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DE RUEHKO #6231 2990407
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P 260407Z OCT 06
FM AMEMBASSY TOKYO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7803
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
RUCPDOC/USDOC WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUYNAAC/COMNAVFORJAPAN YOKOSUKA JA PRIORITY
RHHMUNA/HQ USPACOM HONOLULU HI PRIORITY
RHHMHBA/COMPACFLT PEARL HARBOR HI//N541// PRIORITY
RHMFIUU/HQ PACAF HICKAM AFB HI//CC/PA// PRIORITY
RUHBANB/OKINAWA FLD OFC US FORCES JAPAN CP BUTLER JA PRIORITY
RHMFIUU/COMUSJAPAN YOKOTA AB JA PRIORITY
INFO RUEHFK/AMCONSUL FUKUOKA 8594
RUEHOK/AMCONSUL OSAKA KOBE 1980
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 4675
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 1315
RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL 0794
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 2368
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHDC
UNCLAS TOKYO 006231
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
STATE FOR I/RF, PA/PR/FPC/W, IIP/G/EA, EAP/PD, R/MR,
EAP/J, EAP/P, PM;
USTR FOR PUBLIC AFFAIRS OFFICE;
TREASURY FOR OASIA/IMI;
SECDEF FOR OASD/PA;
CP BUTLER OKINAWA FOR AREA FIELD OFFICE;
PACOM HONOLULU FOR PUBLIC DIPLOMACY ADVISOR
E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: OIIP KMDR KPAO JA
SUBJECT: MEDIA REACTION Q NORTH KOREA - TOKYO
LEAD STORIES: Thursday morning's Tokyo Shimbun front-
paged a speech Wednesday by JDA Director General Kyuma in
Tokyo in which he indicated a plan to partially deploy
PAC-3 and SM-3 missile defense systems by the end of
December 2007, advancing the JDA's original deployment
plan by three months.
1. "North Korean Nuclear Crisis: Limits to China's
Influence" The liberal Asahi's columnist Yoichi Funabashi
commented (10/26): "China sent three senior officials,
including State Councilor Tang, to Pyongyang after North
Korea's nuclear test. Following his return to Beijing,
Tang told visiting Secretary of State Rice: 'Fortunately,
our trip was not fruitless.'... North Korea apparently
told Tang that it would refrain from conducting another
nuclear test for the time being and that it would return
to the six-party talks depending on the US reaction.
Pyongyang has for the time being kept Beijing from losing
face.... China tried to stop North Korea from launching
ballistic missiles in July but failed to do so, exposing
the limits of its influence over the DPRK.... China is
gravely concerned that North Korea's open possession of
nuclear weapons could set off a nuclear domino effect. At
the same time, it is worried that applying too much
pressure could cause its neighbor to lash out or
collapse.... China will undoubtedly apply further
pressure on Pyongyang to forgo another nuclear test and
return to the six-party talks. Possible options include
freezing financial dealings, halting oil supplies,
blockading the border, and reevaluating the China-DPRK
defense treaty. But the more pressure China applies on
North Korea, the more Pyongyang will use its nuclear
weapons as a political tool in its dealings with
Beijing."
SCHIEFFER