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P 120727Z APR 07
FM AMEMBASSY TOKYO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2596
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INFO RUEHFK/AMCONSUL FUKUOKA 0654
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UNCLAS TOKYO 001609
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
STATE FOR I/RF, PA/PR/FPC/W, IIP/G/EA, EAP/PD, R/MR,
EAP/J, EAP/P, PM;
USTR FOR PUBLIC AFFAIRS OFFICE;
TREASURY FOR OASIA/IMI;
SECDEF FOR OASD/PA;
CP BUTLER OKINAWA FOR AREA FIELD OFFICE;
PACOM HONOLULU FOR PUBLIC DIPLOMACY ADVISOR
E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: OIIP KMDR KPAO JA
SUBJECT: MEDIA REACTION - SIX-PARTY TALKS - TOKYO
LEAD STORIES: Most Thursday morning papers gave top play
to Prime Minister Abe's meeting Wednesday evening with
visiting Chinese Premier Wen.
1. "Six-Party Talks: Time for DPRK to Implement 'Initial
Steps'" The liberal Mainichi editorialized (4/12): "On
Tuesday, the US Treasury Department and Macau authorities
announced that they would release all DPRK-linked funds
frozen at Banco Delta Asia (BDA). Attention is now
shifting to whether North Korea will completely implement
the 'initial steps' toward nuclear disablement stipulated
in the February six-party agreement.... These steps
include the suspension and sealing of the Yongbyon
nuclear complex, as well as the acceptance of IAEA
inspectors. Beyond this lies the major goal of getting
Pyongyang to abandon all its nuclear weapons and
denuclearizing the Korean Peninsula.... Although it is
understandable that the US had to compromise with the
DPRK to break the deadlock, it is important to note that
the US compromise raises many concerns. For example, the
US agreement may be incompatible with the rules it has
proposed for global finance, and there is no guarantee
that North Korea will not keep illicit funds at other
financial institutions in the future.... It will not be
until after Pyongyang completely implements the 'initial
steps' that we will be able to determine whether the US
decision was the correct one."
2. "Pressure Needed for Dialogue" An editorial in the
conservative Sankei commented (4/12): "Following the
release of all of DPRK-linked funds frozen at BDA, the
money will likely to returned directly to North Korea
without being handled by the Bank of China. Many have
noted that Washington completely capitulated to Pyongyang
because of its priority on achieving progress in the six-
party talks. Japan, however, extended its sanctions on
North Korea by another six months on the grounds that the
DPRK government has not acted in good faith on the
abduction issue. The USG and GOJ had previously agreed to
use a policy of 'dialogue and pressure' in dealing with
North Korea. We cannot help but entertain misgivings
about the recent conciliatory US stance. Providing
'carrots' in the absence of any 'sticks' will have no
effect at all, only aggravating the situation. Pressure
is needed to bring Pyongyang to the negotiating table."
DONOVAN