Kosovo: House International Relations Committee Testimony
James W. Pardew, Jr., Principal Deputy Special Advisor to the President and Secretary of State for Kosovo and Dayton
Implementation Statement to the House International Relations Committee Washington, DC, August 4, 1999
Mr. Chairman, I am grateful for the opportunity to provide the committee an update on Dayton and Kosovo implementation.
Over the past decade, the former Yugoslavia disintegrated into the madness of ethnic warfare against civilian
populations. These conflicts produced an estimated 3.5 million refugees and displaced persons, and more than 250,000
killed -- most recently, more than 1 million displaced persons and refugees and an estimated 10,000 murdered in Kosovo
alone.
Throughout this century, the stability of Europe has been a vital interest of the United States. Ethnic conflict in
southeastern Europe clearly is a direct threat to European stability and therefore it is a threat to U.S. national
interests. President Clinton and Secretary Albright have repeatedly emphasized that our overall objective is to see the
whole of southeastern Europe as an integral part of an undivided, democratic, peaceful Europe.
That is why we have invested so much time, energy and resources in the former Yugoslavia over the past 10 years. That is
also why American troops have been in Macedonia since 1993; in Bosnia as part of a NATO- led force implementing the
Dayton Agreement since 1995; and now in Kosovo as part of the NATO-led force implementing the peace agreement that
followed the successful air campaign.
These military deployments are not a permanent solution, however. Long- term regional stability requires an active and
robust political and economic development program. The effort to move Serbia toward democracy is a particularly
important component of the stability program for the former Yugoslavia and the region as a whole.
Mr. Wayne has told you about the overall concept for the region. I will focus more precisely on programs designed for
civilian implementation in Kosovo and Bosnia and for promoting democracy in Serbia.
In Kosovo, civil society must be rebuilt on the ruins of a savage campaign of destruction and murder waged by the forces
of Slobodan Milosevic. Our immediate steps in creating the conditions for an autonomous and democratic Kosovo have been
achieved.
First, the Serb forces responsible for carrying out a systematic campaign of atrocities and ethnic cleansing in Kosovo
have been driven from the province by NATO's successful air campaign.
Second, more than 700,000 out of the approximately 800,000 refugees expelled from Kosovo by Milosevic have been able to
return more rapidly than anyone projected, and have begun to rebuild their lives.
Third, the international security force and civil administration called for in UNSC resolution 1244, under NATO and the
UN, are being established.
KFOR currently has in Kosovo more than 35,000 troops from 21 nations, including 5,596 U.S. forces. KFOR is rapidly
establishing the secure environment necessary for political and economic development in the province.
The UN Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) is making steady progress in deploying civil administrators,
civilian police, and judicial authorities to the field under extremely daunting circumstances. UNMIK has a powerful
mandate, one sufficient to create the foundation for a democratic society. Nevertheless, there is still a long way to
go, and we are urging the UN and contributing countries to deploy their resources and personnel to Kosovo as quickly as
possible. It is essential that we provide the personnel and resources necessary for UNMIK to fulfill its civil
implementation tasks.
The European Commission's just-completed damage assessment reveals that the humanitarian needs in Kosovo are as vast as
they are urgent. Last Wednesday's immediate needs conference in Brussels focused on these humanitarian requirements, and
donors pledged to provide nearly $2.1 billion in humanitarian assistance. The United States pledged more than $500
million in assistance for urgent humanitarian needs. This money comes from the budget supplemental passed by Congress
and signed by the President on May 21 of this year. A follow-on donors conference in the fall will concentrate on
assistance for reconstruction, for which the Europeans will bear the bulk of the burden.
Another urgent item on UNMIK's agenda is the establishment of a civilian police force that will assume responsibility
for law and order. The UN plans to deploy 3,100 international civilian police in Kosovo. UNMIK civilian police will be
armed and will have arrest authority. The U.S. intends to provide 450 of those police.
As these police deploy, the OSCE will begin training the Kosovar police force of 3,000 which will eventually take over
responsibility for civilian policing. The U.S. is playing a leading role in this effort as well, with an American
appointed to head the police training academy.
The U.S. has nominated more than 20 qualified human rights monitors as part of the OSCE's contingent of more than 100
who will monitor and protect the human rights of all Kosovars, whatever their ethnicity or religion. In addition, we
have pledged $9 million to date for the ICTY to ensure that the work of the War Crimes Tribunal in Kosovo can be carried
forward. We are working with the OSCE and the Council of Europe to provide further political and resource support to
promote respect for human rights, establish institutions such as a human rights ombudsperson, and build the rule of law.
Further down the road, democratization in Kosovo will require an active, pluralistic political life, free and fair
elections, and self- government. We have no intention of seeing one single-party system replace another. We are working
with the UN, the OSCE, and other international organizations to foster political party development, promote the
participation of Kosovars in the political process, and promote the growth of responsible independent media -- an
indispensable part of democracy and civil society in Kosovo. Our goal is to hold local and Kosovo-wide elections as soon
as is feasible.
In the final analysis the future of Kosovo will depend upon the people who live there. As Secretary Albright said to a
crowd of Kosovars in Pristina last Friday, "If there is to be a true victory in Kosovo, it cannot be a victory of
Albanians over Serbs, or NATO over Serbs. It must be a victory of those who believe in the rights of the individual over
those who do not."
Let me turn to Bosnia and Herzegovina, where in the implementation of the Dayton agreement we have achieved a number of
successes, but much still remains to be done. We can be justifiably proud of NATO's success in establishing the secure
environment necessary for normal political, economic and social life in Bosnia.
Progress on refugee returns has been mixed, but the signs over the last year are encouraging. Since Dayton, almost
600,000 Bosnians have returned to the country. Of those, more than 80,000 have gone to areas where their ethnic groups
are in the minority. While the rate of minority returns has been unacceptably slow, the pace is accelerating. Almost as
many minorities returned in 1998 as in the 2 preceding years combined, and minority returns this year are outpacing
those of 1998.
Although this progress is small, it is a significant step toward our goal of a self-sustaining return process. We will
continue to make clear to Bosnian officials that closer ties with the U.S. and western institutions depend upon improved
performance on minority returns. This is our greatest leverage with Bosnian leaders, and it is the key to the progress
we have achieved to date.
Most Dayton-mandated national institutions and symbols are now in place, though state organizations are limited in their
functions so far. The work of the three-member joint Presidency is showing promise, as demonstrated last week at the
Stability Pact summit in Sarajevo. With little more than 2 weeks lead time and with nightmarish security and logistical
obstacles to overcome, the three worked together to ensure that this summit of more than 40 world leaders went smoothly.
We see real progress in policing in Bosnia as a result of efforts by the International Police Task Force (IPTF) and
bilateral donors, including the U.S. Police cooperation between the two entities is growing. With IPTF coordination,
local police are undertaking increasingly professional criminal investigations, and police academies are now up and
running in both entities to bring new trainees into the police force - a real milestone in police restructuring.
Economic reform is an area where progress has been slow. There have been some successes, such as the new "convertible
mark" currency and the new customs law, which have bound Bosnia together as a single economic entity. But progress
toward a functioning, market-based economy is inadequate. This is above all the fault of political leaders who remain
committed to political control over economic activity, in order to guarantee their political party's continued
dominance. They continue to block privatization and other reforms, and to maintain an economic and regulatory climate
that discourages private investment, foreign or domestic. Accordingly, our efforts now will focus on pressing Bosnia's
leaders to act decisively in the areas of economic restructuring, privatization and judicial reform in order to secure
Bosnia's economic future. Finally, let me turn to our efforts to promote democratization in Serbia. Long-term stability
in the region requires replacement of Milosevic and movement toward democratic government in Serbia. President Clinton
has made clear that as long as the Milosevic regime is in place, the United States will provide no reconstruction
assistance to Serbia, although we do not rule out continued humanitarian assistance through international organizations.
Over the past several weeks, Serbia's citizens have shown their disgust for Milosevic and their hunger for democratic
government through spontaneous demonstrations in the streets of cities throughout the country. Opposition parties,
taking advantage of the popular sentiment against Milosevic, have organized their own rallies and are beginning to
mobilize for a larger effort in the fall.
These are all positive developments and we want to nurture them. At the same time, I do not want to give rise to
exaggerated expectations that the Milosevic regime will fall anytime soon. Milosevic continues to hold the main levers
of power in his hands, most importantly the army, the police, and most of the government-owned media. Nevertheless,
regardless of whether Milosevic stays or goes in the short term, our support for democratic forces is an investment in
Serbia's future.
Over the past 2 years, the U.S. Government and NGOs such as NDI, IRI, and the NED have spent $16.5 million on projects
aimed at promoting democratic governance and civil society in the F.R.Y. In Sarajevo last Friday, the President
announced that he will work with the Congress to provide $10 million this year and more over the next 2 years to
strengthen independent media, NGOs, independent trade unions, and the democratic opposition in Serbia.
Our democratization programs in Serbia focus on three areas. First is assistance to oppostion parties. Here we intend to
provide them with technical assistance and first-class political advice, the kind that may seem commonplace to us but
represents a whole different way of thinking to them.
Second, we are promoting independent media and the free flow of information in Serbia in two ways. In order to increase
the amount of objective news reaching the population, we are nearing completion of the "Ring Around Serbia," a network
of transmitters that will permit us to broadcast VOA, RFE, and other international news programs throughout the country.
Perhaps even more important, however, we want to strengthen Serbia's own independent media, since Serbs, like Americans,
prefer to get their news from their own sources, in their own context.
Finally, we give special importance to support for Montenegro. President Djukanovic and the multi-ethnic, democratic
government of Montenegro have demonstrated courage and determination in implementing reforms and resisting Belgrade's
attempts to strip Montenegro of its constitutional powers. Montenegro is too small to change Serbia directly, but we
believe it can serve as a model for the Serbian opposition, providing advice on election strategy and the implementation
of painful but necessary reforms. We have steadily increased our support for Montenegro, providing financial and
technical assistance worth $25 million in 1999 as well as humanitarian assistance worth millions through UNHCR.
Our efforts now can do two things. In the short term, we can help the indigenous Serbian opposition focus its energies
and more effectively articulate the anger and frustration of the Serbian public. In the longer term, we can cultivate
and strengthen those forces that will carry the democracy banner as long as Milosevic remains in power. Both of these
are important goals. U.S. leadership in this endeavor will be critical, and your support will be essential. We look
forward to working together with Congress to bring democracy to Serbia -- an indispenable element of stability for the
entire region.
This concludes my statement, Mr. Chairman. I would be pleased to answer your questions.
ENDS