P 111147Z DEC 00
FM AMEMBASSY ANKARA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9745
INFO AMCONSUL ISTANBUL
AMCONSUL ADANA
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 06 ANKARA 008112
S/CT FOR REAP
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/07/10
TAGS: PTER TU
SUBJECT: TURKEY: 2000 ANNUAL TERRORISM REPORT
REF: STATE 217248
(U) CLASSIFIED BY DCM JAMES F. JEFFREY FOR REASONS: 1.5
(B) AND (D).
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OVERVIEW
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1. (U) COMBATTING TERRORISM IS A MAJOR PRIORITY IN TURKEY'S FOREIGN AND DOMESTIC POLICY. THE GOT APPROACHES THE WAR
AGAINST TERRORISTS WITH AN OUTLOOK SIMILAR TO THE USG'S INTERNATIONAL, COORDINATED APPROACH. THE DANGER POSED TO TURKEY
BY TERRORISM IS ILLUSTRATED BY THE FACT THAT THE THREE POSTS OF THE U.S. MISSION TO TURKEY CONSTITUTE 50 PERCENT OF THE
HIGH-THREAT POSTS IN THE EUROPEAN BUREAU (EUR). MOREOVER, THE NUMBER OF TERRORIST GROUPS IN TURKEY EXCEEDS THE NUMBER IN
THE REST OF THE HIGH-THREAT EUR COUNTRIES COMBINED. INTERNATIONAL AND DOMESTIC TERRORIST GROUPS IN TURKEY INCLUDE
SEPARATIST, RADICAL ISLAMIST, LEFTIST, AND TRANSNATIONAL GROUPS. RIGHT-WING TERRORISM, WHICH USED TO BE AN ISSUE FOR
TURKEY, IS NOW LARGELY DEFUNCT. RIGHT-WING VIOLENCE, TO THE EXTENT THAT IT EXISTS, OPERATES AT THE LEVEL OF CRIMINAL
MAFIA GANGS.
U.S.-DESIGNATED TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS
2. (U) THE BEST-KNOWN TRANSNATIONAL TERRORIST GROUPS IN TURKEY ARE THE KURDISTAN WORKERS' PARTY (PKK) AND THE
REVOLUTIONARY PEOPLE'S LIBERATION PARTY/FRONT (DHKP/C, FORMERLY KNOWN AS DEV-SOL). ON OCTOBER 8, 1997, THE SECRETARY OF
STATE DESIGNATED BOTH GROUPS AS FOREIGN TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS SUBJECT TO THE ANTITERRORISM AND EFFECTIVE DEATH PENALTY
ACT OF 1996. ON OCTOBER 8, 1999, THE SECRETARY RENEWED THOSE DESIGNATIONS.
LEFTIST TERROR ORGANIZATIONS
3. (U) BEYOND THE PKK AND DHKP/C, THERE ARE SEVERAL LEFTIST AND ISLAMIST TERRORIST GROUPS OPERATING IN TURKEY. MANY OF
THESE GROUPS ARE SMALL AND RELATIVELY INACTIVE, THOUGH THEY HAVE TARGETED FOREIGNERS, INCLUDING AMERICANS, IN THE PAST.
ONE OF THE MORE ACTIVE LEFTIST GROUPS IS THE TURKISH WORKERS' AND PEASANTS' LIBERATION ARMY (TIKKO). OTHER GROUPS
INCLUDE THE TURKISH COMMUNIST LABORERS' PARTY/LENINIST (TKEP/L), THE TURKISH REVOLUTIONARY COMMUNIST PARTY (TDKP), THE
MARXIST LENINIST COMMUNIST PARTY/LIBERATION (MLKP/K), AND THE TURKISH REVOLUTIONARY COMMUNISTS UNIT (TIKB).
ISLAMIST TERROR ORGANIZATIONS
4. (U) THE ACTIVE ISLAMIST ORGANIZATIONS IN TURKEY ARE THE ISLAMIC GREAT EASTERN RAIDERS' FRONT (IBDA/C), TURKISH
HIZBULLAH, AND THE "JERUSALEM WARRIORS." IN 2000, THE IBDA/C'S TEMPO OF OPERATIONS WAS LOW. HIZBULLAH, HOWEVER, WAS IN
THE SPOTLIGHT BECAUSE TURKISH NATIONAL POLICE (TNP) RAIDS EXPOSED THE ALARMING REACH OF THE ORGANIZATION AND THE
SURPRISING NUMBER OF COVERT MURDERS IT HAD STAGED. THE JERUSALEM WARRIORS ALSO CAME TO PUBLIC ATTENTION IN 2000. THOUGH
TURKISH HIZBULLAH AND THE JERUSALEM WARRIORS ARE NOT RELATED TO EACH OTHER, THE TNP UNCOVERED EVIDENCE FROM ITS RAIDS ON
TURKISH HIZBULLAH THAT EXPOSED SOME OF THE JERUSALEM WARRIORS TERRORIST ACTIVITIES. THE ORGANIZATION IS ALLEGED TO BE
RESPONSIBLE FOR THE ASSASSINATIONS OF SEVERAL PROMINENT TURKISH INTELLECTUALS, FOREIGN DIPLOMATS, AND A U.S. SERVICE
MEMBER.
5. (U) THE CAPITALIZED TITLES BELOW CORRESPOND TO REFTEL QUESTIONS. WITH THE EXCEPTION OF THE "MAJOR COUNTERTERRORISM
EFFORTS" SECTION THAT IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWS, THEY ARE IN THE SAME ORDER AS THE QUESTIONS IN REFTEL.
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MAJOR COUNTERTERRORISM EFFORTS (E)
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INTERNATIONAL APPROACH
6. (U) DURING 2000, THE GOT CONTINUED TO SUPPORT EXISTING INTERNATIONAL CONVENTIONS, PROTOCOLS, AND AGREEMENTS ON
TERRORISM. THE GOT IS A SIGNATORY TO ELEVEN OF TWELVE UN INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM CONVENTIONS. DURING 2000, THE
"INTERNATIONAL CONVENTION FOR THE SUPPRESSION OF TERRORIST BOMBINGS," WHICH TURKEY HAS SIGNED, WAS UNDERGOING THE
PROCESS REQUIRED TO SECURE PARLIAMENTARY RATIFICATION. TURKEY HAS NOT YET SIGNED THE "INTERNATIONAL CONVENTION FOR THE
SUPPRESSION OF THE FINANCING OF TERRORISM."
[INFORMATION FOR THE REPORT'S CLASSIFIED ANNEX.]
7. (C) ACCORDING TO PRESS REPORTS THE GOT HAS EXERCISED ITS RIGHT TO INSPECT THE CARGO OF IRANIAN FLIGHTS TRANSITING
TURKISH AIRSPACE EN ROUTE TO LEBANON. IN LIGHT OF IRAN'S SUPPORT FOR LEBANESE HIZBULLAH, THIS WAS A SIGNIFICANT
CONTRIBUTION TO THE INTERNATIONAL FIGHT AGAINST TERRORISM IN THE MIDDLE EAST. WITH LIMITED SUCCESS, THE TURKS ALSO
CONTINUALLY USE DIPLOMATIC CHANNELS TO URGE WESTERN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES TO TAKE ACTION AGAINST THE EUROPEAN FRONT
ORGANIZATIONS OF THE PKK, DHKP/C AND OTHER GROUPS.
FIGHT AGAINST THE PKK
8. (U) ON THE DOMESTIC FRONT, THE TURKISH ARMED FORCES (TSK), JANDARMA (A PARAMILITARY POLICE FORCE), TNP, AND VILLAGE
GUARDS (PARAMILITARY GUARD FORCES RECRUITED FROM AMONG SOUTHEASTERN VILLAGERS) CONTINUED VIGOROUS COUNTERINSURGENCY
OPERATIONS TO SUPPRESS THE PKK THROUGHOUT EASTERN TURKEY AND IN NORTHERN IRAQ. CONTINUING GOT COUNTERINSURGENCY
SUCCESSES AND THE PKK'S SELF-PROCLAIMED CEASE-FIRE LED TO A DECREASE IN TERRORIST ACTIVITY COMPARED TO PREVIOUS YEARS.
ACCORDING TO THE TURKISH GENERAL STAFF (TGS), FOR THE FIRST ELEVEN MONTHS OF THIS YEAR THERE WERE 45 PKK-RELATED
INCIDENTS, COMPARED TO 3,298 FOR THE FULL YEAR OF 1994. IN 2000, AS IN PREVIOUS YEARS, MORE THAN 200,000 SECURITY
PERSONNEL REMAINED DEDICATED TO COUNTERINSURGENCY OPERATIONS IN EASTERN TURKEY AND NORTHERN IRAQ. LARGE, MULTI-UNIT
COMBINED-ARMS OPERATIONS WERE NOT NECESSARY; MOST COUNTERINSURGENCY OPERATIONS WERE CONDUCTED BY SMALLER UNITS ON A
CONTINUING BASIS.
9. (U) TURKEY'S SOUTHEASTERN EFFORTS BORE FRUIT IN THE WAKE OF OCALAN'S 1999 CAPTURE. A MEASURE OF TURKEY'S SUCCESS WAS
A STEEP DECREASE IN PKK-RELATED INCIDENTS IN 2000 AS COMPARED WITH 1999. AS A RESULT OF THE DECREASE, THE TSK WAS
INCREASINGLY ABLE TO HAND OVER ANTI-TERRORIST OPERATIONS TO THE JANDARMA AND TNP. ANOTHER INDICATION OF THE GOT'S
PROGRESS AGAINST THE PKK WAS PARLIAMENT'S JUNE 2000 APPROVAL OF A NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL RECOMMENDATION CALLING FOR
VAN PROVINCE TO BE REMOVED FROM THE STATE OF EMERGENCY REGION (OHAL). THE OHAL IS NOW REDUCED TO FOUR PROVINCES
(DIYARBAKIR, HAKKARI, SIRNAK, AND TUNCELI).
10. (U) IN ADDITION TO CONDUCTING COUNTERINSURGENCY OPERATIONS, THE GOT CONTINUES ITS ATTEMPTS TO ADDRESS ECONOMIC
DISPARITIES IN SOUTHEASTERN TURKEY. THE GOT INTENDS FOR THESE EFFORTS, THE MOST PROMINENT OF WHICH IS THE SOUTHEAST
ANATOLIA PROJECT (GAP), TO REDUCE THE POVERTY AND DESPERATION THAT IT BELIEVES ARE THE ROOT CAUSES OF TERRORISM IN THE
REGION. UNFORTUNATELY, TURKEY'S ECONOMIC CONSTRAINTS MEAN THAT MANY OF THESE EFFORTS ARE UNDER-FUNDED, IF FUNDED AT ALL.
FROM A MORE POLITICAL APPROACH, THE GOT HAS NOT MOVED QUICKLY TO GRANT THE GREATER INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS TO ETHNIC KURDS
THAT WOULD UNDERCUT THE SUPPORT ENJOYED IN THE REGION BY THE PKK. THE GOT AND TURKISH SOCIETY AS A WHOLE HAVE YET TO
DEVELOP A CONSENSUS ON HOW TO ACCOMMODATE THE DESIRE OF SOME TURKISH CITIZENS' TO EXPRESS THEIR KURDISH CULTURE.
[INFORMATION FOR THE REPORT'S CLASSIFIED ANNEX.]
11. (C) DESPITE TURKEY'S MILITARY SUCCESS AGAINST KURDISH TERRORISM, THE PKK'S RELUCTANCE TO CHALLENGE THE GOT STEMS, TO
SOME EXTENT, FROM ITS LOYALTY TO ABDULLAH OCALAN AND THE DESIRE TO AVOID CAUSING HIS EXECUTION. THE PKK'S
PERSONALITY-CULT MINDSET MAKES IT DIFFICULT FOR MEMBERS OF THE ORGANIZATION TO ABANDON OCALAN BY IGNORING HIS CALL FOR A
CEASE-FIRE. HOWEVER, WITH APPROXIMATELY 5,000 PKK TERRORISTS UNDER ARMS OUTSIDE OF TURKEY, THE POSSIBILITY REMAINS THAT
KURDISH TERRORISM WILL RETURN TO TURKEY, PERHAPS VIA A PKK FACTION OR SPLINTER GROUP. THIS BECOMES MORE LIKELY AS THE
PKK CONTINUES TO SUFFER MILITARY DEFEATS FROM NORTHERN IRAQ'S KURDISH GROUPS, IN ADDITION TO THE TSK.
ON-GOING SUPPRESSION OF DHKP/C
12. (U) DURING 2000, TURKISH SECURITY FORCES CONTINUED THEIR ON-GOING AND EFFECTIVE CAMPAIGN TO DISRUPT THE DHKP/C
THROUGH RAIDS AND ARRESTS. THE TNP'S VIGILANCE CONTRIBUTED TO A YEAR IN WHICH DHKP/C INCIDENTS WERE RARE AND RELATIVELY
MINOR. NOTABLE WAS THE TNP'S AUGUST ARREST OF SEVEN ALLEGED DHKP/C TERRORISTS WHO APPARENTLY WERE PLANNING AN ATTACK ON
INCIRLIK AIRBASE, FROM WHICH U.S./UK/TURKISH COMBINED TASK FORCE ENFORCES THE "NO-FLY ZONE" OVER NORTHERN IRAQ.
MAJOR PUSH AGAINST HIZBULLAH
13. (U) TURKISH HIZBULLAH (HIZBULLAH), WHICH WAS FOUNDED IN THE 1980S IN SOUTHEAST TURKEY, IS A SUNNI-ISLAM KURDISH
GROUP NOT RELATED TO LEBANESE HIZBULLAH. HIZBULLAH HAS GENERALLY TARGETED ETHNIC-KURDS, PARTICULARLY BUSINESS AND
CULTURAL FIGURES WHO WERE NOT SUFFICIENTLY ISLAMIST IN THE ORGANIZATION'S EYES. IT ALSO FOLLOWS A PATTERN OF TARGETING
ITS OWN FORMER MEMBERS WHO HAVE BROKEN RANKS OR SIMPLY MOVED ON FROM THE ORGANIZATION.
14. (U) OVER THE COURSE OF 1999, HIZBULLAH INCREASED ITS OPERATIONS IN ISTANBUL, WHERE THE DISAPPEARANCES OF
ETHNIC-KURDISH BUSINESSMEN EVENTUALLY ATTRACTED POLICE ATTENTION. INVESTIGATIONS LED TO THE JANUARY 17 TNP RAID ON A
HIZBULLAH SAFEHOUSE THAT WAS FORTUITOUSLY ALSO SERVING AS HIZBULLAH'S HEADQUARTERS. IMMEDIATE RESULTS OF THE RAID WERE
THE DEATH OF HIZBULLAH LEADER HUSEYIN VELIOGLU AND THE DISCOVERY ON THE PREMISES OF THE BODIES OF SOME OF THE MISSING
BUSINESSMEN. IN THE WEEKS FOLLOWING, A TROVE OF EVIDENCE FROM THE RAID ALLOWED THE GOT TO CONDUCT A SERIES OF
WIDE-RANGING RAIDS TO ROLL UP MUCH OF THE ORGANIZATION. THE TNP CAPTURED OR KILLED MUCH OF HIZBULLAH'S LEADERSHIP,
SEIZED SEVERAL CACHES OF WEAPONS, AND PERHAPS MOST IMPORTANT, DISCREDITED ITS EXTREMISM BY EXPOSING EVIDENCE OF 156
MURDERS.
15. (U) THOUGH SUCH RAIDS INFLICTED SEVERE DAMAGE ON HIZBULLAH, THE ORGANIZATION CONTINUES TO EXIST, AS DEMONSTRATED BY
THE GOT'S UNRELENTING PURSUIT OF ITS REMNANTS AND WITH WEEKLY REPORTS OF RAIDS AND ARRESTS. VIEWING STATISTICS FOR THE
OHAL ONLY, THE MAGNITUDE OF THE GOT ACTIVITY AGAINST HIZBULLAH IS CLEAR, EVEN THOUGH FULL YEAR 2000 FIGURES WERE NOT YET
AVAILABLE. FOR ALL OF 1999, THERE WERE 267 ANTI-HIZBULLAH OPERATIONS, WITH 420 SUSPECTS ARRESTED OUT OF A TOTAL OF 1366
TAKEN INTO TEMPORARY CUSTODY. FIGURES FOR 2000 UNTIL THE END OF OCTOBER SHOW 723 OPERATIONS, WITH 1744 SUSPECTS ARRESTED
OUT OF 2712 TAKEN INTO TEMPORARY CUSTODY.
16. (U) TURKISH HIZBULLAH HAS NOT YET ACTED AGAINST U.S. CITIZENS, PERSONNEL, OR FACILITIES, OR AGAINST THE TURKISH
STATE, EXCEPT IN REACTION TO POLICE RAIDS. NONETHELESS, HIZBULLAH HARBORS EXTREME ANTI-WESTERN VIEWS AND IT IS POSSIBLE
THAT THE ORGANIZATION MAY SHIFT ITS ATTENTION TO FOREIGNERS, TO INCLUDE AMERICANS, IN THE FUTURE. DURING 2000, GOT
OFFICIALS AND THE TURKISH MEDIA ALLEGED THAT HIZBULLAH HAD IRANIAN LINKS AND SUPPORT.
CAPTURE OF THE JERUSALEM WARRIORS
17. (U) THE JERUSALEM WARRIORS, WHICH REPORTEDLY IS A SUB-GROUP OF A LARGER GROUP CALLED TEVHIT ("UNITY" OR
"MONOTHEISM"), IS AN ETHNIC TURKISH, EXTREME ISLAMIST GROUP. ITS MEMBERS ARE SUNNI MOSLEMS WHO SEEK TO ESTABLISH
ISLAMIST RULE IN TURKEY. AS NOTED ABOVE, HIZBULLAH AND THE JERUSALEM WARRIORS ARE NOT DIRECTLY RELATED. NONETHELESS, THE
TWO ORGANIZATIONS HAD SUFFICIENT CONTACT THAT THE TNP'S RAIDS AGAINST HIZBULLAH PRODUCED EVIDENCE THAT IDENTIFIED THE
JERUSALEM WARRIORS AND RESULTED IN THEIR MAY CAPTURE. ACCORDING TO SOME GOT OFFICIALS AND THE SUSPECTS' MEDIA-REPORTED
CONFESSIONS, THIS PREVIOUSLY UNKNOWN ORGANIZATION WAS ALLEGED TO HAVE HAD IRANIAN TRAINING, SUPPORT, AND DIRECTION. THE
ORGANIZATION STANDS ACCUSED OF THE PREVIOUSLY UNSOLVED MURDERS OF SECULARIST INTELLECTUALS, THE MOST PROMINENT OF WHOM
WHERE UGUR MUMCU, AHMET TANER KISLALI, MUAMMER AKSOY, AND BAHRIYE UCOK. THE JERUSALEM WARRIORS ALLEGEDLY MURDERED
FOREIGNERS AS WELL, INCLUDING USAF SSGT VICTOR MARVICK AND EGYPTIAN, INDIAN, ISRAELI, AND SAUDI DIPLOMATS.
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JUDICIAL RESPONSE TO ACTS OF TERRORISM (A)
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18. (U) TURKEY'S JUDICIAL SYSTEM TAKES A VIGOROUS APPROACH TO ENFORCING THE COUNTRY'S COUNTERTERRORISM LAWS. OF THE
APPROXIMATELY 150-200 TERRORISM-RELATED CASES PROSECUTED IN TURKEY'S STATE SECURITY COURTS, THREE STOOD OUT THIS YEAR.
STATUS OF ABDULLAH OCALAN'S CASE
19. (U) ON JUNE 29, 1999, ANKARA STATE SECURITY COURT NO. 2 CONVICTED ABDULLAH OCALAN OF TREASON UNDER ARTICLE 125 OF
THE TURKISH PENAL CODE AND SENTENCED HIM TO DEATH. ON NOVEMBER 25, 1999, THE NINTH COURT OF APPEALS UPHELD THE VERDICT.
ON JANUARY 12, 2000, PRIME MINISTER BULENT ECEVIT ANNOUNCED HIS DECISION NOT TO FORWARD CONVICTED PKK LEADER ABDULLAH
OCALAN'S DEATH PENALTY SENTENCE TO PARLIAMENT, WHICH WOULD BE REQUIRED TO APPROVE HIS EXECUTION. THIS DECISION WAS MADE
IN CONSIDERATION THE APPEAL OCALAN'S TO THE EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS (ECHR). IN NOVEMBER 2000, THAT APPEAL WAS
TAKEN UP BY THE ECHR AND IS EXPECTED TO REQUIRE AT LEAST A YEAR-AND- A-HALF TO RESOLVE.
MAIN HIZBULLAH TRIAL
20. (U) THOUGH THERE ARE MULTIPLE COURT ACTIONS ARISING FROM THE GOT'S SUCCESSES AGAINST HIZBULLAH, THE MAIN TRIAL FOR
156 MURDERS OPENED IN JULY IN DIYARBAKIR'S STATE SECURITY COURT AND CONTINUED THROUGHOUT THE REMAINDER OF 2000, WITH A
DECISION EXPECTED SOMETIME IN 2001. AMONG THE 15 ACCUSED WERE VELIOGLU DEPUTIES CEMAL TUTAR AND EDIP GUMUS, WHO
ALLEGEDLY HANDLED THE ORGANIZATION'S "MILITARY" AND "POLITICAL" ACTIVITIES.
JERUSALEM WARRIORS TRIAL
21. (U) THE TRIAL OF THE JERUSALEM WARRIORS AND THEIR ACCOMPLICES OPENED IN ANKARA ON AUGUST 14. 17 SUSPECTS WERE
CHARGED WITH VARYING DEGREES OF INVOLVEMENT IN 22 MURDERS OVER THE COURSE OF TEN YEARS. AS NOTED ABOVE, AMONG THE
VICTIMS WHERE PROMINENT SECULARIST INTELLECTUALS AND JOURNALISTS, FOREIGN DIPLOMATS, AND ONE U.S. SERVICE MEMBER, USAF
SSGT VICTOR MARVICK.
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EXTRADITIONS INVOLVING SUSPECTED TERRORISTS (B)
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22. (U) IN 2000 THERE WERE NO EXTRADITIONS ON TERRORISM- RELATED CHARGES FROM TURKEY TO THE UNITED STATES. LIKEWISE,
THERE WERE NO SUCH EXTRADITIONS FROM THE UNITED STATES TO TURKEY, NOR WERE THERE ANY SUCH EXTRADITIONS FROM OTHER
COUNTRIES TO TURKEY.
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IMPEDIMENTS TO PROSECUTION OR EXTRADITION (C)
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23. (U) FOR A VARIETY OF REASONS, TURKEY HAS LONG FACED DIFFICULTY IN THE EXTRADITION OF SUSPECTED TERRORISTS FROM OTHER
COUNTRIES. SYRIA, IRAQ, AND IRAN HAVE LONG HARBORED PKK TERRORISTS, WHICH THEY USE AS A TOOL IN THEIR RELATIONS WITH
TURKEY. IN EUROPE THERE IS CONSIDERABLE SYMPATHY FOR KURDISH POLITICAL ASPIRATIONS. THE PKK HAS FOUND PROTECTION FROM
PROSECUTION OR EXTRADITION THERE DUE SOME GOVERNMENTS' INABILITY TO DISTINGUISH BETWEEN LEGITIMATE KURDISH POLITICAL AND
CULTURAL ASPIRATIONS AND SUPPORT FOR PKK TERRORISM. THE DHKP/C AND OTHER LEFTIST TERROR GROUPS HAVE ALSO BEEN ABLE TO
OPERATE IN EUROPE UNDER A SHIELD OF CONCERNS ABOUT TURKEY'S HUMAN RIGHTS RECORD.
24. (U) A KEY IMPEDIMENT TO EXTRADITIONS OF TERRORIST SUSPECTS FROM EUROPE IS TURKEY'S LEGAL PROVISION FOR CAPITAL
PUNISHMENT, EVEN THOUGH A DE FACTO MORATORIUM EXISTS. SINCE 1984, 28 TERRORISTS, MOST NOTABLY PKK LEADER ABDULLAH
OCALAN, HAVE BEEN SENTENCED TO CAPITAL PUNISHMENT, BUT NO EXECUTION HAS BEEN CARRIED OUT SINCE THAT TIME. NONETHELESS,
AND DESPITE OBLIGATIONS UNDER THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON TERRORISM, SEVERAL COUNTRIES HAVE BEEN RELUCTANT TO EXTRADITE
SUSPECTS TO TURKEY. THROUGHOUT 2000, PUBLIC DEBATE ON THE EVENTUAL ABOLITION OF CAPITAL PUNISHMENT CONTINUED, WITH MOST
OBSERVERS PREDICTING THAT TURKEY'S EU CANDIDACY STATUS WILL EVENTUALLY LEAD TO ABOLITION.
25. (U) ONE HIGH-PROFILE EXAMPLE OF A EUROPEAN REFUSAL TO EXTRADITE A SUSPECT SOUGHT BY TURKEY WAS THE CASE OF FEHRIYE
ERDAL. ERDAL, A MEMBER OF THE DHKP/C, WAS ACCUSED OF DIRECT INVOLVEMENT IN THE JANUARY 1996 MURDER OF A PROMINENT
INDUSTRIALIST, OZDEMIR SABANCI, AND TWO OTHER INDIVIDUALS. THE BELGIAN GOVERNMENT CITED TURKEY'S LEGAL PROVISION FOR
CAPITAL PUNISHMENT AS AN OBSTACLE TO HER BEING RETURNED TO TURKEY, EVEN THOUGH TURKEY WAS WILLING TO PROMISE NOT TO
EXECUTE HER. THE BELGIAN GOVERNMENT ALSO CHARACTERIZED THE SPECIFIC CHARGES FOR WHICH THE GOT SOUGHT HER AS BEING
"POLITICAL CRIMES." SHE REMAINS UNDER HOUSE ARREST IN BELGIUM PENDING A TRIAL ON MINOR WEAPONS CHARGES. BELGIAN (AND
OTHER) AUTHORITIES HAVE ALSO COMPLAINED THAT TURKEY'S EXTRADITION REQUEST WAS NOT PRESENTED IN A MANNER TACTICALLY
CALCULATED TO ACHIEVE EXTRADITION AND HAVE SUGGESTED THAT A MORE SOPHISTICATED INTERNATIONAL APPROACH TO THE EXTRADITION
ISSUE MAY HAVE PRODUCED A MORE WELCOME RESULT.
26. (U) TURKISH MINISTRY OF JUSTICE OFFICIALS REPORT THAT THEY HAVE REQUESTED EXTRADITIONS OF SUSPECTED PKK, DHKP/C, AND
OTHER TERRORISTS FROM FRANCE, GERMANY, ITALY, AND THE UK IN RECENT YEARS. ALL SUCH REQUESTS WERE REFUSED ON THE GROUNDS
THAT THE SUSPECT MIGHT FACE CAPITAL PUNISHMENT, THE CRIMES INVOLVED WERE POLITICAL, OR THE SUSPECTS MIGHT FACE
PERSECUTION FOR POLITICAL BELIEFS.
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RESPONSES OTHER THAN PROSECUTION (D)
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27. (U) PRESIDENT SEZER, PRIME MINISTER ECEVIT, FOREIGN MINISTER CEM, CHIEF OF THE TGS GENERAL HUSEYIN KIVRIKOGLU, AND
FORMER-PRESIDENT DEMIREL HAVE ALL MADE STRONG STATEMENTS DENOUNCING TERRORISM DURING 2000. THE GOT FREQUENTLY AND
VIGOROUSLY MAKES PUBLIC CONDEMNATIONS OF ALL FORMS OF TERRORISM.
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GOVERNMENT SUPPORT FOR TERRORISM (F)
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28. (U) THE GOT CONSISTENTLY AND STRONGLY OPPOSES BOTH DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM. TURKEY DOES NOT VIEW ITS
MAINTENANCE OF DIPLOMATIC OR ECONOMIC/COMMERCIAL RELATIONS WITH CUBA, IRAN, IRAQ, LIBYA, SUDAN, AND SYRIA AS
CONSTITUTING SUPPORT FOR INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM.
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STATEMENTS SUPPORTING TERRORIST-SUPPORTING COUNTRIES (G)
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29. (U) THE GOT MADE NO PUBLIC STATEMENTS IN 2000 IN SUPPORT OF TERRORIST-SUPPORTING COUNTRIES ON TERRORISM ISSUES.
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SIGNIFICANT CHANGES IN ATTITUDE TOWARD TERRORISM (H)
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30. (U) TURKISH OFFICIALS, IN THEIR PUBLIC STATEMENTS, CONTINUE TO LABEL THE FIGHT AGAINST TERRORISM AS ONE OF THE GOT'S
TOP SECURITY PRIORITIES. WHILE THE TSK CONTINUES ITS OPERATIONS AGAINST PKK TERRORISTS IN THE SOUTHEAST OF THE COUNTRY,
THE TNP CARRIES ON ITS DILIGENT AND VIGOROUS WORK IN SUPPRESSING THE DHKP/C AND HIZBULLAH, WHICH PRIMARILY OPERATE IN
URBAN AREAS.
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U.S. COUNTERTERRORISM EFFORTS AND INITIATIVES (I)
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31. (U) CLOSE U.S.-TURKISH COOPERATION CONTINUES TO BE STRENGTHENED BY 14 YEARS OF TURKISH PARTICIPATION IN THE STATE
DEPARTMENT'S ANTI-TERRORISM ASSISTANCE (ATA) PROGRAMS. ATA PROGRAMS INCLUDE MANDATORY HUMAN RIGHTS COMPONENTS. GOT
OFFICIALS HAVE TOLD EMBASSY OFFICIALS THAT THEY VIEW ATA PROGRAMS AS A POSITIVE STEP TOWARD BRINGING TURKISH POLICE
STANDARDS INTO GREATER CONFORMITY WITH EU AND INTERNATIONAL NORMS.
32. (U) TURKEY COOPERATES WITH THE UNITED STATES IN ITS EFFORTS TO COMBAT TERRORISM IN CENTRAL ASIA. IN JUNE 2000, A GOT
OBSERVER ATTENDED A CONFERENCE IN WASHINGTON DESIGNED TO PROMOTE COUNTERTERRORISM DIALOGUE AMONG KAZAKHSTAN, KYRGYZSTAN,
TAJIKISTAN, TURKMENISTAN, UZBEKISTAN. TURKISH OFFICIALS HAVE REGULARLY PARTICIPATED IN COUNTER-TERRORISM CONSULTATIONS
WITH THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE. SUCH CONSULTATIONS ARE AN OPPORTUNITY TO EXCHANGE INFORMATION AND COORDINATE STRATEGY.
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COOPERATION - INVESTIGATIONS AND PROSECUTIONS (J)
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33. (U) THE MUTUAL LEGAL ASSISTANCE TREATY BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND TURKEY, WHICH ENTERED INTO FORCE IN JANUARY
1981, GOVERNS INVESTIGATIVE COOPERATION. THE GOT HAS EXPEDITIOUSLY PROCESSED REQUESTS FOR INVESTIGATIVE ACCESS TO
EVIDENCE UNDER THIS TREATY. HOWEVER, IN SOME CASES THE GOT HAS LEFT REQUESTS UNANSWERED FOR OVER THREE YEARS. THERE WERE
NO REQUESTS MADE TO THE GOT IN 2000.
34. (U) IN 1999 THE USG REQUESTED AND RECEIVED INFORMATION RELATED TO THE INVESTIGATION INTO THE ATTEMPTED DHKP/C ROCKET
ATTACK ON THE U.S. CONSULATE GENERAL IN ISTANBUL. THIS YEAR THE THREE TNP OFFICERS WHO PREVENTED THE ATTACK WERE TRIED
ON CHARGES OF HAVING EXTRA-JUDICIALLY MURDERED THE DHKP/C SUSPECTS. THE CASE REMAINS ON-GOING.
35. (U) OVERALL, IN THE LAST FIVE YEARS, THE GOT HAS WORKED CLOSELY WITH THE USG IN THE APPREHENSION, CONVICTION, AND
PUNISHMENT OF THOSE RESPONSIBLE FOR TERRORIST ATTACKS IN TURKEY. THE MOST PROMINENT EXAMPLE OF THE GOT'S AGGRESSIVE
EFFORTS TO BRING TERRORISTS TO JUSTICE IS THE ARREST AND ON-GOING TRIAL OF FOUR SUSPECTS IN THE 1991 ASSASSINATION OF
USAF SSGT VICTOR MARVICK IN ANKARA. THE TRIAL OF THE FOUR, WHO WERE ALLEGEDLY MEMBERS OF THE JERUSALEM WARRIORS, AN
ISLAMIST TERROR GROUP, BEGAN IN AUGUST 2000. THESE INDIVIDUALS, AND THEIR 13 COHORTS, STAND ACCUSED OF ALMOST A SCORE OF
OTHER MURDERS AND ATTACKS, AS NOTED ABOVE.
[INFORMATION FOR THE REPORT'S CLASSIFIED ANNEX]
36. (S) IN 2000 THERE WAS ONE EXTRADITION FROM TURKEY TO THE UNITED STATES INVOLVING AN INDIVIDUAL WITH SUSPECTED
TERRORIST CONNECTIONS WHO HAD ALSO COMMITTED A VARIETY OF NON-TERROR RELATED CRIMES IN THE UNITED STATES. THIS
EXTRADITION, WHICH WAS EFFECTED IN THE SPACE OF APPROXIMATELY FIVE MONTHS, WAS AN EXAMPLE OF SUCCESSFUL U.S.-TURKISH
COOPERATION. THE SMOOTH EXECUTION OF THE EXTRADITION WAS PARTICULARLY NOTABLE BECAUSE THE MOST RECENT PREVIOUS
EXTRADITION, WHICH HAD NO TERRORISM ASPECT, WAS IN 1993.
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COOPERATION - PREVENTION (K)
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37. (U) THE GOT PROVIDES THE USG AND, IN PARTICULAR, U.S. SECURITY OFFICERS IN TURKEY WITH UP-TO-DATE INFORMATION
REGARDING TERRORIST GROUP OPERATIONS. MOREOVER, THE GOT PROVIDES EXTENSIVE POLICE SUPPORT TO DETER AND PREVENT TERRORIST
ATTACKS AGAINST U.S. PERSONNEL AND FACILITIES IN TURKEY. TURKEY PROVIDES DEDICATED TNP GUARDS WHO WORK IN CLOSE
COOPERATION WITH MISSION SECURITY PERSONNEL AT THE THREE DIPLOMATIC POSTS IN TURKEY (ANKARA, ISTANBUL, AND ADANA).
TURKISH POLICE EXPEND LITERALLY TENS OF THOUSANDS OF PERSON-HOURS PROTECTING THE SECURITY OF MANY OFFICIAL AMERICAN
RESIDENCES THROUGHOUT THE COUNTRY. THE TNP ALSO PROVIDES SECURITY MOTORCADE ESCORTS FOR MANY U.S. CIVILIAN AND MILITARY
HIGH-LEVEL VISITORS EACH YEAR, INCLUDING FOR EVERY CONGRESSIONAL DELEGATION TO VISIT TURKEY.
[INFORMATION FOR THE REPORT'S CLASSIFIED ANNEX]
38. (S) IN THE LAST MONTHS OF 2000, U.S. FACILITIES IN TURKEY WERE SUBJECT TO ALMOST WEEKLY TERRORIST THREATS. IN
PARTICULAR, INCIRLIK AIR BASE WAS SINGLED OUT AS THE SITE OF A POTENTIAL TERRORIST ATTACK. IN RESPONSE, THE TURKS
UPGRADED THE THREAT LEVEL AT THE BASE, WHICH INCLUDED ERECTING BARRICADES AROUND THE AMERICAN SECTOR OF THE BASE,
INCREASING VEHICLE SECURITY CHECKS, PERFORMING 100 PERCENT IDENTIFICATION CHECKS, AND INSTALLING MORE CHECK POINTS IN
THE CITY OF ADANA OUTSIDE INCIRLIK. THE GOT ALSO PROVIDED ADDITIONAL PROTECTION IN DURING 6TH FLEET COMMANDER'S VISIT TO
ANKARA AND DURING THE VISIT OF HIS FLAGSHIP, THE USS LASALLE, TO WESTERN TURKEY.
39. (S) IN OTHER ASPECTS OF COOPERATION AND PREVENTION, THE GOT'S COOPERATION HAS BEEN OUTSTANDING. THE GOT HAS
RESPONDED IN A POSITIVE AND FORWARD-LEANING MANNER WHEN THE USG HAS REQUESTED ASSISTANCE REGARDING COUNTERTERRORISM. IN
2000, THE TURKISH NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ORGANIZATION (TNIO), TGS, AND TNP ALL WORKED CLOSELY WITH U.S. INTELLIGENCE TO
RENDER, DISRUPT, TRACK, AND ARREST TERRORISTS WHO WERE TRANSITING TURKEY TO CONDUCT TERRORIST OPERATIONS OR WHO WERE
BENT ON CAUSING HARM WITHIN TURKEY ITSELF. WHEN ASKED, THE GOT WATCH- LISTED INDIVIDUALS WHO MIGHT HAVE ARRIVED AT ONE
OF TURKEY'S PORTS ENTRY. IT HAS PROVIDED THIS ASSISTANCE DESPITE, AT TIMES, VAGUELY-WORDED THREAT REPORTS THAT REQUIRED
A SUBSTANTIAL PERSONNEL COMMITMENT TO DO A JOB THAT COULD HAVE BEEN PERFORMED WITH LESS EFFORT, HAD THE USG BEEN ABLE TO
PROVIDE MORE SPECIFIC INFORMATION.
40. (S) IN NOVEMBER 2000, THE TURKS PROVIDED EXCEPTIONAL ASSISTANCE TO U.S. INTELLIGENCE BY ARRESTING A USAMA BIN LADEN
LIEUTENANT WHO ATTEMPTED TO TRANSIT TURKEY. AT THE REQUEST OF THE USG, THE TURKEY RENDERED HIM TO JUSTICE IN A THIRD
COUNTRY. ALSO IN THE NOVEMBER/DECEMBER TIME FRAME, THE GOT AGGRESSIVELY PROVIDED COVERAGE OF THE MAJOR PORTS OF ENTRY IN
AN ATTEMPT TO APPREHEND A SECOND AND EVEN MORE IMPORTANT PLAYER IN THE BIN LADIN ORGANIZATION.
PEARSON