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Cablegate: Daily Summary of Japanese Press 07/10/06

Published: Mon 10 Jul 2006 10:44 PM
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UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 07 TOKYO 003838
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DEPT FOR E, P, EB, EAP/J, EAP/P, EAP/PD, PA
WHITE HOUSE/NSC/NEC; JUSTICE FOR STU CHEMTOB IN ANTI-TRUST DIVISION;
TREASURY/OASIA/IMI/JAPAN; DEPT PASS USTR/PUBLIC AFFAIRS OFFICE;
SECDEF FOR JCS-J-5/JAPAN,
DASD/ISA/EAPR/JAPAN; DEPT PASS ELECTRONICALLY TO USDA
FAS/ITP FOR SCHROETER; PACOM HONOLULU FOR PUBLIC DIPLOMACY ADVISOR;
CINCPAC FLT/PA/ COMNAVFORJAPAN/PA.
E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: OIIP KMDR KPAO PGOV PINR ECON ELAB JA
SUBJECT: DAILY SUMMARY OF JAPANESE PRESS 07/10/06
Part-1
INDEX:
(1) Japan will not budge on taking vote on July 10, agreement with
US to do all the two can do to persuade China, Russia
(2) Challenge of North Korea's missile firing-What's ahead in
strategy toward DPRK: How to defend Japan; US military uncertain on
whether to conduct counterattack operations
(3) Chinese military attaches made frequent contacts with Defense
Agency officials; Military info leaks suspected
(4) Government made thorough preparations for Japan's response to
Taepodong launch; Secret team launched 20 days before missile
launches
(5) In speech in Sasebo, Economic Minister-Counselor urges US,
Japan to energize business activities to strengthen bilateral ties
ARTICLES:
(1) Japan will not budge on taking vote on July 10, agreement with
US to do all the two can do to persuade China, Russia
NIHON KEIZAI (Page 1) (Abridged)
Evening, July 10, 2006
The Japanese government aims to put to a vote at the United Nations
Security Council a resolution for imposing sanctions on North Korea
as jointly proposed by Japan, the United States, and other
countries. It intends to put the resolution to a vote on July 10 and
will not budge on this schedule. In fact, Foreign Minister Taro Aso
stressed to reporters: "It's better not to delay taking a vote."
This remark seemed to reflect his judgment that it would be
impossible for North Korea to soften its stance even if it is given
more time. At a liaison meeting of the government and the ruling
parties, Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi stated: "The international
community needs to work together to work on (China and Russia)."
This morning, the Japanese and US governments agreed to work in
close cooperation with other countries, such as Britain and France,
to try to get the resolution adopted at the UNSC. They also
confirmed to do everything they can to persuade China and Russia,
which are both reluctant to adopt the resolution.
This policy line was confirmed by Foreign Minister Aso during his
earlier conversation on the phone with Secretary of State Rice and
during his meeting today at the ministry with Assistant Secretary of
State Hill for East Asia and the Pacific, who is now making a tour
of the concerned Asian nations, such as China and South Korea. Chief
Cabinet Secretary Shinzo Abe also talked on the phone to US
Presidential Assistant for National Security Affairs Hadley.
Aso pointed out during the meeting with Hill: "It's important to
adopt the resolution as quickly as possible." Hill emphasized the
need to set in motion the six-party talks as swiftly as possible.
(2) Challenge of North Korea's missile firing-What's ahead in
strategy toward DPRK: How to defend Japan; US military uncertain on
whether to conduct counterattack operations
TOKYO SHIMBUN (Page 1) (Full)
July 8, 2006
Shigeru Handa, city desk
TOKYO 00003838 002 OF 007
SUBJECT: DAILY SUMMARY OF JAPANESE PRESS 07/10/06
Part-1
INDEX:
(1) Japan will not budge on taking vote on July 10, agreement with
US to do all the two can do to persuade China, Russia
When North Korea fired seven ballistic missiles on July 5, a
resolution that was certain to clear the municipal assembly of
Okinawa City in Okinawa Prefecture was scrapped. It was a resolution
against the planned deployment of Patriot Advanced Capability 3
(PAC-3) surface-to-air intercept missiles to the US Air Force's
Kadena base on the island prefecture.
"Isn't it strange to discuss the matter under a state of tension?" A
conservative member of the city's municipal assembly raised this
question to make his case. This assemblyman's assertion gained
ground.
The ballistic missiles shocked Okinawa. Is Japan fully ready to
defend itself?
In December 2003, the government made a cabinet decision to
introduce a missile defense (MD) system. This MD system counters
intruding ballistic missiles in two stages. An Aegis-equipped
destroyer of the Maritime Self-Defense Force (MSDF) on stage
launches sea-based Standard Missile 3 (SM-3) intercept missiles to
shoot down a ballistic missile in midcourse phase. In case the SM-3
misses the missile, the ground-based PAC-3 interceptor shoots it
down in the terminal phase. PAC-3 deployment starts in March next
year and SM-3 deployment in March 2008.
However, the Air Self-Defense Force (ASDF) will deploy the PAC-3 to
only three of its six air defense missile groups. The PAC-3's shield
is highly effective only in Tokyo, Gifu, Fukuoka, and their
environs. This was noted in the Diet. There are people inside and
outside the shield of PAC-3 intercept missiles. This problem has yet
to be resolved.
US Forces Japan (USFJ) plans to deploy the PAC-3 to the Kadena Air
Base. This PAC-3 deployment to Kadena is intended to shield US
military personnel on that base.
The PAC-3 cannot be expected to intercept all intruding missiles
even if its shield network covers the Japanese archipelago like a
porcupine, according to Defense Agency Administrative Deputy
Director General Takemasa Moriya. Given its cost effectiveness,
there is a limit to depending on MD within the limited slot of
defense spending.
"If North Korea fires many ballistic missiles at Japan, that will
constitute a defense emergency," one SDF staff officer said. "But,"
he continued, "the SDF is not capable of fighting overseas." The SDF
officer added, "In this case, we can only expect US forces to strike
North Korea." The officer indicated that his expectations were on
the Japan-US alliance.
Japan and the United States are to cooperate with each other to
defend Japan under their security treaty. However, the 1997
guidelines for defense cooperation between Japan and the United
States state: "US forces will consider, as necessary, the use of
forces providing additional strike power." With the wording
"consider," the guidelines indicates that the United States will not
automatically invoke its strike power.
TOKYO 00003838 003 OF 007
SUBJECT: DAILY SUMMARY OF JAPANESE PRESS 07/10/06
Part-1
INDEX:
(1) Japan will not budge on taking vote on July 10, agreement with
US to do all the two can do to persuade China, Russia
The question then is how far the United States will go to defend
Japan. In 1993, when there was a crisis over North Korea's suspected
development of nuclear weapons, US forces studied the option of
striking North Korea. The US military reportedly estimated
casualties in a full-scale war at 52,000 for US forces, 490,000 for
South Korean forces, and 1,000,000 including civilians.
China and North Korea have concluded a treaty on friendship,
cooperation, and mutual assistance, under which the two countries
are obligated to cooperate with each other in the military area.
This bilateral pact cannot be ignored. "US forces may only build up
MD deployment in Japan," one in the Defense Agency surmises.
If the MD system and the Japan-US alliance are insufficient, does
Japan have any other ways to secure its people?
"It would be effective to conclude a multilateral treaty that
freezes missile firing in Northeast Asia," said Tetsuo Maeda, a
journalist on military affairs. "In that case," Maeda added,
"China's ballistic missiles, of course, and the US military's cruise
missiles will be subject to the freeze." Maeda went on, "South
Korea, which is now hurrying to develop short-range ballistic
missiles, must join in, or it will be meaningless." He noted that no
security policy can work out without high-level diplomacy.
(3) Chinese military attaches made frequent contacts with Defense
Agency officials; Military info leaks suspected
SANKEI (Top play) (Full)
July 8, 2006
Two military attaches to the Chinese embassy in Japan were
repeatedly in touch with senior Defense Agency officials, sources
revealed yesterday. Police authorities have confirmed on the spot
that each of the two Chinese embassy attaches had met Defense Agency
officials and others about 20 times. Police investigated the agency
in secret to find if they had leaked military information, including
classified information about the Self-Defense Forces (SDF). However,
police investigations were discontinued because both Chinese
attaches were returned home. Meanwhile, it became known in December
last year that a Japanese diplomat at the Japanese consulate general
in Shanghai had been urged by Chinese intelligence authorities and
committed suicide in China. China is now suspected of having
conducted espionage activities in Japan, as well.
According to informed sources, a military attache to the Chinese
embassy in Japan repeatedly met a former mid-level Defense Agency
official at restaurants in Tokyo and other places around 1997.
Police investigators watched and tailed them. As a result, they
confirmed on the spot that the two had made about 20 secret contacts
in one year. However, the attache suddenly returned to China. In
2002, another attache repeatedly met a senior official of a Defense
Agency research institution at restaurants and other places. The
police confirmed that they had made more than 10 contacts in nearly
one year. However, this Chinese attache also returned home shortly
thereafter.
Their contacts were periodic. Police authorities therefore kept tabs
TOKYO 00003838 004 OF 007
SUBJECT: DAILY SUMMARY OF JAPANESE PRESS 07/10/06
Part-1
INDEX:
(1) Japan will not budge on taking vote on July 10, agreement with
US to do all the two can do to persuade China, Russia
on them for a long time, suspecting that those Defense Agency
officials might have leaked defense secrets to their Chinese
counterparts. However, the police had to discontinue investigations
because both of the two Chinese attaches returned home. The police
could not discover if intelligence had been leaked.
The Defense Agency classifies confidential information into three
categories-top secret, strictly secret, and secret. SDF personnel
and other employees leaking secret or higher classified information
will be charged with a violation of the SDF Law.
In September 2000, a senior official of the Defense Agency was
arrested by the Tokyo Metropolitan Police Department (MPD) for a
violation of the law. This official was alleged to have handed over
a secret document to an attache from the Russian embassy in Japan.
In March last year, another incident involving the Chinese embassy
was brought to light. In this case, the MPD raided the Defense
Agency, suspecting that a senior official of the agency stole a
document with submarine data from his office. The stolen file is
alleged to have gone to China through a trader who used to visit the
Chinese embassy.
In March this year, a Tokyo-based consultant firm's president was
arrested for a violation of the Immigrant Control and Refugee
Recognition Law. The president's pocket notebook seized by the MPD
had a description indicating that the president was ordered by a
Chinese embassy counselor to campaign for the unification of China
and Taiwan. The MPD therefore made an unusual request to the
counselor in April to report as a witness. This incident brought to
light a part of Chinese spying.
However, this is the first time that police investigators have
uncovered questionable contacts between Chinese embassy staff
members and Defense Agency officials.
(4) Government made thorough preparations for Japan's response to
Taepodong launch; Secret team launched 20 days before missile
launches
North Korea launched a barrage of missiles on July 5. How did the
Japanese prepare itself against such launches? The government led by
the Prime Minister's Official Residence (Kantei) carried out
thorough preparations for over a month in close cooperation with the
United States. The government's ability to gather Intelligence and
manage a crisis has improved markedly since North Korea launched a
Taepodong-1 missile in 1998. But some challenges still remain
unresolved.
The government began considering measures against North Korean
missiles in late May.
Chief Cabinet Secretary Shinzo Abe ordered Assistant Deputy Cabinet
Secretary Hiroyasu Ando, a former Foreign Ministry official, to
SIPDIS
secretly study measures against missile launches. Aware of growing
SIPDIS
signals around the Taepodong base in North Korea, the Self-Defense
Forces also kept a vigil.
Finally on June 15, it became clear that North Korea mounted a
TOKYO 00003838 005 OF 007
SUBJECT: DAILY SUMMARY OF JAPANESE PRESS 07/10/06
Part-1
INDEX:
(1) Japan will not budge on taking vote on July 10, agreement with
US to do all the two can do to persuade China, Russia
Taepodong-2 on the launch pad.
That evening, Deputy Chief Cabinet Secretary Masahiro Futahashi,
assistant deputy chief cabinet secretaries Ando and Kyoji
Yanagisawa, and Cabinet Intelligence Director Hideshi Mitani
assembled at Abe's office on the fifth floor of Kantei. They formed
the government's secret team to deal with missile launches. The team
also served as the government's control tower to make arrangements
for sanctions against North Korea and Japan's response.
To be prepared against missile launches, the members also decided to
remain in Tokyo on weekends in principle so that the relevant
cabinet ministers, such as the chief cabinet secretary, the foreign
minister, the defense chief, and the land, infrastructure, and
transport minister, could assemble swiftly. In mid-June, the team
generally outlined a nine-item sanctions plan, including a ban on
port calls by the North Korean ferry Man Gyong Bong.
In a tense atmosphere on the morning of July 4, the Kantei, based on
the intelligence that the North would fire more than one missile in
the early hours of July 5, began mapping out specific sanction
measures to protest launches of Rodong and Scud missiles in addition
to a Taepodong-2.
The project team was split in views on the evening of July 4 over
Japan's responses to such cases as a Taepodong-2 not flying over the
Japanese archipelago and the North firing Rodong missiles alone.
Many expressed cautious views about prohibiting Man Gyong Bong's
port calls in reaction to such events. But Abe's words determined
Japan's course of action: "North Korea has received two yellow cards
due to the abduction and nuclear issues. It doesn't matter whether a
Taepodong does not reach Japan or the North fires Rodongs, Japan
will give that country a red card the next time around."
In the end, the Taepodong-2 did not reach Japan, but the government
in just a few hours after its launch formally decided to impose
sanctions on the North, including banning the Man Gyong Bon from
entering Japanese ports.
Close cooperation with the United States
Japan the United States worked closely to prepare themselves against
North Korean missiles.
On the morning of June 15, Abe discussed Japan's response with US
Ambassador to Japan Thomas Schieffer over breakfast at his official
residence.
"Are you sure that Japan will take a strong attitude, including
economic sanctions?" Schieffer asked. In response, Abe said firmly,
"Yes, I'm positive." Through the Abe-Schieffer breakfast meeting,
Tokyo and Washington also generally nailed down the scenario of
Japan seeking sanctions against North Korea at a UN Security Council
meeting with the assistance of the United States.
In a press conference at 9 a.m. July 5, five hours and a half after
the North fired the first missile, Foreign Minister Taro Aso
announced that Japan had called for an emergency UN Security Council
meeting.
TOKYO 00003838 006 OF 007
SUBJECT: DAILY SUMMARY OF JAPANESE PRESS 07/10/06
Part-1
INDEX:
(1) Japan will not budge on taking vote on July 10, agreement with
US to do all the two can do to persuade China, Russia
Abe said to his aides on July 7: "Japan's resolute stance prompted
the United States, Britain, and France to support the UN Security
Council sanctions resolution."
System to notify local governments needs improvements
A senior Cabinet Secretariat official noted: "Unlike North Korea's
missile launch in 1998, we were all in all able to take the
necessary steps this time." Abe held his first press conference
about three hours after the North fired the first missile to give an
outline of the missile launches.
The government's information was patchy when the North launched a
Taepodong-1 missile on August 31, 1998. The Defense Agency did not
formally announce until 11 p.m., half a day after the launch, that
the missile warhead had landed in the Pacific Ocean. The delay was
ascribable to poor coordination between the Foreign Ministry and the
Defense Agency for press announcements.
The teamwork between Japan and the United States then was also poor.
The US military was slow to inform the Self-Defense Forces of the
missile launch.
The July 5 launches, though, exposed the poor communication level
between the central and local governments.
The prefectural governments received fax messages on the missile
launches from the Internal Affairs and Communications Ministry Fire
and Disaster Management Agency at 6:30 a.m., three hours after the
North fired the first missile. Hokkaido Governor Harumi Takahashi
said disapprovingly in a press conference on July 5, "We need such
information in a more timely manner. The fax message came after NHK
news reports, and that's a problem."
In the wake of the missile launches, the Fukui prefectural
government went into an initial emergency mode for the first time to
defend its people. Frustrated with a lack of information from the
central government, Fukui Governor Issei Nishikawa reportedly
directly called the Fire and Disaster Management Agency to gather
information.
The government was also slow to issue warnings to the ships
navigating in the Sea of Japan and aircraft.
A government source said, "The government directly explained things
to the public on the situation in the press conference shortly after
six o'clock." But local governments are urging the central
government to find out what needs to be done to provide more
information to the public in a timely manner and take necessary
steps accordingly.
(5) In speech in Sasebo, Economic Minister-Counselor urges US,
Japan to energize business activities to strengthen bilateral ties
YOMIURI (Full)
June 29, 2006
Economic Minister-Counselor James Zumwalt at the US Embassy to Japan
TOKYO 00003838 007 OF 007
SUBJECT: DAILY SUMMARY OF JAPANESE PRESS 07/10/06
Part-1
INDEX:
(1) Japan will not budge on taking vote on July 10, agreement with
US to do all the two can do to persuade China, Russia
delivered a speech titled "The Future of Japan-US Economic
Relations" at the Shinwa Bank in Sasebo City, Nagasaki Prefecture,
yesterday. In the speech, Zumwalt stated: "There is no other
economic issue between the US and Japan than the beef issue now. It
is necessary to promote business activities between the two
countries, as part of efforts to strengthen bilateral relations."
The economic minister-counselor gave the speech before about 40
local economists and others under the sponsorship of the
Japan-America Society of Sasebo and other organizations. In
reference to US-Japan relations, Zumwalt emphatically said: "The
combined shares of outlays by the US and Japan for military affairs
and research and development are 55 PERCENT and 50 PERCENT ,
respectively." He added: "Japan is a partner with which the US finds
it easier to cooperate based on common values."
On the beef issue, Zumwalt stated: "I hope Japan will introduce
international criteria, instead of its own ones." Turning to Japan's
official development assistance (ODA), he remarked: "Japan's ODA has
decreased by 30 PERCENT over the past six years. It is important
for Japan to disburse ODA funds commensurate with its economic
strength."
Regarding economic development in Sasebo, which houses US military
bases, Zumwalt said: "It should be possible to bring in investments
directly from the US."
Zumwalt assumed his current post in April 2004. He will return to
the US in August to become the director of the Office of Japanese
Affairs in the East Asian Affairs Bureau at the State Department.
SCHIEFFER
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