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DE RUCNDT #0579/01 1972217
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 162217Z JUL 07
FM USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2269
INFO RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RUEHZO/AFRICAN UNION COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RUEHGG/UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RUEHDS/AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA IMMEDIATE 1388
RUEHAE/AMEMBASSY ASMARA IMMEDIATE 1155
RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO IMMEDIATE 0856
RUEHKH/AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM IMMEDIATE 0802
RUEHNR/AMEMBASSY NAIROBI IMMEDIATE 0630
RUEHNJ/AMEMBASSY NDJAMENA IMMEDIATE 0307
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI IMMEDIATE
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC IMMEDIATE
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 USUN NEW YORK 000579
SIPDIS
SENSITIVE
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PGOV PREL SU UNSC KPKO
SUBJECT: KHARTOUM TIGHTENS GRIP ON AU AND UNSC OVER HYBRID
REF: USUN NEW YORK 000340
USUN NEW Y 00000579 001.2 OF 003
1. (SBU) SUMMARY. The extent of the influence of Sudan's
Government of National Unity (GNU) over the hybrid draft
resolution was apparent during July 13 meetings at the United
Nations Security Council (UNSC) in which African Union (AU)
Commission Chairperson Konare participated. In a private
meeting with Ambassador Khalilzad prior to the UNSC session,
Konare urged the USG to recognize GNU efforts on Darfur and
to create a new environment of trust. He said compromise was
needed on the draft text to allay GNU "apprehensions" about
mentioning Chapter VII and UNSCR 1706. Konare warned that
these references in any draft would result in an impasse on
adopting the text. In the follow-on "informal dialogue"
between Konare and the full Council, South Africa, Congo,
Russia, Indonesia, Qatar and China all railed against the
draft text against the draft text, insisting that it focus
only on mandating the hybrid; Qatari Permanent Representative
(PR) al-Nasser went so far as to say the draft should be
"completely re-worked," a statement suggesting Qatar might
repeat the tactic it employed during April negotiations on
the UNMIS mandate renewal resolution of floating a competing
text (reftel). This intense pressure proved too much for
Ghana, which announced it would no longer co-sponsor the
resolution. No further Experts Meetings on the draft text
have been scheduled. Ambassador Khalilzad will have separate
meetings on July 16 with Joint Special Representative
Rodolphe Adada and Sudanese PR Abdalmahmood Abdalhaleem. END
SUMMARY.
KONARE ARTICULATES KHARTOUM'S DEMANDS ON DRAFT RESOLUTION
--------------------------------------------- ------------
2. (SBU) Ambassador Khalilzad met on July 13 with AU
Commission Chairperson Konare, who was accompanied by AU
Peace and Security Commissioner Said Djinnit, AU Mission PR
Lila Ratsfandrihamanana and Special Assistant Abdoul Kader
Toure. Ambassador Khalilzad pushed Konare for his support on
the hybrid draft resolution, specifically asking him to agree
to proceed as quickly as possible, to specify a single UN
chain of command (with strategic directives coming from the
AU and the UN but operational instructions coming only from
the UN) and to mandate the force under Chapter VII.
Ambassador Khalilzad sought clarification from Konare on the
deployment of two additional battalions for Heavy Support
Package force protection and on African troop generation for
the hybrid. Ambassador Khalilzad emphasized that the USG
harbored no ill will toward the GNU and wanted to work
constructively on the problem of Darfur, which both the USG
and the GNU had a mutual interest in solving.
3. (SBU) Konare expressed appreciation for Ambassador
Khalilzad's message, as well as for the reception he had
received in Washington on July 11. On timelines, Konare
stressed the need for all to move quickly on the hybrid,
especially the UN which he commented "was not easy to work
with" (NOTE: The UN levels the same charge against the AU.
END NOTE). Konare agreed with Ambassador Khalilzad on the
necessity for unity of command and control for the hybrid and
said that specifying this in the resolution would not be a
problem. In agreeing with these two points, however, Konare
urged the USG to recognize GNU efforts on Darfur without
writing the GNU a "blank check" absolving it from any
responsibility for the security situation on the ground, and
to create a new environment of trust with Khartoum.
4. (SBU) To achieve this trust, Konare said the UNSC must
consider Sudan's "apprehensions" on the draft resolution,
which, according to Konare, were three-fold. First, the
resolution should take into account the "clarifications" made
on the hybrid during June 11-12 AU-UN-GNU technical
discussions in Addis Ababa (NOTE: Konare did not specify what
these clarifications were when asked by Ambassador Khalilzad.
END NOTE). Second, the resolution should avoid reference to
Chapter VII, which Konare called politically important for
the USG but just as sensitive for the GNU. Ambassador
Khalilzad pointed out the philosophical divide among Members
on this issue and stressed that the debate was not
Sudan-specific. Ambassador Khalilzad warned that it would be
difficult for us to be flexible on this point, given the need
to justify to Congress a peacekeeping operation of the
USUN NEW Y 00000579 002.2 OF 003
hybrid's size and cost. UKUN later reported to Poloff that
Djinnit told the UK he did not expect Chapter VII to
ultimately be a show-stopper on the draft. Finally, the GNU
wanted deleted mention of resolutions not accepted by
Khartoum; i.e., UNSCR 1706. Konare emphasized that both the
AU and the GNU were anxious for the UNSC to adopt the hybrid
resolution as soon as possible and warned that failing to
consider Khartoum's concerns would result in an impasse on
adoption of the text.
5. (SBU) Ambassador Khalilzad solicited Konare's assistance
in maintaining African ownership of the draft resolution,
mentioning the fact that Ghana was under pressure from
unknown sources to abandon its co-sponsorship (NOTE: Ghana
announced in subsequent Council consultations that on
instructions from Accra, it could no longer co-sponsor the
draft. END NOTE). Konare agreed that AU leadership was
"fundamental" and said he would meet with African UNSC
Members to try to reach agreement on a position. Konare said
Ghana would be perceived as being controlled by the UK if it
maintained its co-sponsorship while divisions in positions
with other African Council Members persisted. "If the
Africans aren't united," Konare warned, "then it's good for
Sudan."
KHARTOUM'S COUNCIL ALLIES DID ITS BIDDING
-----------------------------------------
6. (SBU) In a subsequent meeting with the full Council,
Chairperson Konare called for the speedy adoption of the
hybrid draft resolution, for the acceleration of hybrid
deadlines and for the consolidation of "burgeoning trust"
with the GNU, reiterating the need to assure the GNU the
Council had no hidden agenda and that the Addis Ababa
"clarifications" must be incorporated into the text. He
expressed hope that the resolution would be adopted by
consensus. Khartoum's Council allies (South Africa, Congo,
Russia, Indonesia, Qatar and China) then took turns railing
against the draft text, insisting that it focus solely on
mandating the hybrid. South African PR Kumalo charged that
the draft should reflect the mandate provided by the AU PSC
in its June 22 communiqu and not try to be an "omnibus
resolution" as he said the current draft attempts. He warned
against refining issues like command and control in the text,
debate which would serve only to bog down Experts'
discussions, delay adoption until August and risk a
non-consensus decision.
7. (SBU) The representatives of Congo, Russia and Indonesia
agreed with Kumalo that the draft resolution should avoid
addressing issues other than simply authorizing the hybrid
operation, which Congolese PR Gayama added should be under
Chapter VIII and based on the June 11-12 agreements and the
November 16 Addis Ababa conclusions. Russian Deputy PR
Dolgov advised that the resolution focus on providing a
"reasonable, feasible and effective" mandate and on sending a
positive signal to Darfur parties to support the political
process and implement the AU-UN roadmap. Dolgov warned
against the Council's creating "complexities we might
regret." The Indonesian delegate suggested deferring other
Darfur concerns to a subsequent resolution and to focus in
this one on empowering the GNU to deal with its Darfur
problem.
8. (SBU) More ominous comments came from Qatari PR al-Nasser,
who went so far as to say the draft needed to be "completely
re-worked" in line with the AU PSC June 22 communiqu and
under Chapter VIII (COMMENT: This statement suggested Qatar
might repeat the tactic it employed during April negotiations
on the UNMIS mandate renewal resolution of floating its own
competing text to mandate this force, as it did during reftel
negotiations. END COMMENT). Al-Nasser also said the draft
should not put Darfur rebels on the same level as the GNU,
"humiliate Sudan" by threatening sanctions without a
recommendation from the Panel of Experts or in any way
discredit the GNU with which it should instead be seeking to
build confidence. He thought a Chapter VIII reference would
be the appropriate vehicle for launching a regional solution
to the Darfur issue. Chinese PR and current UNSC President
Wang called the draft resolution "a big disappointment" that
failed to reflect the current momentum generated with the GNU
USUN NEW Y 00000579 003 OF 003
on resolving the Darfur issue. He warned Members against
behaving like "spoilers."
STRONG EUROPEAN INTERVENTIONS
-----------------------------
9. (SBU) Belgian PR Verbeke and Slovakian PR Burian made
strong interventions in support of the draft resolution,
stressing the need for unity of command and control and the
need for sufficient mandate clarity to allow the hybrid to
adequately address the situation on the ground. Burian
called on the GNU to contribute to this climate of
confidence-building by removing obstacles to hybrid
deployment. French PR de La Sabliere agreed with the point
that the hybrid force must be effective in protecting
civilians and argued that the resolution must consider the
"comprehensive policy" regarding Sudan. He spoke to the need
for a consensus text. Arguing in favor of retaining the
Chapter VII reference and language on clear command and
control, UK Deputy PR Pierce stressed that the hybrid must be
based on "sound peacekeeping principles" to avoid failure on
the ground, and she shared de La Sabliere's view that the
resolution take into account all aspects of the Darfur
situation.
SOMALIA
-------
10. (SBU) Belgium, France and Italy pressed Konare for
details on how the AU PSC would likely proceed when AMISOM,s
mandate expired at the end of August. Italian PR Spatafora
criticized the AU for failing to full deploy AMISOM forces,
commenting, "A lot was promised, but so far all we see are
two battalions of Ugandans. Before the Council takes up this
issue again, we need to start looking at what has gone wrong
and how we can get AMISOM to stand up." Konare did not
comment on whether the AU PSC would renew AMISOM,s mandate,
but said that AMISOM had been prevented from fully deploying
by the lack of logistical and technical support from UN
Member States. (COMMENT: While Konare clearly did not want
to speculate on the whether the AU PSC would renew AMISOM,s
mandate, Ghanaian and South African colleagues have told
Poloff that the AU PSC may decide to give AMISOM a
three-month renewal as a means of pressuring the UNSC to take
stronger action on Somalia. END COMMENT.)
COMMENT
-------
11. (SBU) Khartoum has clearly been doing its legwork in
rallying support against the hybrid draft resolution. As of
now, UKUN has not proposed a new date for Experts Meetings on
the text to resume. Ambassador Khalilzad will meet with the
Sudanese PR on July 16 to address GNU problems with the text,
and this type of outreach will undoubtedly be required on a
sustained basis to counter the Council bloc Khartoum has
built in support of its position. It will also require
significant outreach with African Council Members to get
Ghana back on board as a co-sponsor. Without the AU
President endorsing the AU-UN hybrid resolution, we face a
real credibility crisis that could be easily exploited by one
of Khartoum's friends on the Council only too eager to step
in; at this point, Qatar seems the likely candidate. END
COMMENT.
KHALILZAD