Leave the South China Sea to Asians
Brian Cloughley
The gesture by China concerning non-violent resolution of regional difficulties is comforting, but we should not imagine
for a moment that if military muscle is exerted by others, then Beijing will lie down like a purring pussy cat.
One thing Asia doesn’t need is Washington meddling in the Spratly Islands’ dispute, which has a long and sometimes
violent history. I have a map of the People’s Republic of China (PRC), given me by a Chinese diplomat sixteen years ago,
which depicts the South China Sea as lying within its territory, including the Spratlys to which Malaysia, the
Philippines, Taiwan and Vietnam also lay claim. (Brunei doesn’t actually claim anything out loud; it only states that
one of the outcrops, Louisa Reef, is within its Exclusive “and highly lucrative” Economic Zone.) In the south-west, the
Natuna islands are shown as Indonesian, which is proper, but the rest of the 100,000 square miles of sea, and everything
in it, is delineated as Chinese.
Estimates of the number of islets in the Spratlys (called Nansha by the PRC) vary from 40 to 200, which seems a
remarkable disparity but is understandable as most of the tiny cays, reefs and sandbanks are covered by water at various
tidal periods. The largest outcrop, Itu Aba, is all of two metres above sea level (sometimes) and measures about 1.4 km
by 400 metres on a good day.
In 1946 it was occupied by Chinese Nationalist (now Taiwanese) forces who took over from the Japanese, and is a notable
complication in the PRC-Taiwan issue because it was Taiwan (then Formosa) that negotiated a separate peace with Japan in
1952. Neither Nationalist nor Communist China had been represented the previous year at the San Francisco peace
conference which produced a treaty whereby Japan renounced extra-territorial claims, including to the Spratlys.
So there is substance to Taiwan’s claim to the islet of Itu Aba (which, delightfully, means ‘what’s that?’ in Malay),
and the Taipei government has ‘ coastguard’ (read military) and radar installations on it; but the legality of ownership
depends on the greater international question of the status of Taiwan. This is an example of the sort of puzzle — and it
is far from an inconsequential one” that colours the entire Spratlys’ debate, and as the US is flexing its muscles and
China has just ratified a protocol by which it agrees to deal peacefully with contentious matters in its region, it is
timely to cast an eye on the problem, not least because the China Sea is one of the most sensitive shipping routes in
the world, especially for Japan.
The dozen or so islets occupied by littoral nations are bristling with weapons (China has over 2000 troops squashed onto
half a dozen atolls), and although the PRC will not ‘participate in any activity which shall constitute a threat to the
political and economic stability, sovereignty, or territorial integrity ‘ of the countries of the Association of South
East Asian Nations (ASEAN), one wonders about its long-term plans.
In the Asia Times Alan Boyd recorded a western diplomat as saying “Well, it always helps to talk, and ASEAN has very few
options open to it. [But] in practice Chinese strategic ambitions will be undiminished, so in effect ASEAN has given
tacit acknowledgement that China holds the high ground over other claimants.” The high ground is pretty modest in the
South China Sea, but one sees what the diplomat means. The hint that China will win in the end is hardly unexpected, and
doubtless Beijing will continue to be the major player, while being pragmatic enough to permit others to have decent
slices of the maritime cake.
None of the islets was taken over by imperialists in the heyday of colonial expansion, and I have long held a theory
about this: the French realised grapevines wouldn’t grow on coral, and it dawned on the British that they couldn’t build
a decent-sized Government House. Kaiser Wilhelm wasn’t interested as there was no room for a cavalry charge, and when
America colonised the Philippines in 1898 it left the Spratlys alone because the floating baseball had not yet been
invented.
Attraction was there none, but there is now considerable interest in the region, although estimates of the amounts of
oil, gas and rare minerals under the sea vary greatly. This is not surprising, because what exploration company is going
to admit that there might be gold under them thar cays?
No matter what crude nationalistic advantage might apply by occupation of individual islets, there is the knotty problem
of legally apportioning particular and economically lip-smacking spots of sandy coral to any one country. Article 121(3)
of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS; recently ratified by China) says comonsensically that “Rocks which
cannot sustain human habitation or economic life of their own shall have no Exclusive Economic Zone or continental
shelf,” but if a lovely rich subaqueous oil gusher spouts a few kilometres away from your very own 3 by 3 lump of coral,
are you going to pay much attention to UNCLOS? Last year the World Court ruled in Malaysia’s favour over a dispute with
Indonesia over two tiny islands, but such cases depend on both parties submitting to international jurisdiction, and it
is unlikely China would agree to any such procedure.
The gesture by China concerning non-violent resolution of regional difficulties is comforting, but we should not imagine
for a moment that if military muscle is exerted by others, then Beijing will lie down like a purring pussy cat. The
Philippines, Vietnam and Singapore are involved in Washington’s plans for expansion of its military presence in the
region (an ‘Asian NATO’ has been suggested, to confront China, which would be reinventing a wobbly wheel “remember the
farce of SEATO?), and Deputy Defense Secretary Wolfowitz announced in Singapore last month that’’s very important to
this whole region that the United States remains committed here.”
This may be agreeable to some countries, but it is disturbing for others that the Bush administration intends to meddle
further in their region. Introduction of yet more US military might is not going to create stability: it is going to
exasperate the PRC (perhaps it is meant to do that) and encourage division.
It will place supporters of SEATO (Two) against those who consider it foolhardy of the Pentagon (which rather than the
State Department is directing foreign policy round the world; an absurd situation) to adopt a highly visible military
posture in the ‘Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality’ supported by Malaysia and the Indonesian government (but not
necessarily the latter’s generals, which is another complication). The US should stay right out of it and leave the
ASEANs and China to look after their own region.
Brian Cloughley is a former military officer who writes on international affairs. His website is http://www.briancloughley.com