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OO RUEHBZ RUEHDU RUEHGI RUEHJO RUEHMA RUEHMR RUEHPA RUEHRN RUEHROV
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DE RUEHKH #1427/01 2540900
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O 110900Z SEP 07 ZDK
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8469
INFO RUEHZO/AFRICAN UNION COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RHMFISS/CJTF HOA IMMEDIATE
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 001427
SIPDIS
SENSITIVE
SIPDIS
DEPARTMENT FOR AF A/S FRAZER, AF S/E NATSIOS, AND AF/SPG
ADDIS ABABA ALSO FOR USAU
E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PREL PGOV KPKO UN AU SU
SUBJECT: AU, UN, PARTNERS PLAN ACTION ON SECURITY
ARRANGEMENTS
1. (SBU) The African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS) called a
long-awaited working group meeting in Khartoum on September 4
to invigorate discussion of the ailing security provisions of
the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA). With the arrival of Joint
Special Representative Rudolphe Adada and Force Commander
Martin Luther Agwai, representatives from the AU, the UN, the
U.S. and the UK discussed a plan of action for addressing the
break-down in the DPA's security mechanisms, including the
Cease-fire Commission (CFC) and the Joint Commission (JC),
and the rise in banditry and attacks against AMIS and
humanitarian organizations in Darfur.
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Breakdown in the CFC, JC
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2. (SBU) The CFC and the Joint Commission had ceased to
function, according to JC Secretary Abubakr Rufai. The
majority of SLM representatives were absent from the CFC in
protest of a reduction in the monthly subsistence allowance
(MSA), meaning cease-fire investigations could not occur.
The Sudanese Government, which the AU claimed was "quietly
behind" the protest, had delayed progress on a plan for
Janjaweed disarmament. The CFC could thus focus on only one
component of its mandate: verification of areas of control.
While the AU had completed its verification report in recent
weeks, it was awaiting revisions from the DPA signatories.
Meanwhile, lack of political leadership over the DPA
signatory commanders--i.e. the Sudan Liberation Movement
(SLM)/Minawi--had led to a rise of anarchy in the field,
according to AU Head of DPA Implementation Sam Ibok.
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Freeze DPA or Fix Political Issues?
-----------------------------------
3. (SBU) Ibok suggested that with the arrival of Joint
Special Representative Rudolphe Adada and Force Commander
Martin Luther Agwai, the UN and AU needed to make a "clean
break" from the security provisions associated with the DPA
as part of the new UN/AU peace process. He said that the
UN/AU Joint Mediation Support Team was studying the options
for a cessation of hostilities that could be effectively
monitored. While Ibok recommended a complete "freeze" of
implementation of the security provisions, other
participants--including some from the AU--cautioned that such
an action would give the impression that the international
community had abandoned the DPA. Poloff asserted that the
problem with the security mechanisms was political, not
structural. The focus should be on reversing the breakdown
in command and control within the SLM/Minawi and providing
incentives to the DPA signatories and the non-signatories to
participate in effective security arrangements.
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Non-Military Support
--------------------
4. (SBU) Abdul Mohammed, the head of the Darfur Darfur
Dialogue and Consultation (DDDC), advised that a series of
confidence building measures among the SLM/Minawi commanders,
AMIS, and the humanitarian organizations should be put in
place. While the international community should make clear
that the decision to reduce the MSA--which was not designed
as a source of income for the movement's commanders--was
non-negotiable, Mohammed cautioned that the SLM should "not
be pushed into thinking there is no reason to be a part of
the (security and political) process anymore." Referring to
the recent completion of the AU report on areas of control,
UN Director of Political Affairs Abidoun Bashua asked if the
UN/AU could launch a program to provide non-military
logistical support to meet the basic needs of the commanders
and their families, which would decrease the motivation for
looting and banditry. The UK representative emphasized the
importance of addressing security issues with the commanders
at the local level and not just in Khartoum or the Darfur
state capitals. Poloff noted that the SLM had approached the
U.S. and the AU regarding a proposed conference with the SLM
political leadership and the field to address the threats
against humanitarian operations, the MSA issue, the
dysfunction in the CFC, and non-military support. Ibok was
supportive of the proposal and agreed to work with Poloff to
help the SLM focus its strategy.
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Action Points
KHARTOUM 00001427 002 OF 002
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5. (SBU) The participants adopted three action points at the
conclusion of the meeting: 1) AMIS will prepare a briefing
paper on the status of funding and payment of the MSA to
date, 2) AMIS and the UN Mission in Sudan (UNMIS), in
consultation with the U.S. and the UK, will prepare
suggestions for an interim arrangement for a cessation of
hostilities and an effective monitoring capacity, and 3) AMIS
will prepare a proposal to provide non-military logistical
support to the DPA signatory movements. The working group
agreed to meet on September 16 to review progress on the
proposals, which would then be raised to the chief of mission
level.
FERNANDEZ