Bush's New Multilateralism
With the billions of dollars appropriated by the U.S. for Iraqi reconstruction almost all spent, Japan, Australia and
other nations in President George W. Bush's "coalition of the willing" are likely to be asked to shoulder much of the
burden for funding the large number of unfinished projects.
Getting others to take up the slack is reportedly high on Secretary of State Condoleeza Rice's agenda when she visits
the Far East in March. Her trip, originally scheduled for this week, was postponed because of the current crisis in
Israeli politics caused by Prime Minister Ariel Sharon's recent stroke.
The new initiative comes barely a month after President Bush appointed Rice to take over the leading role in supervising
and coordinating the U.S. reconstruction program in Iraq. The American administration has signaled that it will not seek
further funding for these efforts.
"The U.S. never intended to completely rebuild Iraq," Brig. Gen. William McCoy, the Army Corps of Engineers commander
overseeing the work, told reporters at a recent news conference. In an interview, McCoy reportedly told The Washington
Post newspaper, "This was just supposed to be a jump-start."
However, Gen. McCoy's assertion seems to be at odds with previous administration statements. For example, in a speech on
Aug. 8, 2003, President George W. Bush said, "In a lot of places, the infrastructure is as good as it was at prewar
levels, which is satisfactory, but it's not the ultimate aim. The ultimate aim is for the infrastructure to be the best
in the region."
Relatively little of the $30 billion allocated for reconstruction since the invasion
remains to be spent, and spending authority is scheduled to run out in June 2007. A decision not to renew the
reconstruction program leaves Iraq with tens of billions of dollars in unfinished projects, and an oil industry and
electrical grid that have yet to return to pre-war production levels.
It also leaves the State Department with a mandate to provide a "focal point" for reconstruction efforts and to
supervise and coordinate reconstruction programs not only in Iraq, but also in other countries emerging from civil
strife. These include Afghanistan, but Bush Administration officials have announced they will henceforth rely more on
the Afghan Government, NATO, and contractors from other countries.
Steven Aftergood, head of the Government Secrecy program of the Federation of American Scientists, told me the switch
from the Pentagon to the State Department was "a belated recognition that existing policy on reconstruction and
stabilization has been woefully inadequate."
That switch came in a little-noticed December 7 Presidential National Security Directive that said, "The Secretary of
State shall coordinate and lead integrated United States Government efforts", coordinating these efforts with the
Secretary of Defense to ensure harmonization with any planned or ongoing U.S. military operations across the spectrum of
conflict."
The State Department will lead U.S. Government efforts to prevent countries at risk "from being used as a base of
operations or safe haven for extremists, terrorists, organized crime groups, or others who pose a threat to U.S. foreign
policy, security, or economic interests," said the Bush directive.
Some administration observers say the switch from the Pentagon to the State Department was a product of increasing
frustration with the pace of reconstruction work in Iraq. They also believe the cutoff in reconstruction funding is part
of a new White House narrative that also includes reduction in the number of U.S. troops in Iraq before U.S. mid-term
elections in November 2006, when the entire House of Representatives and a third of Senators will stand for reelection.
According to a report by the special inspector general for Iraq (IG), reconstruction officials cannot say how many
planned projects they will complete, and there is no clear source for hundreds of millions of dollars a year needed to
operate the projects that have been finished.
The IG's report describes some progress but also a number of projects that have failed. For example, expensive
electrical substations were built but not connected to the country's electrical grid.
Much of the reconstruction funding has been diverted to other projects. At least $2.5 billion earmarked for
infrastructure and schools was diverted to building up a security force. Funds originally intended to repair the
electricity grid and sewage and sanitation system were used to train special bomb squad units and a hostage rescue
force. The U.S. has also shifted funds to build 10 new prisons to keep pace with the insurgency, and safe houses and
armored cars for Iraqi judges.
Hundreds of millions of dollars from the reconstruction fund was also used to hold elections and for four changes of
government, and establish a criminal justice system, including $128 million to examine several mass graves of Saddam
Hussein's alleged victims.
In addition to the diversion of funds to other types of projects, the reconstruction efforts have been plagued by
substantial corruption and overcharging by contractors.
While 3,600 projects will be completed by the end of the year, the cost of security has eaten up as much as 25% of each
project, according to the IG. A U.S. congressional report last October forecast that many reconstruction projects were
unlikely to get off the ground because of security costs. Iraqi authorities estimate that 10 billion dollars are needed
for the health sector alone, to build or rehabilitate and provide equipment for hospitals and clinics.
Production by Iraq's national electrical grid remains at 4,000 megawatts, 400 megawatts below pre-war levels, with the
average Iraqi receiving less than 12 hours of power a day. Oil production, which according to the Pentagon's prewar
planning was supposed to provide the funds for Iraqi reconstruction, also remains well below prewar levels. The
shortfall has been attributed mainly to sabotage by insurgents. Iraq's refineries are currently producing approximately
two million barrels of oil a day, compared with 2.6 million barrels on the eve of the invasion.
The ending of reconstruction funding appears to mark a change from a promise the president made in 2003 to provide Iraq
with the best infrastructure in the region.
But just how far the U.S. intended to go in that process has always been murky. While President Bush gave the impression
that Iraq was slated for a complete makeover, Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld appeared less certain. He told the
Senate Appropriations Committee in March 2003, "I don't believe that the United States has the responsibility for
reconstruction, in a sense (reconstruction) funds can come from those various sources I mentioned: frozen assets, oil
revenues and a variety of other things, including the Oil for Food, which has a very substantial number of billions of
dollars in it."
On the other hand, that view seems to contradict a report submitted the same year by the prime consulting contractor
hired by the Pentagon to lay out the future of Iraq's economy. The company, BearingPoint Inc. of McLean, Virginia, said,
"The reconstruction of Iraq has begun. Not the reconstruction of vital public services such as water, electricity or
public security, but rather the radical reconstruction of its entire economy."
Clearly, this has not happened. And the Administration's recent funding decision suggests it is not likely to happen any
time soon.
And with many of Iraq's key ministries in disarray and some dogged by persistent corruption, observers say it is
doubtful that the country's government will have either the resources or the expertise to manage the many remaining
large-scale reconstruction projects.
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