VZCZCXRO0373
OO RUEHGI RUEHMA RUEHROV
DE RUEHKH #0972 1710848
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 200848Z JUN 07
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7666
INFO RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RHMFISS/CJTF HOA
UNCLAS KHARTOUM 000972
SIPDIS
DEPT FOR AF A/S FRAZER, AF S/E NATSIOS, AF/SPG, AND S/CRS
ADDIS ABABA ALSO FOR USAU
NSC FOR PITTMAN AND SHORTLEY
SENSITIVE
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PREL PGOV KPKO AU UN SU
SUBJECT: CDA TO MFA: SUDAN MUST SHOW "NEW REALITY" (CORRECTED COPY
FOR KHARTOUM MRN 00965)
REF: KHARTOUM 925 KHARTOUM 947
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Sudan Lags in its Commitments
-----------------------------
1. (SBU) In an introductory meeting with Undersecretary of Foreign
Affairs Siddiq Mutriff on June 16, CDA Fernandez said that many in
the U.S. doubt Sudan's sincere commitment to resolve the Darfur
conflict and instead viewed the Sudanese Government as responding
only to pressure. "Everything you do contributes to the idea that
you're only doing these because you're forced," said the CDA.
Mutriff expressed his government's view that Sudan was criticized
regardless of its actions and recommended that discussions on the
Darfur conflict be resolved through dialogue on "technical" issues
rather than through political rhetoric.
----------------------------------------
Sudan Accepts "All Components" of Hybrid
----------------------------------------
2. (SBU) Mutriff said that Sudan had accepted the United
Nations/African Union hybrid peace-keeping force "in all its
components" during the June 11-12 consultations in Addis Ababa. He
said that agreement between the UN, the AU, and the Sudanese
Government on the force had been reached in "a neutral,
professional, and technical manner." Mutriff had later explained
the agreement in the presence of President Bashir, who concurred
that Sudan "must commit to what we've agreed to." Mutriff suggested
that acceptance of the hybrid be the basis for cooperation between
Sudan and the U.S. "We need to do things out of our convictions,"
he stated. "If we do things because of sanctions or for improved
relations, it won't work."
-----------------------------
Sudan Must Show "New Reality"
-----------------------------
3. (SBU) The CDA said that the U.S. would be monitoring Sudan's
adherence to the recent agreement with the UN and AU to show that it
was interested in a "new reality." In order to change international
perceptions of Sudan formed since 2003 and break the cycle of mutual
recriminations, Sudan must be "clear" its in sincerity to defuse the
conflict by cooperating on the deployment of an effective
peace-keeping force and contributing to a political solution.
Pointing to Afghanistan and Palestine, the CDA noted the lasting
repercussions of a generation of children growing up in camps and
said it was "in Sudan's interest" to end the conflict. "All the
people of Darfur should have a role in political life, a role in the
future," he said.
---------------------------------
Street Opening: "A Terrible Idea"
---------------------------------
4. (SBU) Calling the threat to open the street in front of the
Embassy "a terrible idea," CDA said that the Sudanese Government
would be blamed for any attack on diplomatic personnel. Mutriff
said that he had advised the Governor of Khartoum State to meet with
CDA (Ref. A) to discuss the issue. Recognizing that opponents of
the Government could use the issue to "embarrass" Khartoum, Mutriff
said that the security services were sympathetic to the problem and
that security would be increased for the Embassy. CDA explained
that the security services had requested that a diplomatic note be
sent to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Ref. B). Mutriff was
unaware of this request.
----------------------------
Conclusions from Addis Ababa
----------------------------
5. (SBU) At the conclusion of the meeting, Mutriff passed a document
to CDA, which represented the conclusions of the recent
consultations in Addis Ababa. In describing the mandate of the
UN/AU hybrid, the document matched the UN/AU report on the mission
with the exception of slight changes to the sections on rule of law
and border security. The document differs slightly in its
description of options one and two for the force size and calls for
651 fewer police officers. An explicit reference to Sudan's
facilitation of access to land and water for the force is also
absent. (Note: The document and a preliminary analysis of its
contents was forwarded to AF/SPG on June 18. End note.)
FERNANDEZ