VZCZCXRO6401
PP RUEHBZ RUEHGI RUEHMA RUEHPA RUEHROV
DE RUCNDT #0695/01 2332255
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 212255Z AUG 07
FM USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2499
INFO RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHZK/ECOWAS COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHGG/UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHDS/AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA PRIORITY 1452
RUEHAE/AMEMBASSY ASMARA PRIORITY 1213
RUEHBS/AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS PRIORITY 1536
RUEHKH/AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM PRIORITY 0870
RUEHNJ/AMEMBASSY NDJAMENA PRIORITY 0323
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI PRIORITY
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 USUN NEW YORK 000695
SIPDIS
SENSITIVE
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: CD PGOV PHUM PREF PREL SU UNSC KPKO
SUBJECT: CHAD/CAR: UN URGES COUNCIL TO "TRUST BUT VERIFY"
PEACEKEEPING PLANS
REF: SECSTATE 116973
USUN NEW Y 00000695 001.2 OF 004
1. (SBU) SUMMARY. At August 21 consultations, United Nations
Department of Peacekeeping Operations
Assistant-Secretary-General Annabi advised the Security
Council to "trust but verify" plans for peacekeeping in
eastern Chad and northeastern Central African Republic (CAR),
given Chadian President Deby's acceptance in principle to the
French and European Union forces that would comprise the
military component of the proposed operation. Annabi
reported that the EU Council of Ministers would finalize the
proposal in its September 17 meeting, necessitating Security
Council action beforehand in the forms of a Presidential
Statement as a political signal to the EU to continue
planning (circulated by the French delegation and contained
in paragraph 10) and a resolution (to be circulated in draft
by the end of August). Annabi deferred discussions of costs
and troop numbers of the follow-on operation, in which the UN
would assume military control from the EU, saying only that
the cost estimates would be small compared to that of the
hybrid operation in Darfur. Annabi said the UN did not see a
need to include formed police units as part of its police
deployment at this time and seemed relieved to avoid command
and control issues that formed units would likely trigger.
Members were generally supportive of the proposed operation
and expressed willingness to engage constructively in an
August 22 Experts Meeting on the PRST so that it could be
adopted by the August 25 departure for the region of a joint
UN-EU assessment team. END SUMMARY.
ANNABI OUTLINES REVISED PEACEKEEPING CONCEPT
--------------------------------------------
2. (SBU) At August 21 Security Council consultations, United
Nations (UN) Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO)
Assistant-Secretary-General (A/SYG) Annabi outlined the three
key features of the revised concept for Chad and CAR
peacekeeping, per the August 10 Secretary-General's (SYG)
Report (S/2007/488), versus the SYG's February 23 Report
(S/2007/97). The first was that the military component of
the operation would be provided by the European Union (EU)
for the first 12 months, vice the UN, based on discussions
between French FM Kouchner and Chadian President Deby, in
which Deby agreed "in principle" to such a concept. The
second was that the force would have no direct involvement in
cross-border activities with Sudan. The third was that
Chadian gendarmes would be mentored, trained, equipped, paid
and monitored by the UN but would fall under national
authority.
3. (SBU) A/SYG Annabi went on to describe the three pillars
of the proposed deployment. The first such pillar would be a
multidimensional UN presence (including inter alia political
affairs officers, civil affairs officers and human rights
officers), to be based in large part in a forward
headquarters in Abeche, eastern Chad, with field offices in
Iriba, Farchana and Goz Beida. The second pillar would be a
police component comprised of UN-trained Chadian gendarmes
mandated to maintain law and order in and around the 12
refugee camps, IDP concentrations and civilian populations at
risk in eastern Chad, with six "jurisdictions" in Abeche,
Bahai, Guereda, Iriba, Farchana and Goz Beida. The final
pillar would be an EU military force mandated to assist in
protecting civilians at risk and to facilitate the provision
of humanitarian assistance. Annabi expected the concept of
operations for this pillar to be finalized by the EU by
mid-September, after which the force would deploy for an
initial 12-month period, with follow-on arrangements to be
decided by a joint EU-UN assessment at the six-month mark.
4. (SBU) A/SYG foresaw coordination of the EU-UN operation
with the UN Country Team in Chad in the areas of assisting in
the protection of civilians at risk; of selecting, training
and advising Chadian law enforcement elements; of liaising
with relevant national military and judicial organs; of
facilitating the provision of humanitarian assistance; of
liaising with the Government of Chad and with UNHCR to
re-locate refugee camps in close proximity to the Darfur
border; of protecting UN personnel, facilities and equipment
and ensuring their freedom of movement; of liaising with the
Sudanese Government, the African Union (AU), the AU Mission
USUN NEW Y 00000695 002.2 OF 004
in the Sudan (AMIS), the UN-AU Mission in the Sudan (UNAMID),
the UN Peace-building Office in CAR (BONUCA) and the
Community of Sahel and Saharan States (CENSAD); and of
promoting reconciliation and cohesion. Annabi noted that a
Special Representative of the SYG would be appointed as
overall Head of Mission and that the UN team based in
N'djamena would serve as the nucleus of the operation.
5. (SBU) On timelines, A/SYG Annabi reported the EU Council
of Ministers would meet September 17 to consider the
arrangements, necessitating coordinated efforts among the UN,
EU and Government of Chad. Annabi noted that in addition to
weekly UN-EU video conferences on the proposed Chad/CAR
operation, a joint EU-UN information-gathering mission would
go to N'Djamena, Abeche and Birao from August 25 to September
1 to inform the "Crisis Management Concept" to be presented
to the EU Ministers on September 17. Once the EU approved
the military component, Annabi explained that the SYG would
submit another report to the Security Council containing
specific recommendations on EU troop numbers and structure
and strength of the UN component of the operation, in order
to inform a draft resolution. In response to a question from
Ambassador Wolff, Annabi deferred discussion of cost
estimates to the forthcoming SYG report, saying that the cost
for the initial UN component (SRSG and office, 350
international police) would be limited but would increase
"dramatically" if/when the UN absorbed the military component
from the EU. Still, Annabi assured, the price tag would be
small compared to that of UNAMID in neighboring Darfur. Also
in response to Ambassador Wolff's question, Annabi said the
UN did not see a need to include formed police units as part
of its police deployment at this time, adding however that
had they been necessary, they would have fallen under UN
command and control.
6. (SBU) A/SYG Annabi acknowledged that more work remained to
be done with Chadian President Deby to ensure his support for
the hand-over of the military part of the operation to the UN
after the initial 12-month deployment but advised the Council
to "trust but verify," meaning, he said, trust the EU and FM
Kouchner but verify that Deby's agreement in principle
translates to realization of the plan. Annabi hoped that
some EU elements would transition to the UN force after 12
months to give "immediate credibility" to the operation.
Annabi added the faster the follow-on deployment could be
clarified, the better it would be for the UN, not least in
identifying troop- and police-contributors. He noted that
Deby had opposed from the outset any deployment at the border
with Sudan, but Annabi was optimistic that the presence would
nonetheless have a stabilizing effect where deployed in
eastern Chad.
MEMBERS EXPRESS SUPPORT FOR PROPOSED PLAN AND PRST
--------------------------------------------- -----
7. (SBU) Members were generally supportive of the proposed
operation. French Permanent Representative (PR) Ripert
detailed the extent of French engagement with the Governments
of Chad, CAR and Sudan on improving the security situation in
the region, which resulted in "unanimous support of all
governments concerned." He urged the Council to seize this
opportunity to act and accordingly circulated a draft
Presidential Statement (PRST), which he hoped could be
adopted by the time a joint UN-EU assessment team would
depart for the region on August 25. Ripert added that his
delegation would submit by the end of August a draft
resolution based on the three pillars A/SYG Annabi had
outlined (NOTE: French Poloff told USUN on August 21 that the
French Mission hoped the draft resolution would be adopted by
September 14, ahead of the September 17 EU Council Ministers'
meeting. END NOTE). The Belgian delegate advised that any
draft resolution be clear on the requirement for coordination
structures between the UN and the EU, on command and control,
and on logistical coordination between all components of the
operation. The Slovakian delegate was firm that the force be
given Chapter VII mandate authority to protect civilians at
risk.
8. (SBU) Several delegations, including South Africa and
Indonesia, spoke to the need for the force to support the
political processes in Chad and CAR, despite A/SYG Annabi's
USUN NEW Y 00000695 003.2 OF 004
reminder that President Deby had opposed any involvement of
the proposed force in the internal dimension of the Chadian
problem and that to do otherwise could jeopardize Deby's
agreement to the deployment. Russian Deputy PR Dolgov,
supported by the Qatari representative, urged solicitation of
the Sudanese Government's opinion on Chad/CAR deployment so
as to foster cooperation on strengthening the border regime
and movement of refugees. A/SYG Annabi responded that the UN
had been working transparently with Sudan since the outset
and that an upcoming visit by SYG Ban to Sudan, Chad and
Libya would reinforce this spirit. The Chinese and Qatari
delegates similarly urged Annabi to secure Chadian consent
for any deployment.
9. (SBU) Members expressed willingness to engage
constructively in an August 22 Experts Meeting on the PRST so
that it could be adopted by the time a joint UN-EU assessment
team would depart for the region on August 25.
10. (U) Begin draft PRST text:
The Security Council reiterates its concern about the
prevailing insecurity along the borders between the Sudan,
Chad and the Central African Republic and about the threat
which this poses to the civilian population and the conduct
of humanitarian operations.
Following the adoption of resolution 1769 (2007), the
Security Council welcomes the report of the Secretary-General
dated 10 August 2007 (S/2007/488), which proposes a revised
concept of operations aimed at contributing to the protection
of refugees, internally displaced persons and civilian
populations at risk in eastern Chad and the north-eastern
Central African Republic.
The Security Council expresses its readiness to authorize the
establishment of the proposed multidimensional presence in
eastern Chad and the north-eastern Central African Republic,
on the basis of the recommendations contained in the
Secretary-General's report. The Council takes note of the
SIPDIS
Secretary-General's observations and proposals relating to
SIPDIS
military elements for the protection of the multidimensional
presence. It welcomes the readiness of the European Union,
expressed at the meeting of the Council of the European Union
on 23 and 24 July 2007, to consider the establishment of an
operation in support of the United Nations presence in
eastern Chad and the north-eastern Central African Republic.
The Security Council encourages the Secretary-General and the
European Union, as far as they are concerned and in
consultation with the Governments of Chad and the Central
African Republic, to proceed with preparations for this
multidimensional presence. It requests the Secretary-General
to study, in consultations with the Governments of Chad and
the Central African Republic, the follow-on arrangements for
this multidimensional presence after a period of 12 months,
in particular on the basis of a joint assessment of
requirements to be conducted by the United Nations
Organization and the European Union six months after its
deployment.
The Security Council requests the Secretary-General to
continue to keep it closely informed of the preparations for
the multidimensional presence.
11. (U) End draft PRST text.
12. (SBU) COMMENT. An issue that will require consistent
follow-up once deployment begins is that of accountability
for UN-trained Chadian gendarmes. Annabi assured that the UN
would conclude a memorandum of understanding (MOU) with the
Government of Chad on the responsibilities and modalities of
the revised peacekeeping concept to ensure the type of
"quality control" over the gendarmes that UNHCR (which
currently trains gendarmes in the refugee camps) lacks.
Annabi saw the oversight role of UN civilian police and
rotation of gendarmes as direct means of verifying the
gendarmes' conformity with UN performance standards.
Nonetheless, we should ensure that any MOU signed is clear on
this point so as to avoid problems in the future. END
USUN NEW Y 00000695 004.2 OF 004
COMMENT.
KHALILZAD