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DE RUCNDT #0580/01 1972218
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 162218Z JUL 07
FM USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2272
INFO RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RUEHZO/AFRICAN UNION COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RUEHGG/UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RUEHDS/AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA IMMEDIATE 1391
RUEHAE/AMEMBASSY ASMARA IMMEDIATE 1158
RUEHBS/AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS IMMEDIATE 1479
RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO IMMEDIATE 0859
RUEHKH/AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM IMMEDIATE 0805
RUEHLI/AMEMBASSY LISBON IMMEDIATE 0492
RUEHNJ/AMEMBASSY NDJAMENA IMMEDIATE 0310
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI IMMEDIATE
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC IMMEDIATE
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 USUN NEW YORK 000580
SIPDIS
SENSITIVE
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: ET PGOV PREL SU UNSC KPKO
SUBJECT: UNSC/DARFUR: HYBRID JOINT SPECIAL REP SEEMS SHAKY
ON TASKS AHEAD
USUN NEW Y 00000580 001.2 OF 002
1. (SBU) SUMMARY. In a July 16 discussion with Ambassador
Khalilzad, Joint Special Representative (JSR) Rodolphe Adada
offered no assurance that he would be able to reconcile
competing strategic directives from the United Nations (UN)
and the African Union (AU) over administration of the hybrid
operation in Darfur were such a situation to arise. Adada's
Special Assistant told Poloff privately that Adada had "big
concerns" over hybrid management. UN Department of
Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) Poloff separately
characterized Adada's concerns as involving his desire to
bring all humanitarian activities in Darfur under the hybrid
umbrella, despite the traditional reluctance on the part of
the humanitarian community there to affiliate itself with an
operation of a military nature. Adada will be in Washington
on July 17 and is seeking meetings with A/S Frazer and others
as appropriate. Adada will then travel to London, Lisbon,
Brussels and Cairo before returning to Sudan o/a July 27.
END SUMMARY.
2. (SBU) Participants in this meeting were JSR Adada, Adada's
Special Assistant Omar Kane (Mauritania), Ambassador
Khalilzad, Ambassador Sanders and Poloff.
3. (SBU) In a July 16 discussion with Ambassador Khalilzad,
JSR Adada emphasized the importance of including in the
hybrid draft resolution a reference to the June 12 Addis
Ababa high-level technical discussion between the AU, UN and
the Sudanese Government of National Unity (GNU). When asked
by Ambassador Khalilzad whether these discussions reflected a
substantive change in focus with regard to the AU-UN June 5
report on the hybrid, Adada said firmly no. Adada mentioned
he had met with African members of the Security Council with
AU Commission Chairperson Konare on July 13 but offered no
read-out, other than to say the participants were still
trying to sell key aspects of the draft resolution to Sudan.
4. (SBU) JSR Adada made clear that Chapter VII and command
and control language should be included in the draft
resolution text. When asked by Ambassador Sanders about how
he would respond in the event he received conflicting
strategic directives from AU and UN leadership with regard to
hybrid operations, Adada offered no concrete assurance he
could reconcile the two, saying, "But they (the AU and the
UN) have to agree. If not . . . This could not happen.
There is no solution." Adada agreed with Ambassador
Khalilzad that this possibility spoke to the need for a
single chain of command to the Force Commander.
5. (SBU) Adada's assistant Kane emphasized two main points
important to the JSR. First was the need to support the
AU-UN roadmap for the Darfur political process and to take
into account new IDP movements and emerging Arab community
leadership. Second, Kane stressed that development
activities, particularly in the realms of medical, economic,
education, health and water assistance must occur in parallel
with this peace effort. Kane acknowledged USG efforts in the
field in Darfur in this regard and called for their
continuation. When asked how reported GNU allocation of
Darfur lands to non-Darfuri Arabs could affect these
development goals, Adada claimed to know nothing about such
activities, although Kane admitted this type of activity was
a problem.
6. (SBU) JSR Adada told USUN he planned to return to Sudan
o/a July 27, with stops on the way in London, Lisbon,
Brussels and Cairo (NOTE: DPKO Poloff told Poloff privately
that it was difficult to convince Adada, a former FM of the
Republic of Congo, of the need for him to be in El Fasher,
rather than in some other more comfortable locale.
7. (SBU) COMMENT. Adada's Special Assistant told Poloff
privately that Adada had "big concerns" over hybrid
management, which DPKO Poloff separately clarified to be
Adada's desire to bring all humanitarian activities in Darfur
under the hybrid umbrella, despite the traditional reluctance
on the part of the humanitarian community there to affiliate
itself with an operation of a military nature. DPKO noted
that this insistence was not where Adada would be facing his
USUN NEW Y 00000580 002.2 OF 002
most daunting challenges in Darfur, citing his
responsibilities for the day-to-day management of an over
20,000-troop force once the hybrid was stood up. Adada
indeed has his work cut out for him, and it was not clear to
USUN that he fully grasps the nuances of the road ahead in
Darfur. His meetings in Washington could be very useful in
ensuring that he is more completely aware of and prepared for
the task of managing the hybrid. END COMMENT.
KHALILZAD