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FM AMEMBASSY BERLIN
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STATE FOR ISN, EUR, WHA, CAN, EAP/J
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E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PARM MNUC PREL ETTC GM JA RS CA UK FR IT
SUBJECT: SECOND G-8 NONPROLIFERATION DIRECTORS' GROUP
(NPDG) MEETING IN BERLIN, MARCH 30, 2007
REF: A. BERLIN 791
B. BERLIN 376
1. (SBU) Summary: The second G-8 Nonproliferation Directors
Group (NPDG) meeting under the German G-8 Presidency was held
March 30 in Berlin. The delegates discussed the need for
Germany to produce soon a draft statement on nonproliferation
for the June G-8 Summit. The delegates also agreed that the
Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) Preparatory Committee
(PrepCom) should avoid wrangling over procedural issues.
Concerning nuclear fuel cycle issues, the delegates agreed on
the need to convince potential users that proposals on
enrichment and reprocessing (ENR) are not intended to deprive
them of nuclear fuel for peaceful uses. The delegates were
very interested in the status of U.S.-India talks on the
proposed 123 Agreement on civil nuclear cooperation. The
delegates also discussed making progress in the Nuclear
Suppliers' Group, Conference on Disarmament, The Hague Code
of Conduct, the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), the
Biological Weapons Convention (BWC), UNSCR 1540
implementation, and the IAEA Additional Protocol. Lastly,
Germany appealed to the U.S. and Russia to invite EU
institutions to participate in Global Initiative to Combat
Nuclear Terrorism activities. End summary.
-------------------------------------------
Draft Statement for Heiligendamm G-8 Summit
-------------------------------------------
2. (SBU) German Chair Ruediger Luedeking, MFA Deputy
Commissioner for Arms Control and Disarmament, opened the
meeting by discussing a draft statement on nonproliferation
to be issued at the June G-8 Summit in Heiligendamm. He said
the goal is for a succinct Summit statement that avoids
repetitions from previous years' statements. He said the
German Government will circulate the draft to the other G-8
partners and solicit input prior to the scheduled April 24
NPDG meeting (Note: Which was later cancelled. End note.)
-------------------
NPT PrepCom Meeting
-------------------
3. (SBU) Luedeking then turned to the agenda items, beginning
with a discussion of the NPT PrepCom, scheduled for April
30-May 11 in Vienna. The delegates agreed a good start is
important for the current NPT five-year review cycle. DAS
Andrew Semmel urged setting the PrepCom agenda right away
instead of allowing protracted debate on procedural issues,
such as happened at the 2005 Review Conference (RevCon). DAS
Semmel also cautioned that Iran could try to hijack the
PrepCom and pit the Nonaligned Movement (NAM) members against
the nuclear supplier states. Luedeking urged the G-8
partners to support PrepCom Chairman Yukiya Amano's approach
used in previous RevCons, including the 2000 meeting, as
models for conducting work at the next RevCon. DAS Semmel
noted the U.S. does not consider some previous RevCons as
ideal models. In particular, the U.S. is concerned about the
use of the 2000 RevCon, since the U.S. no longer supports all
of the 13 steps toward nuclear disarmament agreed to at that
time. DAS Semmel urged the NPT to set a more balanced agenda
and to produce a more balanced statement, said the U.S. is
ready for discussion of Article VI concerning disarmament,
and called for more attention to Article X concerning NPT
withdrawal. He said the U.S. shared talking points with
Amano and will discuss them and other issues at the PrepCom,
despite Iran's reluctance to consider Article X. Luedeking,
summarizing the discussion, said Article X will be important
at the PrepCom, that a focus on the peaceful use of atomic
energy should be emphasized, that outreach work should be
done to convince the NAM signatories that our approach to
Article IV is not designed to deny them nuclear technology,
and that Iran should not be allowed to radicalize the NAM
members.
--------------------------------------------- ----
Multilateral Approaches to the Nuclear Fuel Cycle
--------------------------------------------- ----
4. (SBU) After the NPDG partners discussed this agenda item,
Luedeking summarized the discussion as follows: the G-8
partners have broad consensus for giving assurances for the
nuclear fuel cycle, but nonproliferation is the driving
concern. The G-8 partners have made a number of proposals to
the IAEA on this issue, but are now waiting for the IAEA to
advance them to the Board of Governors in June. Because it
is an important and sensitive issue for the NAM, the G-8
partners should engage potential users to convince them the
proposals are not aimed at depriving them of their right to
the peaceful use of nuclear fuel. In addition, the delegates
agreed Iran would likely try to manipulate discussion of the
nuclear fuel cycle to its advantage. DAS Semmel noted the
overlap among the assured nuclear fuel supply proposals under
evaluation by the IAEA, but he also said it is not
contradictory to pursue both nonproliferation and the goals
of Article IV on the peaceful uses of atomic energy.
--------------------------------------------- ------------
NSG Issues, U.S.-India Talks on Civil Nuclear Cooperation
--------------------------------------------- ------------
5. (SBU) DAS Semmel updated the NPDG delegates on the status
of U.S.-India talks on civil nuclear energy cooperation.
Luedeking said because Germany will chair the NSG in 2008, he
is interested in the sequence of events for the proposed 123
Agreement and other steps in the process. He also asked
about the conditions and certifications under the Hyde Act,
whether the conditions are being met, and, specifically,
about the issue of perpetual safeguards and what would happen
if India conducted any nuclear tests. DAS Semmel said the
U.S. and India have achieved a single bracketed text for the
123 Agreement at the most recent negotiating session and now
clearly understand which points still need to be negotiated.
One reason for delay in the 123 Agreement process is the
domestic sensitivities in India, DAS Semmel said. The U.S.
position is that the agreement should provide for safeguards
in perpetuity. If India detonates a nuclear device, U.S. law
would require an end to civil nuclear cooperation and the
right to repossess the nuclear technology provided to India.
This is a point of contention with India, DAS Semmel noted.
Another point of contention concerns the U.S. ban on
transferring nuclear fuel enrichment and reprocessing (ENR)
technology to countries that do not already possess it,
because India wants advance consent rights on reprocessing
and access to reprocessing technology. DAS Semmel also said
India is committed to the FMCT, even though India and the
U.S. may differ on FMCT policy. The President will have to
certify to Congress that India is fulfilling its FMCT
commitment as well as make other certifications prior to
Congressional consideration of the agreement.
6. (SBU) Luedeking discussed preparations for the April 16-18
NSG Consultative Group Meeting in Cape Town. Germany passed
out a Point of Contact Note, NSG(07)14, containing a German
proposal, and asked for comments. Luedeking said the
proposal's goal is to create a new status between NSG members
and non-adherents to ensure that as nuclear technical
expertise spreads to new recipients that are not NSG members
they will still follow the NSG Guidelines. The Canadian and
Italian delegates supported the proposal. The French
delegate cautioned against creating a new category for now
because of concern that the NSG would be charged with
applying double standards. Germany asked G-8 partners to try
to reach agreement in principle on the concept of their
proposal in Cape Town while leaving details to be worked out
later.
7. (SBU) Luedeking queried the U.S. on the prospects that it
will accept within the NSG a criteria-based approach to ENR
transfers. DAS Semmel repeated the U.S. stance of opposing
ENR transfers to countries that do not already possess the
technology. After some comments, Luedeking said the issue
needs to be resolved. (Note: None of the partners raised
dropping the rolling one-year moratorium on ENR transfers
from this year's G-8 Summit Statement, as happened in
previous NPDG meetings. This development may have been due
to the absence of the normal Canadian representative, who had
pressed this issues most vigorously in past meetings. End
note.)
-------------------------
Conference on Disarmament
-------------------------
8. (SBU) Luedeking noted that at its March 30 meeting the CD
was unable to agree on the P-6 proposal for organizing work
in Part II of the 2007 session because several delegations
had lacked instructions. The CD members agreed in principle
on an intersessional meeting in late April, but were unable
to agree on a date. The Japanese delegate urged the G-8 to
demarche CD members jointly, urging support for the P-6
proposal. Japan circulated draft talking points and
solicited input.
9. (SBU) Russian Delegate Anatolij Antonov said Russia wants
the CD to make some progress. He said Russia has demarched
China on the FMCT and is still waiting for a response.
Concerning the proposed G-8 talking points, Antonov said
Russia considered them as mis-characterizing the P-6
proposal. He urged the G-8 to put the priorities in the
first paragraph. Russia's priority, he noted, is outer space
and not the FMCT.
10. (SBU) Luedeking suggested the NPDG review the talking
points, keeping in mind Russia's points about not quibbling
over priorities. He said Germany would circulate the draft
talking points, gather the NPDG input, revise them, and issue
a G-8 demarche to the CD members. (Note: After circulating
the draft, France could not agree to the text of a joint
demarche, so eventually Germany, as G-8 President, made it
unilaterally. End note.)
----------------------------
Hague Code of Conduct (HCOC)
----------------------------
11. (SBU) Luedeking said the HCOC is an instrument with
modest objectives nd diminished effectiveness because of a
lack ofauthority and non-participation by countries such s
China and India. Antonov voiced Russia's concrns about the
HCOC, saying 70 percent of the infomation provided to the
HCOC comes from Russia an other countries were not committed
enough to th HCOC. Luedeking, in turn, noted three issues
fr Germany: (1) the lack of participation, indicatng
declining interest in the HCOC, (2) the need to convince
other countries, such as China and India, to participate, and
(3) the importance of compliance with the HCOC's
confidence-building measures. Luedeking also urged the G-8
to conduct more outreach activities and to consider the
production of an annual report.
-----------
CWC and BWC
-----------
12. (SBU) Germany circulated a paper on the 10th anniversary
of the CWC. Russian Delegate Antonov and DAS Semmel reported
on the destruction to date of chemical weapons stocks of
their respective countries. Both also noted the difficult
prospect of destroying all CW stocks by the 2012 deadline.
All delegates voiced support for the CWC. Luedeking, noting
the difficulty of CWC verification, said complacency could
become a problem. Concerning the BWC, Luedeking said the EU
will provide input to the BWC intersessional meeting.
Germany circulated a report on the G-8 Forensic Epidemiology
Workshop held March 13-15, 2007, in London. Antonov said
Russia's position was that epidemiology should be excluded
from the G-8 Summit Statement.
-------------------------------------
Regional Issues: Iran and North Korea
-------------------------------------
13. (SBU) Luedeking said Iran would be discussed at the April
3 Political Directors' meeting in Berlin. Saying the
situation in Iran is changing, Luedeking noted that G-8
partners could not agree on Summit Statement language until
later. The British delegate said the UK is grateful for G-8
support over the Iranian seizure of British sailors and
marines. He said the UK is not linking the detention to the
UNSCR 1747 sanctions on Iran.
14. (SBU) Japanese Delegate Takeshi Nakane said Japan
regretted that the Six Parties had been unable to enter talks
yet over freezing the DPRK's nuclear facilities. Germany
briefed the partners on a March 6-8 EU Troika visit to
P'yongyang. During that visit, the DPRK said it favored
complete de-nuclearization of the Korean Peninsula so long as
it receives assurances from the U.S. The DPRK also said it
would like better relations with the EU. Luedeking noted
that the EU should not be expected to contribute funding as
part of any settlement with the DPRK since the EU was not at
the table, but that the EU would continue to support the
Six-Party talks diplomatically. French Delegate Carre said
if the agreement progresses, it will be a positive signal to
Iran to end its nuclear activities outside of IAEA safeguards.
-----------------------------------
UNSCR 1540, IAEA Safeguards, and GI
-----------------------------------
15. (SBU) Luedeking discussed G-8 demarches on UNSCR 1540
implementation and the IAEA Additional Protocol. He noted
that universalization is the goal for both. Luedeking
reported Germany had delivered two sets of demarches on
implementing UNSCR 1540, with some countries responding
favorably. Luedeking also said Germany would deliver
demarches on the Additional Protocol. DAS Semmel suggested a
G-8 Foreign Ministers' letter, recalling how effective the
U.S.-led 2004 Foreign Ministers' letter on IAEA Safeguards
was. To Luedeking's objection that too many Foreign
Ministers' letters would diminish their impact, DAS Semmel
advised sending a letter only to countries which had not
signed the Safeguards and/or Additional Protocol. DAS Semmel
also observed the work for making demarches on
universalization does not have to be completed by the G-8
Summit but could be spread throughout 2007.
16. (SBU) Luedeking urged the U.S. and Russia to invite EU
institutions to participate in Global Initiative activities.
He said inviting EU institutions would not set a precedent
for inviting other international organizations. Luedeking
also maintained only certain institutions, namely EURATOM,
had the necessary competencies to oversee nuclear activities
in the EU member states. Russian Delegate Antonov observed
that although every EU member state beyond the original
invitees had been asked to join individually, only Greece had
accepted. French Delegate Carre agreed that although
individual EU states should be more active the GI would be
more effective if the appropriate EU institutions could
participate. The EU delegate said a paper could be prepared
on EU competencies relevant to the GI and making the case for
EU participation in the GI.
17. (U) This cable was coordinated with DAS Semmel subsequent
to the delegation's departure.
TIMKEN JR