Tenable Policies for Nepali Decision-Makers
By Dipta Shah
The post-February One era has witnessed a range of political developments.
From an internal perspective (the apparent divide amongst the Maoist leadership aside), the most significant development
has been the formulation of a seven-party alliance, a feat that Nepal hasn’t witnessed since pre-1990. From an external
perspective, developments revolve around the observed behavior of the US, India and the EU.
US policy vis-à-vis Nepal is constrained by the same parameters as those faced by all international community members.
These constraints culminate in a forced decision over whether to risk regional security or to accelerate the pace of
liberalization.
In a display of diplomatic excellence, US policy-makers appear to have selected the only viable path to achieving both
security and democracy simultaneously. Their decision is manifested in the USG’s quest to advance both agendas in a
balanced manner by refusing to fall prey to the prevailing paradigmatic parameters.
Other international actors have displayed far less wisdom in their navigation of identical pitfalls.
Given the legacy of deteriorating human rights in Nepal and the ambiguous achievements / failures (depending on
interpretation) of the post-February One environment, the EU has opted in favor of uninhibited liberalization first, in
the hopes that peace and security will prevail later.
While the Indian government’s official stance appears firm (and in line with the EU’s), its unofficial position remains
ambiguous. The Indian government’s reluctance to cater to the security concerns of its own Armed Forces is rather
alarming because it is India’s security wing that will bear the brunt of failed policy vis-à-vis Nepal. Owing to its
proximity, the EU enjoys the luxury of maintaining a policy that ignores South Asian security concerns – the Indian
government does not.
In other international developments, Baburam Bhattarai’s Delhi-tour occupies some significance. Although it is rather
unprecedented for a political figure from any nation to hold talks with an organization (deemed a terrorist outfit by
its own government), Baburam Bhattarai’s alleged engagements with CPI-Marxist leader Prakash Karat could be a positive
development.
As a politician in the world’s largest democracy and an individual who answers first and foremost to the interests of
the Indian people, it is inconceivable that Mr. Karat would advise the Nepali Maoist leader to traverse any path other
than that which is characterized by moderation.
Media reports that highlight the act of the meeting accentuate India’s blatant disregard for Interpol but fail miserably
on delivering on more significant aspects of the reported rendezvous - analysis on the possible outcomes of the
interaction.
Meanwhile, the United States has remained resolute in its policy that long-term peace and stability can only be achieved
through concerted action by all major power brokers in Nepal. Despite constant lobbying by various groups and
organizations, the US has maintained its far-sighted vision for peaceful and democratic discourse – one that retains the
perspicuity of discerning partisan lobbies from those that serve Nepal’s long-term interests.
The beauty of the US policy formulation process is that it incorporates all legitimate parties with concerns on Nepal.
This does not imply that every concern results in policy shifts, merely that all parties are granted the satisfaction of
being heard and the assurance that their interests will somehow factor into overall decision-making.
Notwithstanding the low priority that Nepal occupies in terms of American obligations, it is encouraging that the US
remains involved in lending resolution to Nepal’s crisis. Granted, major decisions on Nepal are deferred to India but
the knowledge that India’s status (as a regional power) is inextricably tied to her performance as a regional stabilizer
is a reassuring realization - especially for a country where the Indian military’s war games are constantly misconstrued
as evidence of an imminent invasion of Nepal.
A high-level interpretation of current US policy runs as follows: the Maoist insurgency remains the primary driver
behind instability, non-democratic discourse cannot be sustained indefinitely (but neither can democracy with historical
standards of governance) and measured reforms across the political spectrum (combined with continued harmony between
Nepal’s legitimate political forces) is the only way out.
A failure to recognize the significance of these broad principles will be Nepal’s tragedy alone. Admission of guilt is
insufficient if the only alternative is indefinite agitation; rigid positions are untenable, if room for inclusive
politics is decimated; propagation of insignificant gossip (and name-calling) is counterproductive, when the ability to
absorb and interpret is lacking; employing threats as political leverage (the ramifications of which are not fully
understood) is dangerous, for fear that such threats may become self-fulfilling prophecies.
There still remains enormous potential for mutually agreeable progress in Nepal if future decisions (by all parties) are
weighed using the proposed American yard-stick.
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Dipta Shah is a recent graduate from Columbia University's School of International Affairs (SIPA). now he works for a
global advisory services firm, doing finance and risk analysis.