VZCZCXRO7040
OO RUEHDE RUEHFL RUEHNP
DE RUEHRO #0710/01 0961009
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 061009Z APR 07
FM AMEMBASSY ROME
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7637
INFO RUEHXP/ALL NATO POST COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHGG/UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHAM/AMEMBASSY AMMAN PRIORITY 0550
RUEHBW/AMEMBASSY BELGRADE PRIORITY 0310
RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO PRIORITY 0369
RUEHDM/AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS PRIORITY 0651
RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL PRIORITY 0359
RUEHRH/AMEMBASSY RIYADH PRIORITY 0464
RUEHTV/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV PRIORITY 0939
RUEHTI/AMEMBASSY TIRANA PRIORITY 4301
RUEHDE/AMCONSUL DUBAI PRIORITY 0219
RUEHFL/AMCONSUL FLORENCE PRIORITY 2310
RUEHJM/AMCONSUL JERUSALEM PRIORITY 0430
RUEHMIL/AMCONSUL MILAN PRIORITY 8544
RUEHNP/AMCONSUL NAPLES PRIORITY 2462
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 0733
RUEHPS/USOFFICE PRISTINA PRIORITY 0393
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
RHMFISS/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
RHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC PRIORITY
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 ROME 000710
SIPDIS
NOFORN
SIPDIS
DEPT. FOR EUR
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/04/2016
TAGS: PREL NATO UNSC EUN IT
SUBJECT: ITALY: FM D'ALEMA ON KOSOVO, AFGHAN NGO DETAINEE,
MEPP, LEBANON, IRAN SANCTIONS, GUANTANAMO AND ABU OMAR
REF: A. STATE 36991
B. STATE 37005
C. STATE 41871
D. STATE 42573
E. ROME 625
F. ROME 702
Classified By: AMBASSADOR RONALD SPOGLI, REASONS 1.4 B AND D.
SUMMARY
-------
1. (C/NF) Amb. Spogli got FM D'Alema's agreement to make a
clear statement in support of the Athisaari plan for Kosovo
and was told that the FM did not think he could or should
control an Italian NGO threatening to close its hospitals in
Afghanistan unless one of its employees was released by the
Afghan Government. During an April 5 tour d'horizon, the
Ambassador and FM also discussed Iran sanctions (D'Alema said
Italy was applying the rules thoroughly), the Middle East
peace process (D'Alema worried the Israelis and Palestinians
would miss an opportunity for progress), Lebanon (where
everything but UNIFIL is at an impasse, according to the FM),
and the Abu Omar case. The Ambassador briefed D'Alema on the
request that Italy consider taking some Guantanamo detainees
to help speed the closure of the facility. D'Alema said
trying to close Guantanamo was a noble step and that if Italy
could help, it would try to do so (see also septel on
Guantanamo). End Summary.
Afghanistan and Emergency Now
-----------------------------
2. (C/NF) On April 5, Ambassador Spogli and Foreign Minister
D'Alema discussed key issues on the foreign policy agenda.
The Ambassador raised concerns about the statements of Gino
Strada, head of the Italian NGO Emergency Now, who was
threatening to close his hospitals in Afghanistan unless the
Afghan Government released one of his staff being held for
possible terrorist affiliations. The Amb. said such an
unwelcome step would be punishing the Afghan people and asked
if D'Alema could help get Strada to stop making threats.
D'Alema replied that he had spoken with Strada, who told him
that if his employees are going to be arrested in
Afghanistan, he would move his operations to a country that
doesn't arrest his staff. D'Alema told the Amb. that all
sides needed to show flexibility and that if the Afghan
Government had evidence against the individual being held, it
should be shared. D'Alema noted that Italy was grateful to
the U.S. Embassy in Kabul for helping secure Red Cross access
to the detained individual. Then, somewhat exasperated, he
said, "Strada is who he is. He runs an NGO. He is not part
of the Italian Government. He says they cannot work in
Helmand without having contact with the Taliban. He thinks
the Taliban have the legitimate support of the people there.
We have urged him to be prudent. But we do not control him
and he feels threatened." D'Alema then said that during the
Mastrogiacomo kidnapping the Taliban cell phones that were
traced all had Pakistani numbers, and that if terror bosses
could live carefree in a Pakistan that could not be
reproached because of its alliance with the U.S., we would
not win this war.
Kosovo - Firm Support for Status
--------------------------------
3. (C/NF) The Ambassador noted that the Italian position on
the Athisaari plan for Kosovo had generated some confusion
and that a clear statement of support would be very helpful.
D'Alema emphatically insisted that Italy supported the
Athisaari plan's core status provisions ("they should not be
touched"). Italy continued to believe that some non-status
issues, like protection of religious sites and minority
rights, however, could still be improved. He said there were
two unacceptable outcomes: continuing the status quo and a
unilateral declaration of independence by Kosovo. The latter
would tear Europe apart and pull the legal legs out from
under the European mission to Kosovo. He argued that a UNSCR
was needed that would help soften the Russian position, and a
proposal needed to be crafted for Serbia - something
conditional with flexible rewards - that could be offered to
Belgrade when Serbia inevitably rejects Kosovar independence.
Without these elements, the region could be destabilized, he
said. He added that Italy had been clear in its talks with
Russia and everywhere else that it would absolutely support
Athisaari's core status proposal without prolonging talks and
without new negotiations. The Ambassador asked if D'Alema
could make a public statement to that effect. D'Alema agreed
to do so.
Iran Sanctions - Italy in Compliance
------------------------------------
4. (C/NF) The Ambassador asked how Iran sanctions were
proceeding for Italy, and noted our disappointment that when
action was taken against Bank Sepah in Italy all funds had
already been moved. D'Alema said the Iranians knew it was
coming and were a step ahead, as they had been elsewhere. He
added that when he had spoken with Larijani early in the week
to urge the release of the UK sailors, Larijani had protested
vigorously about the action against Bank Sepah. D'Alema
asserted "we are applying the sanctions rules. We are in
compliance. But Italy is also the victim of the sanctions
and is excluded from negotiations with Iran and from the
group with primary responsibility for decisions on Iran,
despite being a UNSC member."
Israel-Palestine: About to Miss an Opportunity?
--------------------------------------------- --
5. (C/NF) The Ambassador thanked D'Alema for his recent
helpful comments insisting that Palestinian leaders accept
the three Quartet conditions before Italian officials would
meet with them. The FM said he feared a moment of
opportunity was being lost. Abu Mazen was stronger than
before but needed to find a way to get results out of his
dialogue with Olmert. Both sides, he said, need to be pushed
and encouraged. Without progress the risk of violence would
increase. He suggested what was needed now was a confidence
building phase with limited ambition focusing on releasing
prisoners, improving Palestinian quality of life, granting
more freedom of access/movement and getting credible security
assurances for Israel. The Palestinians, he said, would
never accept an independent state within provisional borders,
because they believe this means they will never get final
status issues resolved. He envisions an eventual regional
final status conference, but not until the open final status
questions have been resolved by the two sides. He said with
both sides weak and lacking strategies to reach solutions,
the international community needed to step in and offer hope
for positive movement. Europe should press the Palestinians
and the U.S. should press the Israelis in a coordinated
division of labor, he suggested, adding that the Palestinians
needed to hear the message that when the time comes, the U.S.
would be willing to push Israel to resolve the final status
issues. He informed the Amb. that Abu Mazen would be in Rome
in the coming weeks.
Lebanon - D'Alema Concerned
---------------------------
6. (C/NF) Turning to Lebanon, D'Alema said he was very
concerned because the only thing working there was UNIFIL.
Everything else was totally blocked. Parliament was not
meeting. Reconstruction was at a standstill. The economy
was in danger. There was no progress on the arms embargo or
Sheba Farms. He said the Lebanon Contact Group meeting in
London had been a good step and hoped that the group would
meet at the political level to help bolster UN action. He
also said some way had to be found to get Syrian buy-in or
the embargo would never work.
Guantanamo Detainees - Closure a Noble Idea
-------------------------------------------
7. (C/NF) The Ambassador briefed D'Alema on the request for
Italy to consider taking some of the 25 releasable Guantanamo
detainees who could not be returned to their countries of
origin. D'Alema said it was a delicate issue, but the idea
of trying to close Guantanamo was noble, and if Italy could
find a way to help, it would. The devil would be in
practicalities of whether Italy could take any of the
detainees. (See septel for PM and Min. of Interior views on
taking Guantanamo detainees.)
Abu Omar - Pre-emptive Letters
------------------------------
8. (S/NF) D'Alema closed the hour-long meeting by noting that
he had asked the Secretary if the Department could send
something in writing to him explaining that the U.S. would
not act on extradition requests in the Abu Omar case if
tendered. This, he explained, could be used pre-emptively by
the GOI to fend off action by Italian magistrates to seek the
extradition of the implicated Americans. D'Alema said he
understood that L had discussed this with the Italian
Ambassador in Washington.Amb. Spogli explained that we were
waiting for the constitutional court to decide on the merits
of the case before deciding on our next steps, because Min.
of Justice Mastella had suspended action until that court
rendered a decision. The FM noted that there was still the
risk of action by the magistrates at any time. The
Ambassador agreed that we should work to avoid having
extradition requests forwarded.
SPOGLI