agreement.
The Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM) lacked capacity
and made tactical errors. Brylle called First Vice President
Salva Kiir's recent speech mentioning a return to war "a
little over the hill." CDA Fernandez noted that while the
NCP was the shrewdest political actor in Sudan, often
out-maneuvering the SPLM, the SPLM was relatively more
sophisticated than any of the other forces in the country,
such as the Darfur movements. He said that the U.S. was
supporting capacity building in South Sudan to strengthen the
SPLM's hand but was conscious to avoid certain "redlines"
that might lead to belligerence.
3. (SBU) Brylle recalled that the EU had held a recent
meeting in which it decided to explore a broad-based,
international conference to regain focus on CPA
implementation. He was traveling to Nairobi on September 18
to discuss the issue with Kenyan Special Envoy for Sudan
Daniel Arap Moi. CDA Fernandez said that the U.S. supported
an IGAD or IGAD partners meeting to review the CPA and
demonstrate to the NCP that the international community was
"watching." Regarding the recent resignation of Assessment
and Evaluation Commission (AEC) chairman Tom Vraalsen, CDA
Fernandez said that the NCP had responded with a "classic
line: the problem was the individual, who they said was
biased, not the process. They say they continue to support
the process." Brylle called Vraalsen's resignation
"symptomatic" of a trend in NCP decision-making. After
agreeing to the UN/AU hybrid force for Darfur and
negotiations with Darfur's rebels, it "turned the screw" in
another area. Fernandez explained that while a good portion
of the problems in the AEC emanated from the NCP, the SPLM
was also responsible for seeming disinterest, often not
preparing--or even attending--AEC meetings.
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Darfur Political Process Stumbling
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4. (SBU) During a meeting with Brylle in Khartoum, National
Intelligence and Security Service (NISS) Director General
Salah Ghosh had described three "umbrellas" of the Darfur
rebel movements going into the Libya talks: 1) the Justice
and Equality Movement (JEM), 2) the Zaghawa factions of the
Sudan Liberation Army (SLA), and 3) the Fur factions of the
SLA. Ghosh had said that the rebels cannot come "at their
own will" to and from the negotiations once the talks begin.
Brylle said that SLA leader Abdulwahid al Nur, a Fur who has
rejected the Libya talks, "needed a reality check." He
suggested that the international community's continued focus
and interaction with Abdulwahid "contributed to the problem"
by increasing his profile. Brylle further stated that the
NCP was "changing its attitude" on strict adherence to the
DPA by showing some flexibility for the negotiations but that
Khartoum remained "fairly confident they can manipulate the
process." Brylle and CDA Fernandez agreed that the
marginalization of Senior Assistant to the President Minni
Minawi discouraged other movements from joining the peace
process and that his figurehead status would have to be
addressed.
5. (SBU) CDA Fernandez said that the U.S. was concerned about
the political process for several reasons: 1) the disunity
among the rebel factions prior to negotiations, 2) the
disconnect between the rebel movements and the civilian
population, 3) Abulwahid's continued intransigence, raising
the question of who could speak for the Fur, and 4) the
problematic Libyan venue, which might contribute to Eritrea
KHARTOUM 00001464 002 OF 002
becoming a spoiler. Brylle and CDA Fernandez agreed that the
Darfur Darfur Dialogue and Consultation (DDDC) could, in
cooperation with the UN, provide a mechanism for channeling
civil society concerns into the peace process. Brylle also
said that the international community should pressure Eritrea
to prevent it from disrupting the process, inferring that the
EU could use its influene with Asmara.
FERNANDEZ
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