INDEPENDENT NEWS

Cablegate: Show Me the Money: Making the Ceasefire Commission

Published: Wed 14 Mar 2007 08:39 AM
VZCZCXRO4706
OO RUEHGI RUEHMA RUEHROV
DE RUEHKH #0396/01 0730839
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 140839Z MAR 07
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6456
INFO RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE
RHMFISS/CJTF HOA
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 000396
SIPDIS
SENSITIVE, SIPDIS
DEPT FOR AF/SPG, S/CRS
NSC FOR PITTMAN AND SHORTLEY
ADDIS ABABA ALSO FOR USAU
E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PGOV KPKO AU UN US SU
SUBJECT: SHOW ME THE MONEY: MAKING THE CEASEFIRE COMMISSION
FUNCTION
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SUMMARY
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1. (SBU) The African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS) held a March 11
meeting to inform and seek input from the international community on
the functioning of the Ceasefire Commission (CFC) and efforts to
re-energize the Second Chamber for Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA)
non-signatories. There was consensus among the international
community that payments to CFC representatives should be reduced.
AMIS asserted that the mid-March Joint Commission meeting scheduled
for El Fasher would be delayed and occur elsewhere, on account of
"unstable" security conditions in Darfur. The Force Commander
professed that he was unable to give a timeline on the completion of
the areas of control exercise or AMIS re-configuration into three
sectors. End summary.
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STRENGTHENING THE CFC AND SECOND CHAMBER CHALLENGES
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2. (SBU) Acting AMIS Head of Mission Monique Mukaruliza convened
international partners March 11 in Khartoum to provide an update on
the status of the CFC and hear international views on
recommendations to strengthen the mechanism. AMIS proposed reducing
each of the DPA signatories representation to two representatives
per faction at the CFC headquarters in El Fasher and one
representative at each of the 31 Sector HQ and Military Group Sites
(MGS). By this configuration, the total number of CFC
representatives would equal 198. AMIS recommended cutting the
Monthly Subsistence Allowance (MSA) for CFC officials to $1000 (from
$4900) at the CFC HQ level and to $500 (from $2700) at the Sector
levels. The international community expressed universal support for
the reduction in the MSA. (Note: Until recently, MSA for CFC reps
and AMIS forces were backlogged as the UK and Netherlands - which
provide the funding - attempted to reconcile numerous accounting
discrepancies. The excessive MSA payments have had a distorting
effect on the CFC, creating incentives for participation because of
lucrative salaries rather than the ability to examine ceasefire
violations or access respective areas of control. End Note.)
3. (SBU) Noting the warped incentives created by the MSA, AMIS
proposed creating clear terms of reference for the CFC
representatives and rotating them on a six-month basis. S/CRS
Poloff and other diplomatic officials noted the problems this might
create in terms of continuity and capacity. He suggested that it
would be more effective to devise one-year agreements with each CFC
representative that would be renewable in consultation with the AMIS
Force Commander and account for performance. AMIS concurred with
these recommendations.
4. (SBU) AMIS Force Commander Aprezi summarized the challenges
facing the CFC Second Chamber, including the non-payment of MSA
since August 2006; the Sudan Liberation Army (SLA)/Non-Signatory
Faction (NSF) and Justice and Equality Movement (JEM)/Peace Wing's
insistence on adhering to the modalities of the N'djamena
Humanitarian Ceasefire Agreement (vice the DPA); and the absence of
Government consent to allow non-signatory deployment to the Sector
level. Aprezi proposed various schemes to distribute
non-signatories at different levels throughout Darfur, though each
remains predicated on Government approval. S/CRS Poloff noted the
lack of progress on the issue since the February 7 Joint Commission,
in which nearly every participating delegation pressed for the
Sudanese government's acquiescence, and recommended that key
countries (U.S., UK, Norway, Netherlands, Canada, Germany, France,
Egypt) - in conjunction with AMIS, the UN, League of Arab States and
EU - launch an immediate renewed, unified effort to gain Government
agreement. Without non-signatory representation within the CFC
structure, ceasefire violation investigations and facilitation of
AMIS or humanitarian access into SLA/NSF or JEM-controlled areas
will remain difficult if not impossible.
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AMIS FEELING BESEIGED
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5. (SBU) In a brief security update, the Force Commander
characterized the situation in Darfur as "unstable," as manifested
by continued carjackings, tribal fighting and specific attacks on
AMIS personnel. Aprezi's sense of besiegement was clear as he
recounted a series of events targeting AMIS, including the robbery
of a Finance Officer on February 28, the killing of two soldiers in
Graida on March 5, and the theft of property and arms from a
helicopter patrol near Kulbus on March 7. AMIS placed the blame for
the Graida attack squarely on SLA/Minawi. Mukaruliza said that she
intended to address the matter with Senior Assistant to the
KHARTOUM 00000396 002 OF 002
President and SLA leader Minni Minawi, demanding that he hand over
the perpetrators. In this vein, Head of the DPA Implementation Team
Sam Ibok urged the international community to publicly, but
even-handedly, hold the rebel movements to account, implying that
without this pressure the factions would be more likely to operate
with impunity and decline participation in the peace process.
6. (SBU) Responding to questions about AMIS re-organization Aprezi
professed his inability to predict when the peace-keeping force
might be reconfigured to three Sectors. "This must be a joint
decision with the UN," he explained. On the issue of AMIS
verification of factions' areas of control, the FC again punted,
remarking that it was impossible to complete the exercise without
the consent of the non-signatories and greater stability in Darfur.
Both Ibok and Mukaruliza countered Aprezi's assertion, contending
that more could be done in this effort, that hard deadlines should
be provided to all the groups (including non-signatories), and that
the Force Commander should present a clear timeline at the next
Joint Commission meeting.
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COMMENT
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7. (SBU) While AMIS' increased engagement on the CFC issue with the
international community is a positive step, it does little to change
the fundamental truth that without SLA/NSF and JEM representation at
the Sector level and Sudan's consent to allow such a move, the
mechanism will continue to be inhibited in carrying out effective
cease-fire investigations and in maintaining open lines of
communication with non-signatory factions. A concerted and
synchronized effort by the international community to persuade the
Government to change its position may be the only way forward in
enhancing the viability of the CFC, which remains at the heart of
advancing any real prospects of DPA security arrangements. End
comment.
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