INSS INSIGHT - December 11, 2006 No. 3
New Nuclear Programs in the Middle East: What do they mean?
Emily B. Landau
One of the greatest risks associated with Iran’s apparent drive to acquire a nuclear weapons capability is that it will
spark further nuclear proliferation in the region. According to recent reports, six new states in the Middle East are
considering developing nuclear programs – the IAEA has named Algeria, Egypt, Morocco and Saudi Arabia and noted that
Tunisia and the UAE have also shown interest in this regard – which seems to suggest that the risk is now becoming a
reality.
In fact, these states want to proceed down a path that could prove to be very similar to the one taken by Iran. They
have expressed their desire to develop legitimate civilian nuclear programs, but the case against Iran today hinges on
the dangerously close relationship between civilian and military nuclear programs: a civilian program can be used as a
cover for or forerunner of a military program. The prospect of additional states exploiting the weakness of the Nuclear
Non-proliferation Treaty – which allows for the development of potentially problematic civilian programs – is unsettling
to say the least. And the fact that six states have expressed such interest at the same time raises strong suspicions
that this is a reaction to the perceived danger of a nuclear capable Iran and may be tied to plans to develop an Arab
nuclear bomb.
While these are very serious concerns, it is far from clear whether these states have really made a decision to go
nuclear. At this early stage, they may well want to create the impression that they will not remain on the sidelines in
the face of Iran's challenge, but there are no clear indications that they (individually or collectively) have made up
their minds actually to embark on the same path as Iran.
For example, Egypt – one of the more serious potential proliferators – is undoubtedly most troubled by the prospect of
Iran becoming a nuclear state and has begun to voice its concerns more openly than in the past. Moreover, some
statements made by Egyptian officials working in the nuclear realm in recent years have established that Egypt regards
civilian nuclear technology as something that can later be applied to a military program, if a decision to do so is
taken. But while Egypt certainly wants to signal its potential capabilities, it is less likely at this stage to move in
the direction of nuclear weapons development. Egypt is not talking about an indigenous uranium enrichment capability and
it remains a major advocate of nonproliferation efforts in the Middle East. Moreover, through the global nuclear energy
partnership (GNEP) launched in early 2006, the US has been encouraging states in the direction of nuclear energy
programs, and some argue that this may help explain Egypt's interest, especially as US State Department Spokesman Sean
McCormack said last month that the US had no objection to Egypt's nuclear program. In Morocco there are also
contradictory signals which make it difficult to support a conclusion that this state is interested in achieving a
military capability: Morocco has reportedly made plans to develop a nuclear program but it has also joined a US-led
effort to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction – the first North African country to do so.
There are other indications of an emerging desire for coordination and cooperation among moderate Arab states as a means
of confronting the negative implications of Iran's nuclear ambitions. In late October, three Gulf states joined others
in a day-long exercise in the Persian Gulf, in which they practiced intercepting and searching ships suspected of
trafficking in unconventional weapons. The exercise was carried out under the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), a
US-led nonproliferation initiative. This was the first such exercise to take place in the Persian Gulf (near Bahrain,
just across the Gulf from Iran), and it signaled to Iran that its neighbors will not stand idly by while it develops
nuclear weapons.
Regional states can pursue two different routes in attempting to confront Iran's nuclear ambitions: they can participate
in arms control efforts geared to enhancing their regional security, or they can attempt to join the nuclear club. In
light of failing international efforts to stop Iran, these states appear to be pursuing both avenues and it is not clear
which they will ultimately choose, nor is it surprising that they want to keep their options open. While they would like
to participate in efforts to stop Iran, they feel that they can not risk being left on the sidelines if all efforts to
stop or curb Iran ultimately fail.
Enhancing arms control efforts and encouraging regional security dialogue could be critical for lowering the motivation
of states to strive for their own nuclear options. Creating frameworks within which their security concerns can be
raised, recognized and addressed would be an important first stage. Initial agreement to cooperate in areas of clear
mutual concern is already on the agenda, as evidenced by the PSI exercise. It is also underscored by a meeting that was
held in Aqaba, Jordan in late September in which Palestinian Authority Chairman Mahmoud Abbas, Israeli General Security
Service head Yuval Diskin, and heads of intelligence services from Jordan, Egypt, and two states in the Persian Gulf all
took part. At the meeting, Jordan expressed its willingness to host meetings geared to advancing the peace process and
fighting terrorism. Significantly, the need to coordinate and cooperate among all sides and exchange information among
them in order to fight terror in the region was emphasized.
Creating alternative routes for states to enhance their mutual security could help them resist the conclusion that the
only way to ensure their individual security in the face of a nuclear Iran is to develop their own nuclear bomb. Given
that most states will need a lot of time to acquire a military nuclear capability, their incentive to explore
alternative routes is likely to be high.
*************
INSS
The Institute For National Security Studies
Incorporating The Jaffee Center For Strategic Studies
At Tel Aviv University