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Uri Avnery on Abu Mazen and the Palestinian elections - Avnery - a longtime observer of the Palestinian political scene and participant in dialogue with many of its leading
figures - analyses the dilemmas and opportunities facing Abu Mazen, a scapegoat.
"Give Me Some Credit!"
By Uri Avnery
27.11.04
“Give me some credit!” the new Israeli Prime Minister, Levi Eshkol, cried out at the Labor Party convention in February
1965, addressing David Ben- Gurion.
From the moment he resigned, Ben-Gurion started to undermine his successor. Eshkol, who until then had only dealt with
finances, looked pale and ineffectual next to his monumental predecessor, the Father of the State, the leader in two
wars.
Eshkol meant his words quite literally. He said: “Ben-Gurion, I shall use the language of a treasurer: Give me some
credit! That’s all I ask, for one term in office, four years at most!”
The dramatic cry did not help. Ben-Gurion left the party and continued to rain fire and brimstone on Eshkol.
Abu Mazen finds himself in a similar situation today. He, too, could cry out: “Give me some credit!”
Of course, his great predecessor cannot attack him except indirectly, by way of his legacy. But Abu Mazen has enough
opponents in his own Fatah party.
Television presents this as a personal fight between him and the middle generation, in particular Marwan Barghouti. That
lies in the nature of television. Since the small screen is at its best when it shows a human face, but is unable to
show ideas, every controversy becomes a matter of personalities (confirming, by the way, the famous dictum of the
Canadian thinker, Marshall McLuhan, “The medium is the message” - meaning that reality is shaped by the character of the
media.)
Naturally, the Abu Mazen-Barghouti controversy does partly reflect a personal and generational confrontation. Abu Mazen
represents the Fatah Old Guard, while his opponents represent the fighters of the first and second intifadas. But the
real confrontation is between two world views and two grand strategies for the Palestinian national liberation struggle.
I heard the name Abu Mazen for the first time in 1974, when I established contact with the PLO leadership. I asked my
first partner, Sa’id Hamami, the peace martyr, to tell me who was standing behind him. He informed me, in confidence,
that Fatah had set up a three-member committee to direct contacts with Israelis. I called them the “Three Abus” – Abu
Amar (Yasser Arafat), Abu Mazen (Mahmud Abbas) and Abu Iyad (Salah Khalaf).
Among the three, Abu Mazen was directly in charge of Israeli affairs. His doctoral thesis at Moscow University was about
the Zionist movement’s activities during the Holocaust, and once I was even asked to bring him books about the Kastner
Affair (the negotiations between the Zionist Rescue Committee and Adolf Eichmann in 1944).
I met him for the first time face to face when a delegation of the Israeli Council for Israeli-Palestinian Peace
(General Matti Peled, former Treasury Director Ya’acov Arnon and myself) was invited to meet Arafat in Tunis in January
1983. Before the meeting, we spoke with Abu Mazen, as in all the subsequent meetings in Tunis: we always discussed our
ideas first with Abu Mazen and then brought our proposals to Arafat, who spoke the final word.
This experience helps me to understand Abu Mazen’s approach nowadays. His strategy goes like this: the main Palestinian
effort must be directed towards the United States and the Israeli public. There is now an opportunity to change the
one-sided policy of President Bush. During his second term of office he can ignore the powerful Jewish lobby, since he
cannot be elected again anyhow.
Israeli public opinion, too, can be changed. For this, the armed intifada must be stopped. In Abu Mazen’s view, it has
brought no benefits to the Palestinians, but rather hurt their cause.
Most of the young Fatah generation rejects this view out of hand. They believe that it is based on illusions. Bush is
under the influence of Sharon and, anyhow, he is one of the Christian fundamentalists who support the most extreme
right-wing in Israel. Also, it makes no sense to rely on the Israeli Peace Camp, which has forsaken the Palestinians in
their hour of dire need. Except for some small groups, they have done nothing to end the brutal occupation, the killing,
the destruction and starving out, the choking separation wall and the expropriation of land and water. All it does is
issue papers that have no effect whatsoever.
The armed actions, the young Fatah activists believe, do bear fruit. They have hit the Israeli economy hard. They have
created an atmosphere of fear and a reality of poverty. They have produced a readiness to give up the Palestinian
territories. The Israelis understand only the language of force.
A more moderate variant of this attitude proposes intensifying attacks on settlers and soldiers, but stopping the
attacks on civilians in Israel proper. Meaning: the suicide bombings.
While Arafat was alive, the controversy did not get out of hand, because Arafat, as was his wont, created a synthesis
between the two approaches. He used – alternately or simultaneously – diplomacy and violence, according to the changing
situation. The adherents of both strategies saw him as their leader. And, indeed, Arafat led the strategy of recognizing
Israel and seeking peace with it, as in Oslo. But when he came to the conclusion that this effort had run into an
Israeli wall, he used violence. Marwan Barghouti was his pupil.
Now Arafat is gone. The two strategies clash in the Palestinian society, and perhaps in every Palestinian home.
One thing must be clear: the debate about strategy does not reflect a divergence of aims. All Fatah factions are united
around the aims laid down by Arafat: a Palestinian state, the pre-1967 borders (with some possible exchange of
territories), East Jerusalem as the capital of Palestine, sovereignty over the temple Mount, evacuation of the
settlements, an agreed solution to the refugee problem. There is no argument about these.
So how will the controversy be settled?
It will not be easy for the wearers of suits to overcome the bearers of Kalashnikovs, who put their lives on the line
every day. But the Palestinians will use their intelligence. They may well ask themselves: Abu Mazen wants credit? Let’s
give him credit. He believes that he can extract concessions from Bush and Sharon? Why not give him a chance?
Let him try to achieve an end to “targeted liquidations”, “verification of killing”, demolition of homes, degradation at
the checkpoints. Let him try to get meaningful peace negotiations started. Let’s see if Bush offers him more than empty
phrases.
The first time, when the Americans pressured the Palestinians into appointing Abu Mazen Prime Minister, he got nothing.
Sharon stuck a knife in his back. Bush ignored him..
If he can really achieve something this time – so much the better. If not, the Kalashnikovs will speak again. That is
the background of Marwan Barghouti’s decision not to run this time.
Every credit expires sometime. Half a year? A year? Certainly no more. Abu Mazen has already promised Barghouti to hold
elections inside Fatah within nine months.
If the credit bears no interest, the Third Intifada will surely follow.
ENDS