VZCZCXYZ0000
PP RUEHWEB
DE RUEHRL #0376/01 0541710
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 231710Z FEB 07
FM AMEMBASSY BERLIN
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7196
INFO RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 7985
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY 1706
RUEHOT/AMEMBASSY OTTAWA PRIORITY 0963
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY 8510
RUEHRO/AMEMBASSY ROME PRIORITY 0259
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO PRIORITY 1385
UNCLAS BERLIN 000376
SIPDIS
SENSITIVE
SIPDIS
STATE FOR ISN, EUR, WHA/CAN, EAP/J
E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PARM MNUC PREL ETTC GM JA RS CA
SUBJECT: G-8 NONPROLIFERATION DIRECTORS GROUP MEETING,
BERLIN, JANUARY 22, 2007
REF: 06 MOSCOW 12144
1. (SBU) Summary: The U.S. delegation, headed by Acting
Deputy Assistant Secretary for Nuclear Nonproliferation
Policy and Negotiations Andrew Semmel, considers the first
meeting of the Nonproliferation Directors Group (NPDG) under
Germany's G-8 Presidency a good start and hopes to see it
engage in more action items with measurable results. Other
G-8 partners wanted to know the status of the U.S.-India
Civil Nuclear Cooperation Initiative, and most seem to be
warming up to the deal. The partners discussed nuclear fuel
cycle issues, with many stressing the need to address the
concerns of states currently lacking enrichment or
reprocessing technology. The partners essentially agreed on
the need for unity in dealing with the DPRK and Iran, but
Russia urged that Iran not be isolated. Germany will
continue the practice of making G-8 demarches to support the
universalization of the IAEA Additional Protocol and UNSCR
1540. The next NPDG meeting will take place March 30 in
Berlin. End summary.
-------------------
Priorities for 2007
-------------------
2. (SBU) The German Chair, Ruedieger Luedeking, MFA Deputy
Commissioner for Arms Control and Disarmament, began by
referring to the priorities in his letter to other NPDG
representatives that repeated what he had called for at the
last meeting of the Russian presidency in 2006 (see reftel).
He also stressed that the 2007 G-8 Summit declaration on
nonproliferation should be short and not repetitive. Many
others echoed this approach, while France, Japan, Canada, and
the UK noted the importance of not diluting a strong message
on Iran and the DPRK. Russia said the focus should be on
global issues, e.g., the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty
(NPT), BW, and CW.
3. (SBU) Luedeking,s question of whether the NPDG should
address the issue of the proliferation of small arms and
light weapons (SALW) generated little enthusiasm. Most
speakers said the focus should remain on WMD, with France
arguing the theoretical point that "proliferation" should be
reserved for WMD and that to include other issues would
dilute its meaning. Russian Delegate Anatolij Antonov said
if the subject was discussed, he would have to raise the
problem of "illicit production" (Russia's oft-repeated
discussion of the unlicensed production of Soviet-era weapons
by former Warsaw Pact and Soviet states). The U.S. said the
NPDG should focus on the most important subjects and that
SALW was being addressed in other fora. DAS Semmel also
urged the NPDG to consider actionable items.
4. (SBU) The Chair summarized the discussion as follows:
-- There was a consensus on drafting a short Summit statement.
-- The traditional agenda (nuclear weapons, BW, CW, and
delivery systems) should be in the forefront.
-- The Group should take a balanced approach.
-- The partners should try to do justice to items addressed,
such as undertake action items and broaden the consensus on
items under consideration.
-- SALW and conventional weapons would not be a primary focus.
-------------------------------------
Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT)
-------------------------------------
5. (SBU) Japanese Delegate Takeshi Nakane described the
intentions of Yukiya Amano, the Japanese Chairman of the
first Preparatory Committee (PrepCom) meeting, scheduled for
April/May 2007. Amano will try to resolve procedural issues
quickly, to pave the way for substantive discussions. Nakane
informed the NPDG that Japan will host a seminar in Vienna
February 5-6 to prepare for the NPT.
6. (SBU) NPDG delegates generally agreed with the desire to
solve procedural questions quickly. On the substance,
several (e.g., Canada and Italy) cited the importance of all
"three pillars" (nonproliferation, disarmament, and peaceful
uses) of the NPT regime. Russia suggested the NPDG identify
two or three issues as priorities for the first PrepCom.
Antonov also proposed starting negotiations on a Fissile
Material Cutoff Treaty (FMCT) before the PrepCom and hoped no
one would use "events in China" (a reference to the Chinese
anti-satellite test) as an excuse to avoid them. Italy said
the NPT Review Committee (RevCom) president should be chosen
for his capabilities instead of his regional group. (Note:
No one else picked up on this point. End note.)
7. (SBU) The Chair,s summary suggested the next meeting
should consider how to overcome any obstacles that may arise
following Amano,s consultations and the Japanese seminar.
Otherwise the Chair drew the following conclusions:
-- Delegates agreed on the need to support Amano,s efforts
to solve procedural questions.
-- The G-8 should take the lead in showing a constructive
spirit.
-- The PrepCom should copy the procedures from previous
review cycles; discussions of new rules would allow some to
hide behind disagreements to avoid substantive discussions.
-- All three pillars should be endorsed.
-- G-8 members might consider other venues and, in
particular, decide how to start FMCT negotiations at the
Conference on Disarmament (CD).
--------------------------------------------- ---------
Central Asian Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone (CANWFZ) Treaty
--------------------------------------------- ---------
8. (SBU) Luedeking said he added this agenda item to see
whether it was possible to put the Treaty into effect, i.e.,
to persuade the U.S., France, and the UK (P-3) to sign the
Treaty's protocol extending security assurances to the
Central Asian Five (C-5). He asked whether it could it be
done without amending the Treaty, such as by a reservation or
a statement made at the signing. Doing so would send a
positive signal as the NPT review process was under way, he
noted.
9. (SBU) All P-3 members said the problems with the CANWFZ
Treaty were serious enough not to be solved without an
amendment that made it clear that agreements existing at the
time of entry into force (in particular, the Tashkent Treaty
creating a common defense among the C-5 and Russia) cannot
take precedence over the CANWFZ Treaty. France stressed that
the CANWFZ Treaty did not in fact create a nuclear
weapon-free zone and that to welcome it as such was to
devalue such zones altogether. The U.S. said the P-3 were
willing to discuss solutions with the C-5, but confirmed that
only a Treaty amendment would solve the problems.
10. (SBU) Russia disputed the P-3 analysis of the Treaty and
the negotiating record and insisted that any consultations
should include Russia. Antonov offered to consult the C-5
and report back on their plans.
--------------------------------------------- --
U.S.-India Civil Nuclear Cooperation Initiative
--------------------------------------------- --
11. (SBU) The discussion of this agenda item was perhaps the
most detailed and valuable of the session. DAS Semmel
described the initiative's status and the steps needed to
bring it into being. He noted: (1) the U.S. relevant
legislation was passed in December 2006, (2) bilateral
negotiations on a nuclear cooperation (the 123 agreement)
with India had some distance to go, (3) India had not yet
completed its talks on safeguards with the IAEA, (4) any such
agreement would require the approval of the IAEA Board of
Governors, (5) U.S. legislation required the President to
certify to the U.S. Congress prior to a vote on the 123
agreement that India had made "substantial progress" with the
IAEA on concluding an Additional Protocol, and (6) a
consensus decision by the Nuclear Supplier Group (NSG) was
needed. He doubted the steps would be completed by the time
of the April Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) meeting, but
suggested that an extraordinary NSG session in the fall could
decide to provide an exception for India.
12. (SBU) Canada welcomed the Henry J. Hyde United
States-India Peaceful Atomic Energy Cooperation Promotion
Act, but wanted to ensure that any nuclear cooperation with
India did not violate NPT obligations to avoided assisting
non-nuclear weapons states to acquire nuclear weapons.
Canada said India could be asked to endorse elements of the
NPT or to act in conformity with it.
13. (SBU) Russia asked whether the U.S. planned to cooperate
with India on enrichment, to which DAS Semmel answered no.
Russia asked what "substantial progress" toward negotiating
an Additional Protocol means (a condition in the Hyde Act for
approving a U.S.-India cooperation agreement). DAS Semmel
said although progress is in the eye of the beholder, the
President needs something that can be certified for Congress.
Russia was also concerned that India wanted some form of
recognition from Russia during the upcoming Putin visit,
claiming the U.S. had referred to India as a "responsible
nuclear state." Antonov said Russia would not recognize
India as a nuclear weapon state.
14. (SBU) Japan noted the Indian Prime Minister was scheduled
to visit Japan, during which the two sides would discuss a
framework for cooperation. Japan would examine any agreement
in light of its impact on the NPT regime.
15. (SBU) France and the UK both emphasized the need for the
right safeguards agreement between India and the IAEA. The
UK has said this repeatedly to India. Italy would be more
confident about the deal if India had more concretely
committed to FMCT negotiations and had agreed to ratify the
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT).
16. (SBU) DAS Semmel noted that until the IAEA Board of
Governors approves a safeguards agreement, the other steps
could not be taken. He stressed that the Hyde Act is the law
of the land, but the President had issued a signing
statement, giving himself some flexibility in implementing
it, which is not an unusual step. Regarding the Russian
comment, he stressed that the U.S. does not regard India as a
nuclear weapon state and has told India that. DAS Semmel
also made clear that if India detonates a nuclear explosive
device, U.S. law requires that cooperation stop and nuclear
material and equipment supplied under the 123 agreement be
returned.
17. (SBU) In response to a Canadian question about whether
other states had begun to negotiate bilateral nuclear
agreements, the Russian delegate said Russia was discussing
an agreement to expand the nuclear cooperation that it
already had with India. The UK said agreement within the NSG
would be sufficient; there would be no need for a separate
UK-India agreement. France would seek an agreement with
India, but IAEA safeguards were a prerequisite. On the other
hand, France did not need new legislation to engage in
cooperation.
------------------------------------
Other Nuclear Suppliers Group Issues
------------------------------------
18. (SBU) The Group also discussed the status of nations that
adhere to NSG Guidelines but are not NSG members and also the
transfer of sensitive technologies. For the first issue,
Germany noted the need for continued discussion of the
modalities for association with the NSG. Luedeking expressed
concerns that bringing India too close to the NSG could
support India's desire to be recognized as a nuclear weapon
state. Russia asked the Chair to clarify the difference
between Germany's March proposal on NSG
association/membership and the earlier Russian proposal.
Antonov suggested that Germany and Russia combine their
suggestions into a joint proposal. Antonov also commented
that India would not accept anything less than full-fledged
membership. Japan pointed out that by the terms of various
UNSC resolutions, all UN members had to adhere to NSG
guidelines vis--vis Iran and the DPRK.
19. (SBU) Summarizing the brief discussion, Luedeking said:
-- NSG members should take great care in moving forward on
this issue and that there was no rush,
-- that previous Russian suggestions should be reconsidered,
-- basic concerns over passing information on denial
notifications to non-members and the question of NPT status
as a criterion for association with the NSG still need to be
addressed.
20. (SBU) Concerning the transfer of sensitive nuclear
technologies, Canada said it was no longer comfortable with
the "rolling moratorium" on the transfer of sensitive
technologies because it did not account for the good
non-proliferation record of states that could be potential
recipients of transfers. Canada advocated that the NSG agree
on criteria that would allow providers of sensitive
technology to distinguish between states, and until the NSG
agrees on such criteria, Canada cannot accept a continuation
of the moratorium. Canada noted that it is simply not honest
to continue saying in G-8 summit statements that progress is
being ade in reaching agreement on the criteria-based
pproach in the NSG. The UK agreed very strongly with this
approach and hoped the NPDG could help move the NSG toward
agreement.
21. (SBU) In response to questions from the Chair and Japan,
DAS Semmel said the subject was under active discussion in
the U.S., but the U.S. position continues to be that no state
should supply sensitive nuclear technology to any state that
now lacks nuclear enrichment and reprocessing capabilities.
22. (SBU) The Chair requested the U.S. to reconsider before
the next NSG plenary, noting that another statement
supporting a continuation of the moratorium was not
acceptable to many G-8 members.
--------
The DPRK
--------
23. (SBU) Nakane introduced the subject, stating that there
were good prospects for another round of the Six-Party Talks,
which Japan considered the best way to resolve the issue.
Japan hoped that the DPRK would come with a more positive
attitude but also thought it useful to apply pressure on the
DPRK by implementing UNSC Resolution 1718. He noted that
only a few states have reported on their implementation of
1718 to the UN Sanctions Committee. DAS Semmel reported on
the positive statements following Assistant Secretary Hill's
meetings in Berlin and said that a resumption of the talks
was possible in February.
24. (SBU) The Chair supported the call for implementation of
UNSCR 1718 and noted that the EU was taking the necessary
steps for this.
----
Iran
----
25. (SBU) After some introductory remarks by the Chair, who
said that the unity of the "P-3 plus 3" was important in
getting UNSCR 1737 approved, DAS Semmel said that UNSCR 1737
represented the single most important nonproliferation issue
and that much was at stake in its implementation, such as the
credibility of the IAEA and the UN Security Council. The
sanctions had to be targeted, multilateral, and enforced;
Iran needs to know it stands alone. But if it were concluded
that the UNSC resolution route had run its course, the G-8
partners must consider steps outside the Council, such as
financial measures.
26. (SBU) France, Japan, and Canada all called for
implementation of 1737, and France asserted that the unity
behind it may be causing Iran to change its position. Russia
called 1737 a serious signal to Iran but argued against
isolating Iran. Antonov expressed surprise that the day
after passage of UNSCR 1737, a G-8 state had introduced
sanctions "against Russia." Doing so meant Russia had
created the legal basis for sanctioning itself. He
questioned the unity of the six under these circumstances
(Note: He was clearly referring to U.S. unilateral sanctions
imposed on Russian entities in late December. End note).
27. (SBU) Luedeking summarized the discussion as follows:
-- The six were committed to UNSCR 1737,
-- The six were prepared to suspend the measures if Iran
suspended enrichment and negotiations followed,
-- The six need to be credible, which means implementation of
UNSCR 1737,
-- The G-8 partners hoped the process was not coming to the
end of the line in the UNSC,
-- Many shared the concern that Iran was not complying with
the resolution.
--------------------------------------------- ----
Multilateral Approaches to the Nuclear Fuel Cycle
--------------------------------------------- ----
28. (SBU) Luedeking said that despite all the attention given
to developing multilateral approaches to the nuclear fuel
cycle, the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) had shown little
interest, seeing them all as restrictions. Canada also
raised questions about these approaches, wondering if it was
not a solution in search of a problem. The various
proposals, he pointed out, were designed to solve the "Iran
problem," but he was not sure a global problem existed.
29. (SBU) France believed the reason for the lack of response
was that the nuclear suppliers did not really have a product
to sell. The next step might be for the IAEA to look at the
proposals and determine which made sense. He agreed with
Canada that there might not be a supply problem, but there
was a political problem, and the developed countries had to
show they were not creating a one-sided embargo. The UK and
Russia also said there was a need to engage with the
recipient countries, while the U.S. said there were reasons
why states had made all these proposals: the expansion of the
nuclear industry, the projected growth in global energy
needs, nonproliferation concerns, environmental concerns, and
concerns over waste.
30. (SBU) The Chair summarized the Group's conclusions:
-- Acceptance by recipients was a key point,
-- The supplier countries needed to be seen as addressing the
issue,
-- The IAEA could play a key role.
31. (SBU) Luedeking also referred to the paper he had
circulated before the meeting and which suggested several
criteria by which proposals could be evaluated: proliferation
resistance, assurance of supply, legitimacy, and market
compatibility (to which several delegates had added
feasibility). He asked for comments on the paper by March 15
and said that at some point "perhaps at the G8 Summit" it
would be useful to make a common statement about this
subject.
--------------------------------------------- --------------
Universalization Issues: Additional Protocol and UNSCR 1540
--------------------------------------------- --------------
31. (SBU) As time was running out, the Group did not discuss
these issues. The Chair circulated papers containing points
to be used in demarches on both issues and asked for any
comments by February 9. If none is received, the Germans
will proceed. Luedeking also said the group might consider
coordinating assistance to states in carrying out the
requirements of UNSCR 1540 and noted that the EU is very
active in this area.
--------------------------------------------- -----------
BW and the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism
--------------------------------------------- -----------
32. (SBU) These items were skipped, but the Chair called
attention to a G-8 Forensic Epidemiology Workshop to be held
in London, March 13-15. He also pointed out that the EU and
the European Commission had a major role in nuclear energy
and therefore should be represented in the Global Initiative.
---------------------------
Other Business/Next Meeting
---------------------------
33. (SBU) The U.S. called attention to the growing and
anticipated burdens the IAEA will face, as many new demands
for safeguards will arise in the next few years. He
suggested that the G-8 consider how to meet this concern.
34. (SBU) The Chair promised a short agenda for the next
meeting and cancelled the meeting scheduled for February.
Thus the next meeting will take place March 30 in Berlin.
TIMKEN JR