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Cablegate: Un and Ngo Community On International Force For

Published: Wed 22 Nov 2006 04:43 PM
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PP RUEHBZ RUEHDU RUEHGI RUEHJO RUEHMA RUEHMR RUEHPA RUEHRN RUEHROV
DE RUEHNJ #1350/01 3261643
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 221643Z NOV 06
FM AMEMBASSY NDJAMENA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4594
INFO RUEHZO/AFRICAN UNION COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHDS/AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA PRIORITY 0869
RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO PRIORITY 0126
RUEHDK/AMEMBASSY DAKAR PRIORITY 1226
RUEHKH/AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM PRIORITY 0355
RUEHKI/AMEMBASSY KINSHASA PRIORITY 0125
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI PRIORITY 0346
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 NDJAMENA 001350
SIPDIS
SENSITIVE
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: CD PGOV PREL SU UNSC KPKO
SUBJECT: UN AND NGO COMMUNITY ON INTERNATIONAL FORCE FOR
EASTERN CHAD: NO INTERNAL INTERFERENCE
NDJAMENA 00001350 001.2 OF 002
1. (SBU) SUMMARY. In two separate meetings on November 21,
the United Nations and non-governmental organizations (NGOs)
in Chad made clear that any eventual international force on
the eastern border with Sudan should focus on protection of
humanitarian corridors and not involve itself in Chadian
internal political-military affairs. The UN Technical
Assessment Team (TAM), currently in the Central African
Republic, will return to N'Djamena on November 27 when it
will brief the diplomatic community before traveling to the
east from November 28-30. UN Department of Peacekeeping
Operations (DPKO) Assistant Secretary-General Hedi Annabi
will meet up with the TAM in Chad on November 30 and will
brief the Ambassador on the TAM's conclusions on December 2.
END SUMMARY.
2. (SBU) On November 21, UN agencies in Chad hosted two
separate meetings to brief the diplomatic and NGO communities
about the impending visit of the Technical Assessment Mission
(TAM) from the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations
(DPKO). The TAM arrived briefly in Chad November 21 before
flying immediately to the Central African Republic to begin
its work there. The office of the United Nations Development
Program (UNDP), which is coordinating the TAM's visit, hosted
a small meeting for the diplomatic community. Later in the
day, the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
(OCHA) hosted a second meeting open to members of the NGO
community with a view to finding a consolidated position to
present to the TAM when it met with them on November 27.
WHAT A FORCE WILL DO
--------------------
3. (SBU) UNDP, OCHA and the NGO community were unambiguous
that any eventual international presence in eastern Chad
should be mandated to protect refugees and to the extent
possible internally displaced persons (IDPs). It should also
be responsible for protecting humanitarian corridors to allow
unobstructed access between the refugee camps, IDP zones and
humanitarian bases of operation and to prevent further
deterioration of the overall humanitarian situation.
4. (SBU) UNDP Chief Kingsley Amaning was explicit that the
force should serve as a clearly visible deterrent against
humanitarian displacements and cross-borderQttacks, in
particular the Janjaweed He also said that the force should
act as a barrier against rebel infiltration into the refugee
camps. Amaning also looked to the force to report on human
rights violations occurring in eastern Chad as a means of
highlighting for the international community the magnitude of
the "atrocities."
WHAT A FORCE WILL NOT DO
------------------------
5. (SBU) At both meetings the UN and NGO communities made
clear their belief that the eventual force should not get
involved in Chadian political-military internal affairs.
Specifically, UNDP warned against the force's being seen as
supporting the Government of Chad's (GOC) political-military
aspirations or as intervening against the powerful anti-Deby
rebellion. UNHCR later pointed out that avoiding such
pitfalls would be easier in theory than in practice. UNDP
also cautioned against the force assuming entirely what
should be the GOC's responsibility to protect the
humanitarian community operating in the east. The issue of
whether the force would have the authority to chase
perpetrators across the border was debated but not resolved.
TO ARM OR NOT TO ARM
--------------------
6. (SBU) No consensus could be reached among the UN and
humanitarian representatives over whether an international
presence in eastern Chad should be armed and as such be
allowed to make armed interventions. UNDP insists that
President Deby's precondition for accepting such a force in
Chad, which, in UNDP's view would be unarmed police forces,
made the issue a moot point, but NGOs in particular
questioned the efficacy of a unarmed team of monitors in the
face of an armed, aggressive enemy.
7. (SBU) The CARE Country Director argued that by way of
precedent, the only factor that brought peace and ultimately
established order in Sierra Leone was the arrival of armed
British forces. A UNHCR representative countered that the
unarmed UN Protection Force in Bosnia was an example of a
NDJAMENA 00001350 002.2 OF 002
successful unarmed monitoring mission. Representatives of
the diplomatic community were equally skeptical of how a
force that lacked the mandate to "shoot back" could be
effective in eastern Chad.
THE BIGGER THE FORCE, THE BETTER
--------------------------------
8. (SBU) There was general agreement among the humanitarian
and UN agencies that a force size of several hundred civilian
forces would be insufficient to ensure security in eastern
Chad, given the number of troops amassing on both sides of
the border and given the deterioration of the situation as a
result of inter-ethnic conflict, such as in Goz Beida. UNDP
argued that the bigger the force size, the stronger the
message sent as a deterrent.
9. (SBU) UNDP raised the point that force size may be
determined by whether or not "hybrid" forces are ultimately
deployed in Darfur. If troop levels on that side of the
border are sufficiently high to secure the situation, Amaning
asserted that a similarly large presence might not be
necessary in eastern Chad. He also noted President Deby's
concerns that a large UN force on the border might give
Sudanese President Bashir a pretext to further destabilize
Chad.
THE SOONER, THE BETTER
----------------------
10. (SBU) UNDP Chief told the diplomatic corps that he did
not expect any force to arrive in Chad before the end of
January 2007, something the NGO community grudgingly
acknowledged, although they continued to hope to have the
force installed as soon as possible. UNDP pledged to raise
issues of timing and force size with DPKO A/SYG Hedi Annabi
when he met up with the TAM November 30. Annabi is scheduled
to de-brief the Ambassador on December 2 after his meeting
with President Deby earlier in the day. As a sidenote, UNDP
Chief informed that French PM de Villepin would visit
N'Djamena for four hours beginning at 0930 local time on
November 30 as one leg of a trip that also includes
Johannesburg and Brazzaville.
WALL
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