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FBI & 9/11
By Sibel Edmonds
Over four years ago, more than four months prior to the September 11 terrorist attacks, in April 2001, a long-term FBI
informant/asset who had been providing the bureau with information since 1990, provided two FBI agents and a translator
with specific information regarding a terrorist attack being planned by Osama Bin Laden. This asset/informant was
previously a high- level intelligence officer in Iran in charge of intelligence from Afghanistan. Through his contacts
in Afghanistan he received information that: 1) Osama Bin Laden was planning a major terrorist attack in the United
States targeting 4-5 major cities, 2) the attack was going to involve airplanes, 3) some of the individuals in charge of
carrying out this attack were already in place in the United States, 4) the attack was going to be carried out soon, in
a few months.
The agents who received this information reported it to their superior, Special Agent in Charge of Counterterrorism,
Thomas Frields, at the FBI Washington Field Office, by filing “302” forms, and the translator, Mr. Behrooz Sarshar,
translated and documented this information. No action was taken by the Special Agent in Charge, Thomas Frields, and
after 9/11 the agents and the translators were told to ‘keep quiet’ regarding this issue. The translator who was present
during the session with the FBI informant, Mr. Behrooz Sarshar, reported this incident to Director Mueller in writing,
and later to the Department of Justice Inspector General. The press reported this incident, and in fact the report in
the Chicago Tribune on July 21, 2004 stated that FBI officials had confirmed that this information was received in April
2001, and further, the Chicago Tribune quoted an aide to Director Mueller that he (Mueller) was surprised that the
Commission never raised this particular issue with him during the hearing.
Mr. Sarshar reported this issue to the 9/11 Commission on February 12, 2004, and provided them with specific dates,
location, witness names, and the contact information for that particular Iranian asset and the two special agents who
received the information. I provided the 9/11 Commission with a detailed and specific account of this issue, the names
of other witnesses, and documents I had seen. Mr. Sarshar also provided the Department of Justice Inspector General with
specific information regarding this case.
For almost four years since September 11, officials refused to admit to having specific information regarding the
terrorists’ plans to attack the United States. The Phoenix Memo, received months prior to the 9/11 attacks, specifically
warned FBI HQ of pilot training and their possible link to terrorist activities against the United States. Four months
prior to the terrorist attacks the Iranian asset provided the FBI with specific information regarding the ‘use of
airplanes’, ‘major US cities as targets’, and ‘Osama Bin Laden issuing the order. ’ Coleen Rowley likewise reported that
specific information had been provided to FBI HQ. All this information went to the same place: FBI Headquarters in
Washington, DC, and the FBI Washington Field Office, in Washington DC.
In October 2001, approximately one month after the September 11 attack, an agent from (city name omitted) field office,
re-sent a certain document to the FBI Washington Field Office, so that it could be re-translated. This Special Agent, in
light of the 9/11 terrorist attacks, rightfully believed that, considering his target of investigation (the suspect
under surveillance), and the issues involved, the original translation might have missed certain information that could
prove to be valuable in the investigation of terrorist activities. After this document was received by the FBI
Washington Field Office and retranslated verbatim, the field agent’s hunch appeared to be correct. The new translation
revealed certain information regarding blueprints, pictures, and building material for skyscrapers being sent overseas
(country name omitted). It also revealed certain illegal activities in obtaining visas from certain embassies in the
Middle East, through network contacts and bribery.
However, after the re-translation was completed and the new significant information was revealed, the unit supervisor in
charge of certain Middle Eastern languages, Mike Feghali, decided NOT to send the re-translated information to the
Special Agent who had requested it. Instead, this supervisor decided to send this agent a note stating that the
translation was reviewed and that the original translation was accurate. This supervisor, Mike Feghali, stated that
sending the accurate translation would hurt the original translator and would cause problems for the FBI language
department. The FBI agent requesting the retranslation never received the accurate translation of that document. I
provided this information to the 9/11 Commission on February 132, 2004, and to the Department of Justice Inspector
General in May 2002.
The latest buzz topic regarding intelligence is the problem of sharing information, intelligence, within intelligence
agencies and between intelligence agencies. To this date the public has not been told of intentional blocking of
intelligence, and has not been told that certain information, despite its direct links, impacts and ties to terrorist
related activities, is not given to or shared with Counterterrorism units, their investigations, and countering
terrorism related activities. This was the case prior to 9/11, and remains in effect after 9/11.
If Counterintelligence receives information that contains money laundering, illegal arms sale, and illegal drug
activities, directly linked to terrorist activities; and if that information involves certain nations, certain semi-
legit organizations, and ties to certain lucrative or political relations in this country, then, that information is not
shared with Counterterrorism, regardless of the possible severe consequences.
In certain cases, frustrated FBI agents cited ‘direct pressure by the State Department,’ and in other cases ‘sensitive
diplomatic relations’ is cited. I provided the Department of Justice Inspector General and the 9/11 Commission with
detailed and specific information and evidence regarding this issue, and the names of other witnesses willing to
corroborate this, and the names of certain U.S. officials involved in these transactions and activities.
Now, after almost 4 years, we get to hear new bits & pieces: FBI & Midhar’s Case; FBI & Abdel-Hafiz Case; FBI & Saudi planes leaving just days after 9/11 without having the passengers questioned; FBI & Youssef Case; and the list goes on.
Today, after nearly four years since 9/11, the American people still do not know that thousands of lives can be
jeopardized under the unspoken policy of ‘protecting certain foreign business relations.’ The victims' family members
still do not realize that information and answers they have sought relentlessly for almost 4 years has been blocked due
to the unspoken decisions made and disguised under ‘safeguarding certain diplomatic relations.’
Where is the so-called congressional oversight? Why the 9/11 Commission intentionally omitted this info; although
they’ve had it all along? Where is accountability?
ENDS
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