VZCZCXYZ0010
OO RUEHWEB
DE RUEHBUL #2983 2491226
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 061226Z SEP 07
FM AMEMBASSY KABUL
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0048
INFO RHEHAAA/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/OSD WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC//JF/UNMA//
RHMFISS/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RHMFIUU/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RUMICEA/JICCENT MACDILL AFB FL
RHMFIUU/COMSOCCENT MACDILL AFB FL
UNCLAS KABUL 002983
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
DEPARTMENT FOR SCA/FO, SCA/A, S/CRS
CENTCOM FOR CG CFC-A, CG CJTF-82, AND POLAD
E.O. 12958 N/A
TAGS: PREL PGOV AF
SUBJECT: NEXT STEPS WITH S/CRS IN AFGHANISTAN
1. SUMMARY: The Embassy and CJTF-82 jointly recommend that S/CRS,
under Embassy direction, continue its Provincial Reconstruction Team
(PRT) planning process to include the remaining U.S.-led PRTs. The
process should also be extended to the Brigade Combat Team level.
This effort should be completed in time for use in the next PRT
training cycle in January 2008. S/CRS, in conjunction with FSI, AID
and the military, should incorporate the planning process into
pre-deployment training program for PR civil-military command teams.
Finally, Post and CJTF-82, in cooperation with Washington agencies
should develop an enduring approach, the details of which should be
finalized over the next 3 months. End Summary
2. PRTs are proven mechanisms for extending the reach of governance
throughout Afghanistan. Their success has been hampered, however,
by the yearly rotations (soon to be shortened to nine months for the
military) that require that each team learn its tasks,
responsibilities, and operational context from scratch. The process
is further complicated by the need to integrate the civilian and
military elements of a PRT command team. In addition, the press of
operational requirements makes it difficult for PRTs to devote the
necessary time and resources to long-term planning. As a result,
individual actions are often not coordinated as effectively and
efficiently as they could be in order to achieve a larger, strategic
effect.
3. To address these issues, S/CRS drew on proven private sector
strategic planning instruments, already used extensively by the
military services and intelligence community, to design, test and
validate an integrated planning process at two PRTs. Their product
was positively endorsed by the PRT civilian-military command teams
and by the senior levels of CJTF-82.
4. Based on this evaluation, Embassy and CJTF-82 jointly recommend
that:
(A) S/CRS should send a team back to Afghanistan by September 20 to
assist TF Bayonet and TF Cincinnatus in revising their plans and
finish the four PRTs in their Area of Responsibility.
(B) Form a second S/CRS team in October to accelerate the coverage
of the remaining four USG PRTs in Regional Command (RC) East and the
two USG PRTs in RC South.
(C) Assist institutionalizing the PRT planning process through
training civilians assigned to Embassy Kabul (POLAD, DA, FPO, etc.)
and civil-military training institutions (FSI, Fort Bragg PRT
Training, etc).
(D) Develop an enduring approach, the details of which should be
finalized over the next 3 months.
5. When in country, S/CRS will work under the direction of the
Embassy PRT office, in close coordination with CJTF-82. Mr. Kemp,
who serves as the PRT training coordinator, will accompany the team
in its visits to PRTS, both observing and assisting in the process.
To institutionalize the effort Mr. Kemp will also participate in
pre-deployment exercises with the 101st Airborne Division at Fort
Campbell, Kentucky, as well as in PRT training at Fort Bragg in
January, 2008.
DELL