WORLDNET "DIALOGUE"
UNITED STATES INFORMATION AGENCY
Television and Film Service of Washington, D.C.
GUEST: Jamie Shea, NATO Spokesman
TOPIC: NATO's Role in Kosovo
POSTS: Sydney, Wellington, Singapore
HOST: Judlyne Lilly
DATE: July 15, 1999
TIME: 06:00 - 07:00 EDT
MS. LILLY: Hello, and welcome to Worldnet's "Dialogue," I'm your host today Judlyne Lilly.
Kosovo, NATO and peacekeeping, hot topics in the news over the past several months. We are very glad the war is
over. But many challenges remain. To discuss NATO and Kosovo issues with our international audiences, I am honored to
welcome Jamie Shea to our program today. Mr. Shea is the chief NATO spokes person. Mr. Shea, sincere thanks for joining
us today. Can you give us an update on the situation in Kosovo?
MR. SHEA: Thanks very much. I think at the moment things in Kosovo are going well. The KFOR NATO soldiers are
proceedings up to their full deployment strength of about 50,000, which we should achieve by the beginning of September.
But already we have over 41,000 NATO soldiers in the region, over 30,000 of them in Kosovo. So they are establishing an
effective environment of security, they are dealing with the still unfortunately too frequent incidents of revenge
attacks that are beginning fortunately now to go down. They are demilitarizing the Kosovo Liberation Army. They are
providing protection to the Serb minority that we hope very much will stay in Kosovo and help us to build there a truly
multiethnic society.
And at the same time the KFOR soldiers have provided the secure routes and secure framework for the return of
the refugees. Now, I think that this is an astounding story. Already just one month after the NATO airstrikes are
finished, 80 percent -- and that's to say virtually 800,000 -- refugees are on their way to returning to their homes in
Kosovo. It's almost unique in recent history that so soon after the end of the conflict the overwhelming number of
refugees caused by that conflict are able to return to their homes, in many cases spontaneously. And they have the
summer weeks ahead of them to rebuild their homes so that they can live as comfortably as possible by the time that the
winter arrives at the end of October.
At the same time we are also concentrating on the next phase, which is the rebuilding of Kosovo.
MS. LILLY: Thank you, sir. We will begin our international discussion now with our distinguished guests in
New Zealand, Singapore, Australia and the Philippines. Welcome to today's program. We will start with our guests in
Wellington, New Zealand, and in particular Mr. David Dickens (sp). Mr. Dickens (sp), please go ahead with your comments
and questions.
Q Thank you very much, and good evening. Good evening, Jamie. My name is Dave Dickens. I am the director of the
Center for Strategic Studies in Wellington, New Zealand. My first question is that as the media skepticism grew during
the NATO air campaign, did you have any doubts? Was your confidence (dented ?) at all? How did you hang together so to
say?
MR. SHEA: Well, for inquiring -- but I did manage to hang together, although there were some difficult days of
course, particularly in the air campaign that lasted 78 days in all.
No, I never doubted that NATO was going to prevail. I first of all believe that we have a moral duty to do so. I
was impressed that the alliance did not break up, but held together very well indeed throughout -- even during the tough
days. And I knew that our airstrikes would be having a cumulative effect on Milosevic, which ultimately would oblige him
to meet the conditions of the international community. And of course it was difficult to say exactly when this would
happen, but I had no doubt that eventually we would get to that goal.
No, my main task was to simply make myself available to the press, which I did twice a day, to show that NATO
was never going to evade any tough question, that we would always be there to provide answers, and that we would make
the best effort that we could to put the fats as we knew them accurately on the table. Our credibility was not by trying
to counter the Belgrade propaganda with NATO propaganda, but simply by being honest and truthful about what we were
doing, why we were doing it, and why we believed we had a moral duty to continue until our objectives were met.
MS. LILLY: Thank you in Wellington. We will return to you soon. We turn now to Singapore and Ms. Jill Newbranner
(ph) of CCS TV. Go ahead please.
Q Good evening, Jamie, and welcome to "Talking Points." Now, U.S. officials in China are now talking with
Beijing over the issue of compensation over NATO's bombing of the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade. What's expected to come
out of those talks given China's earlier rejection of NATO's explanation of the bombing?
MR. SHEA: Well, I hope that those talks will result in some form of an agreement on compensation, and I think
it's obviously very good that the United States has been so forthcoming in explaining to China the circumstances of this
tragic accident. And of course we never evaded the responsibility for the accidental bombing of the Chinese Embassy. We
made it clear that it was a tragic accident. We apologized to the Chinese authorities immediately on the tragedy, that
it happened. And the undersecretary of State of the U.S., Tom Pickering, has been recently in Beijing to present the
Chinese authorities with a very full and very honest report as to why this tragic mistake happened. And so I hope we can
move beyond this now, and that China would accept that this was simply a tragic accident of a conflict, accept the NATO
apology, and that we can obviously resume healthy bilateral relations. NATO as such as no relations with China, but NATO
allies do. And I think now we need to close the chapter and look to the future.
Q Anything so far on the size of compensation for Chinese families?
MR. SHEA: That's for the allies to determine. The U.S. has taken the lead on this, and I think we will just have
to wait and see what are the results from these talks in Beijing.
Q Sir, if we can turn our attention to Kosovo, as NATO expected there were many mass graves discovered. What is
being done for the families whose loved one have been massacred? Of course they have to wait for the War Crimes Tribunal
to exhume and witness these atrocities. And then what for the families?
MR. SHEA: Well, I think what those families want above all is for justice to be done. And of course the
International Criminal Tribunal has made a very good and very effective start in gathering evidence. We have discovered
up to 100 suspected mass grave or mass crime sites, even more than we predicted from our intelligence sources during the
conflict itself. The international tribunal has over 100 forensic scientists and investigators in Kosovo, and Justice
Arbour, the chief prosecutor, was in Kosovo yesterday, seeing the very good work they are doing gathering all of the
evidence. And of course the evidence is so overwhelming that I anticipate that the tribunal will be indicting many more
war criminals over the next few weeks. And of course it's very important that we keep all diplomatic, economic and other
pressures on Yugoslavia until these indicted war criminals are handed over to the tribunal. That is the best thing that
we can do for those families, to make sure that every crime is thoroughly investigated, and that those responsible are
effectively brought to justice.
Q Well, Russia's role in the peacekeeping force has always been a contentious issue. Now they take their orders
from KFOR. But there's the possibility that they could override these orders if it conflicts with their own national
commanders. Now, how has this affected NATO's unity of command or even credibility?
MR. SHEA: I don't believe it's having any impact whatever. We had a tough negotiation between the United States
and Russia recently in Helsinki, but which came up with a very workable, very good agreement which provides for the
Russian forces to be deployed in three of the NATO-led sectors, but following the same rules of engagements, following
the same command procedures as applying to the NATO troops. So let me emphasize the Russians are not conducting some
sort of separate mission here. They are fully integrated into the NATO mission. And indeed some of the troops that they
have sent to Kosovo have been for the last four years with NATO in Bosnia, so the procedures of working together have
already been very effectively worked out. So I don't believe we are going to have any problems here at all.
What I do hope is that the Kosovar Albanian population, which in part has been somewhat hesitant about the
Russian presence, will understand that the Russians will be as evenhanded in their treatments of all of the people of
Kosovo as the NATO soldiers are going to be.
Q So you don't feel that their cultural and historical alliance with the Serbs will affect NATO's work in
Kosovo?
MR. SHEA: No, I don't. The experience of our cooperation with the Russians in Bosnia is that they implement the
same missions, the same rules of engagement. Indeed in Bosnia they patrolled together with the United States, and I
believe that the NATO commanders in Kosovo will also establish arrangements for these joint patrols. They will be very
closely liaisoned at all headquarters levels as well. So I believe that Russia is there because it wants to play a
constructive role in this peacekeeping effort. We know that we have got arrangements which guarantee the Russians will
be part of KFOR, not part of any kind of separate force. And I believe that a lot of the suspicions that I have seen,
particularly among the Kosovar Albanians, misfounded, and I hope that they will cooperate with the Russians as much as
the Russians I know -- and the Russian Foreign Ministry made this clear in a statement yesterday -- wants to cooperate
with them, the Albanian population of Kosovo.
Q If we could turn our attention to the Kosovo Liberation Army, do you see the KLA as a thorn in the side of
peacekeepers, especially in light of reports that they are setting up their own interim government in some areas?
MR. SHEA: No, I don't believe so. I think that the demilitarization of the Kosovo Liberation Army has gone well.
Next week will mark the 30-day period of which they are due to have handed in all of their long barreled and heavy
weapons. The Supreme Allied Commander of NATO, General Clark, was in Pristina yesterday, and he reported publicly that
the demilitarization is going according to schedule. So far hundreds of weapons have been handed over and are being
placed in secure storage sites.
Now, the UCK, the Kosovo Liberation Army, wants to be part of the political future of Kosovo, and if it wishes
to turn itself into a political party along democratic lines, then that is something that obviously we would welcome
very much. And the leader of the Kosovo Liberation Army, Mr. Hashem Thaqi, has so far I think played a very
statesman-like role in Kosovo in appealing for reconciliation with the Serb community, in accepting to participate in
the transitional council established by the United Nations, and in issuing firm instructions to the UCK military
commanders to stop their military activities, to take off their uniforms and put on civilian clothes, and to cooperate
fully with KFOR over demilitarization. And of course we are going to be very vigilant in ensuring that all aspects of
the demilitarization agreements are followed to the letter.
Q In Kosovo itself reports say damage has actually set the province back several decades. What kinds of numbers
are we talking about here?
MR. SHEA: We know from U.N. reports that about 65,000 houses in Kosovo have been destroyed. That's an enormous
number. But, on the other, what we have seen is some of the damage is less bad than what we had anticipated. In fact,
it's very regional. Along the Albanian border in the west and in the north unfortunately the damage is terrible. Cities
like Djakovica or Podujevo or Pec have been very, very badly damaged if not destroyed. On the other hand, Pristina
itself, where I was just a couple of days ago, the south of Kosovo, the east, have not been badly affected. The roofs
are on most of the houses there, and then of course that will help reconstruct. And some of the infrastructure has also
not been as badly affected. It again shows that the NATO air campaign through its accuracy did not inflict massive
damage on Kosovo. That too I think is a plus point for reconstruction.
Now, I think the most important thing here is that first of all the Kosovar Albanians want to rebuild Kosovo.
They have gone back spontaneously in massive numbers as I've said earlier. They want to get on with the job of
rebuilding their homes. And that mentality is half of the key to a solution. Secondly, the international community has
made it clear that it is prepared to come up with the money for the reconstruction of Kosovo, currently estimated at
around $5 billion over three years by the European Union. That's a big amount, but it's not an insurmountable amount of
money. And clearly the U.N. Transitional Authority, which is now being established under -- (inaudible) -- will have as
one of its key tasks to set the priorities for reconstruction.
But I believe within a couple of years Kosovo will be unrecognizable, and that's for the good.
Q Jamie, what do you know in the sense of latest intelligence on the strength of the Milosevic regime, if at
all, it is coming to an end, especially in the light that there doesn't seem to be an alternative among Milosevic's
opposition?
MR. SHEA: Well, I believe that Milosevic is in trouble. His people are passing a verdict on his 10 years of
misrule, the four wars that he started in the former Yugoslavia and which he has lost; the economic degradation of
Yugoslavia, which used to be one of the most successful of the post-communist countries of Eastern Europe is now one of
the poorest; the fact that the Serbs have been reduced to the status of pariahs in the international community, when
they have indeed a very great contribution to make to the future of Europe. And people now in Serbia are voting with
their feet. Everyday in about 10 Serb cities we have seen major demonstrations. And with the opposition increasingly
vocal, and calling even on demonstrations now to take place in the capital of Belgrade.
We'll have to wait and see what is going to happen here. Obviously we hope that the opposition will be united,
they will be more effective in ousting Milosevic from power in a democratic process to the extent that they settle their
differences or their rivalries and be united. But I believe that the green shoots, if you like, of a democratic
alternative are not dead in Serbia, despite what Milosevic has done in muzzling the media for instance, in creating a
crony economy. Many people obviously want to be part of Europe in Serbia, and we in NATO, the countries of NATO,
strongly encourage and support that democratic alternative to Milosevic.
MS. LILLY: Thank you in Singapore. We'll go now to our guests in Sydney, Australia, and Ms. Indira Nidu (ph) of
SVS TV. Go ahead please.
Q Thank you for your time tonight, Mr. Shea.
MR. SHEA: Thank you.
Q Kosovo Albanian refugees here in Australia will begin returning to Kosovo from as early as next week. Is it
safe for them to return home?
MR. SHEA: Yes, it's fully safe for them to return home. Already about 800,000 people have started to move out of
the camps -- in fact have largely left the camps in Macedonia and in Albania, and have gone back. It's because that they
know with KFOR now achieving fully deployment in Kosovo there is that environment of security which will allow them
safely to return to rebuild their homes. The international community would not be organizing a mass repatriation program
for the 90,000 or so refugees that were sent to third countries if they didn't believe that it was safe for them now to
go back.
Q What about the dangers posed by land mines and booby traps? Just today we heard of another civilian being
killed in a land mine accident.
MR. SHEA: Yes, that is obviously a major concern. There have been about 95 separate incidents of people being
either killed or injured with mines. And indeed one of the big programs of the international community which KFOR will
help will be a de-mining program. But it's very important of course that the refugees follow the advice of KFOR
regarding the routes to take to go home, those which of course have been cleared of mines by NATO troops already; that
they be very careful regarding booby traps and mines when they go back to their homes, particularly in allowing for
example their children to play in surrounding fields. One of the problems of course is that the Serb forces laid
hundreds of thousands of mines. Some of them are in clearly marked areas, which are along the Albanian border, which we
can identify. But a lot of them were simply thrown into the soil randomly, and we don't yet have the accurate
information that we need. So this is a great problem. It can't be solved immediately. It often takes many, many years
and a great amount of money to effectively de-mine a country.
But the most important thing is that the refugees undergo a U.N. or a KFOR mine awareness program. In the camps
in Macedonia and Albania the U.N. Refugee Agency, with NATO assistance, conducted mine awareness training for refugees
prior to their return. And it's very important that those refugees follow these instructions and try to minimize the
risks which unfortunately can't be altogether eliminated just yet.
Q Should those Kosovar Albanians who are concerned about returning be forced to go back to Kosovo?
MR. SHEA: It's the policy of most governments, in line with standard practice of the U.N. High Commissioner for
Refugees, that people are not forced to go back against their will, or at least have the opportunity to request asylum
or temporary residency status, or at least even the right of return. This of course depends upon national legislation as
well.
But what I want to stress here is that so far the signs are that the refugees do want to go back to Kosovo. The
Kosovars are very, very attached to their homeland. During the conflict itself sometimes the humanitarian organizations
had a difficulty in persuading refugees to jump on a plane in Skopje and to be flown to the United States, or to be
flown to Australia, or to be flown to Germany, to be given temporary shelter, because they did not want to leave. In
fact, in Albania one key problem we had was persuading refugees to move out of Kukes in the north along the border and
go to safer areas elsewhere in Albania. They simply wanted to stay just a couple of miles away from their homeland. So I
think this shows the very positive mentality of the overwhelming majority of Kosovar Albanian refugees. They want to go
back, they want to rebuild Kosovo. And therefore I think there would only be a handful of people who would not want to
return.
Q Albanian Kosovars have been protesting, we are seeing today, about the partiality of Russian troops. What
guarantees are there that the Russians will comply with KFOR's rules of engagement?
MR. SHEA: Well, we dealt with this earlier in a previous question, and therefore I would like to reiterate that
the Russian troops and the Russian political authorities in Moscow have emphasized that they will be as evenhanded in
their treatments of the ethnic populations as the NATO troops will be. They are there to protect Albanians, they are
there to protect the Serbs and the other minority groups that make up Kosovo. We have two agreements with Russia that
provide for the Russians to be fully integrated into KFOR. They are not there as part of any separate force. And indeed
our experience in working with the Russians in Bosnia over the last four years is that they do understand modern
peacekeeping techniques and they are evenhanded. We have effective liaison with them throughout the KFOR chain of
command. We have a political instance here at NATO headquarters in the form of the permanent joint council, the
NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council, which can deal with any political or policy-related questions. And therefore I
believe that the Kosovar Albanians should not rush to judgment because of perceptions of the Russian role that they may
have inherited from the time of the conflict. They should just give the Russians a chance to show what they are capable
of. I am sure the experience is going to be a positive one.
Q And finally, Mr. Shea, is NATO satisfied with the way things are going in Kosovo?
MR. SHEA: Well, obviously there are always going to be problems. Things will never be perfect, particularly not
when you have a society and a province completely torn up by war, which has seen unparalleled barbarity and suffering in
Europe at the end of the 20th century -- reconciliation, forgiveness, the willingness to live together between Serbs and
Albanians is not going to happen overnight; the economic problems of a province which has had a lot of its industry
devastated -- not by NATO attacks but simply by the Serb military campaign, which has seen its economic prosperity sink
to below $400 per capita per annum -- all of these issues are going to take time to resolve. But it's going to take not
only a great number of NATO troops at least for the immediate future, although we hope to be able to withdraw them as
circumstances permit -- but a great deal of international economic aid.
You've got to remember also that Kosovo has been part of Yugoslavia; that is to say, part of a communist country
of much of the period since the end of the Second World War, and part of a dictatorship over the last 10 years. And that
has not of course assisted the process of democratization, the process of privatization, the process of market economic
reform, which of course are fundamental to any prosperity and success in Europe as much as anywhere else. So there is a
reconstruction effort, there is a reconciliation effort, and then finally there is an economic, political transformation
effort that has to be engaged.
But on the other hand, am I encouraged? Yes, I am encouraged by the fact that the NATO forces have been able to
achieve security quickly, by the willingness of the refugees to go back and participate with us in this effort, by the
fact that the Kosovar Albanian leaders have shown a great deal of courage and wisdom in appealing for reconciliation
vis-a-vis the Serbs, by the fact that although many Serbs have left some have chosen to stay and some have chosen to
come back. So they are willing to give things a chance as well.
I think the democratization in Serbia in the long run can only help this process. And of course the
international community will have to keep its promise not only to assist Kosovo, but to reconstruct the entire Balkan
region -- in other words, to implement the stability pact on which there will be an important summit meeting in
Sarajevo, Bosnia, on the 30th of July. Because the problems of Kosovo cannot be solved independently of the wider
problems of the entire region of Southeastern Europe, which has to be given assistance towards economic reform, borders
have to be opened, not closed, trading patterns have to be established, security cooperation has to become the norm and
not the exception, and some perspective has to be offered to this region for eventual integration into NATO and the
European Union. And so we just can't take one country individually or one place individually; we need a program which
appeals to all countries to move closer together.
But I am optimistic that we have learned the lessons of the past and that we are going to offer this perspective
to this region.
MS. LILLY: Thank you in Sydney. We will return now to our guests in Wellington, New Zealand, and our guest there
Ms. Kathy Bell (sp). Go ahead please, Ms. Bell.
Q Mr. Shea, I am interested in the effect media scrutiny had on the NATO mission in Kosovo, and how you present
that mission. Some of the media scrutiny was quite intense and personal. How does that affect you and your job?
MR. SHEA: Well, the only thing you can do is be yourself in these kinds of situations. You have to talk to an
audience of millions in the same way that you would talk to an audience of a few journalists in a small briefing room at
NATO headquarters. I decided from the beginning that our best policy was to be accessible to the press. We gave two
briefings a day here at NATO headquarters -- to always be on hand to answer questions, never to evade questions --
always to be honest and be forthcoming, to provide information, even on things which were embarrassing to NATO, like the
regrettable accidents, when unfortunately innocent civilians died -- and to accept the responsibility and to explain why
things had happened.
Yet at the same time I also believe that it's important to point out to the press day after day why NATO was
doing the right thing, even if this could not be a perfect conflict in which technology would always perform perfectly,
and in which you could always discriminate between military targets and civilian victims. Unfortunately that wasn't
possible. But where ultimately it would be far worse not just for the Kosovar Albanians, but for security, stability in
the Balkans in general if NATO had thrown in the towel, had given up, and had simply left Milosevic to his own devices.
In other words, why our course was just and why the price that had to be paid was a price ultimately that was worth
paying.
You see, in conflicts the problem is the media often concentrate on the story of the day, often the risks of
conflict, without concentrating on the benefits in the future which will come when the conflict has been successfully
won. Fortunately now we see the benefits -- the refugees are back, NATO troops are in Kosovo, Serb troops are out of
Kosovo, reconstruction is going on, families are being reunited.
When I was in Pristina a couple of weeks ago, what impressed me was the immense relief being felt by the Kosovar
Albanian population that they could finally come out of their homes, they could walk the streets at night, they could
speak their mind without fear of being murdered or being expelled or being mistreated. And that made me believe that
everything that we have done, no matter how difficult it now seemed at the time, particularly in dealing with the media,
is ultimately worthwhile.
Q Do you think you'd do anything differently if you had to do it again?
MR. SHEA: Well, obviously one always commits mistakes, and I committed mistakes. I clearly accept that. And of
course I would have loved if everything had gone smoothly every single day. But I believe that one at the end of the day
has to be realistic. Your performance is never going to be perfect -- you will have good days, you will have bad days.
There are days when you will have all of the information that you need at your fingertips from your military commanders,
and there will be days when confusing things happen that simply can't be cleared up in real time -- and when you won't
have all the information at your fingertips. You will have days when the words slip off your tongue eloquently and are
very convincing, and there will be days when you are less eloquent and feel tongue-tied.
I think that when you live as I had to live for 78 days under worldwide media scrutiny 24 hours a day, which
everything I said was basically analyzed and dissected, then you have to realize that you cannot expect to be perfect,
even if you have to learn from your mistakes.
And again people pointed out to me all of the time that what some liked about my style of communication others
hated. So in other words, if I had tried to change what I was doing to appease my critics I would have ended up losing
my supporters. And I believe that's a lesson that is to be learned as well. So, yes, I would always try to affect what
we were doing next time round, but realizing that a perfect communications job is probably an unachievable goal.
Q Reports carried by the New Zealand media suggest that NATO attacks on Yugoslavian ground forces in Kosovo may
not have been effective. Is this a finding of NATO battle-assessment teams who are in the province now?
MR. SHEA: No, we haven't come to any conclusion. You are right we have sent in a battle-damage assessment team
-- it arrived two days ago. And I think we clearly have to wait till it produces its report. It will produce the most
authoritative, most accurate report into this question of how many tanks, how many artillery NATO destroyed.
At the end of the day though you have to also recall one fundamental point, which is that Milosevic gave in.
Milosevic agreed to withdraw his forces, he agreed to the deployment of NATO forces. He met the conditions of the
international community.
So whether NATO destroyed one tank or one thousand tanks doesn't really matter. At the end of the day the
military objective was achieved. And for NATO there was no ideal scoreline here of saying that if we achieve a hit rate
of 599 we were winning, but if it was 589 we were losing. What counts at the end of the day is that we applied
sufficient military pressure on the Milosevic regime to get them to do the rational thing of stopping the repression of
their own population, and that's of course what history at the end of the day I think will record about Operation Allied
Force.
Q Kathy Bell (sp) again. How does the funding the West is providing for reconstruction in Kosovo compare to the
costs of NATO's military campaign? And does NATO see that as a relative comparison?
MR. SHEA: Well, it's not a direct comparison, because of course you have to do both. Without the military
campaign -- and this brings me back to the previous question -- we would not be in the situation where we are in today.
So whether the military campaign is perfect or not, whether we achieved every objective we wanted to achieve, at the end
of the day had we not started this military campaign I can assure you there would not be 800,000 returning refugees in
Kosovo today -- they would still be in camps in the neighboring countries with no hope for them going back. There would
not be NATO troops bringing peace to Kosovo today; there would be Serb troops there continuing their campaign of
repression. So the air campaign was the key that has now brought the brighter prospects of reconstruction of Kosovo.
Now, we have to do both. We therefore of course have to on the one hand finance the air campaign that was
required; but we also have now to realize that a conflict is only justified by the good peace that it helps bring about,
and therefore creating that good peace is our responsibility.
I am encouraged here. We had a conference in Brussels -- not at NATO, but at the European Union -- two days ago
of the G-7 finance ministers in which initial pledges were put on the table for the reconstruction. Kosovo is not a big
place. It's about the size of the U.S. State of Connecticut. So we are not talking about rebuilding an entire continent
here. It's very small. It's population is at the moment about 1.5 million. And in global terms the reconstruction costs
of $5 billion over three years, provided it is now shared on an equitable basis throughout the international community,
should be perfectly manageable and should not have a damaging effect on reconstruction elsewhere in the world, whether
it be Africa or Asia or in other societies that have been torn out by war. And indeed what we have to do is bring about
a sufficient degree of reconstruction and confidence in Kosovo's future so the private money, private investment venture
capital from the private sector of course is forthcoming. That's the key to success, and that correspondingly will take
some of the weight off our governments.
Q David Dickens here -- we have been told to repeat our names before we speak to you. Modern air-land battle
doctrine holds that a air campaign should precede a land campaign, and then they should go together simultaneously. Do
you know Michael Rose (ph) has been quite vocal in suggesting that there should have been more of a land campaign and
earlier. What are your views on that?
MR. SHEA: Well, I respect General Rose's views and he has a great deal of experience of course as a U.N.
commander in Bosnia. But I don't agree with him on this particular point.
First of all, the air campaign worked. That is the fact, whether or not as I said earlier every tank that we
hoped we destroyed wad effectively destroyed. At the end of the day the air campaign succeeded all -- not just one or
two -- but all of our key objectives. Secondly, I do not see how a ground campaign would have brought about a more
successful result any more rapidly. I have never believed that it was some kind of panacea, or that the air campaign was
so bad that it needed to be replaced by a ground campaign. I felt that some of the talk of some strategists, that
because the air campaign had not succeeded in 24 or 48 hours it was a failure were wrong. I mean, any military action,
even a ground action, takes several weeks before it can produce optimum results. We never believed that any kind of
activity was going to produce a knock-out blow. It was completely ridiculous to our view that because something had not
succeeded in 24 hours it wasn't going to succeed as it produced its full effects. That's finally what happened.
A ground campaign would have carried enormous risks. And rarely did many strategists actually discuss the risks
of a ground campaign. They only seem to prefer to discuss the risks associated with an air campaign. But a ground
campaign would have taken several weeks to deploy all of the soldiers in the area -- thousands, even hundreds of
thousands, would have been required for a successful invasion of Kosovo. How many atrocities would have been committed
by Milosevic in those several extra weeks to get that ground force ready?
Secondly, if any people have been to Kosovo, as I have over the last couple of weeks, and seen the mountainous
terrain between Albania and Kosovo and the very large hills between Macedonia and Kosovo, a ground invasion against a
very well organized resistance of the Yugoslav army would have not been an easy job. There would have been lots and lots
of casualties, I can assure you.
And, thirdly, the Yugoslav army has trained ever since Tito's days for a ground invasion and how to resist a
ground invasion, how to use defense to the maximum advantage. They trained of course against the prospect of an invasion
by the Soviet army. But this Tito doctrine, which is still very much done in the Milosevic regime, would have been used
against NATO. And therefore -- not that I believe the Yugoslavs would have won -- but they would have made it very
difficult for us. And therefore I believe that we need to realize that a ground campaign was not some kind of easy
alternative, and that's why wisely NATO leaders decided to concentrate on the air campaign. And the proof of the pudding
is in eating -- it worked.
Q Was there much of a debate within NATO headquarters over these kinds of issues?
MR. SHEA: We of course considered the ground option. We planned for a ground option, because that was what you
would expect NATO to do. NATO is a planning organization, and we never rule out any eventuality. So we had plans in the
cupboard -- three different plans -- for ground options. But at the end of the day NATO leaders believed that the
quickest, most effective way of getting Milosevic to meet our five conditions was through air power. After all, we were
not at war -- never have been -- with Yugoslavia. We were not trying to occupy Yugoslavia; we were simply trying to put
sufficient leverage on Milosevic to get him to meet the key diplomatic conditions for resolving the Kosovo crisis,
including withdrawing his troops from Kosovo itself and allowing an international peacekeeping presence, as well as
allowing the refugees to return.
So for those particular objectives, which were limited, air power struck us as being sufficient. And again,
indeed it proved to be the case. To have assembled a large ground force and then to invade Kosovo with it would have
been tantamount to declaring war against Yugoslavia, and this went well beyond the political objectives that we were
pursuing during the Kosovo crisis. Again, that's another aspect which many advocates of the ground campaign did not
mention.
MS. LILLY: Thank you in Wellington. We'll go now to our guests in Manila, the Philippines, to speak with our
guest Mr. Ramon Izberto (ph) of GMS TV. Go ahead please.
Q Good evening, Mr. Shea. Thank you for joining us this evening. Just a few -- I would just like to follow up on
the line of questioning our colleagues in Wellington were pursuing regarding the military campaign. Was there an
identifiable turning point from your point of view where things really changed qualitatively and it went finally NATO's
way?
MR. SHEA: Well, yes. I believe there was. I think the turning point came after the first month also, when
Milosevic saw NATO was not going to crack apart. I imagine Milosevic rather like Napoleon probably went into this
saying, Lord, if I fight may it be against the coalition. Napoleon always believed coalitions would not hold up under
the pressure. But Milosevic was wrong about NATO in this respect. The fact is that although we are an alliance of 19
democratic sovereign countries we did not crack up. Even those countries which had internal political problems, or even
a negative public opinion, still stood solidly behind their NATO allies. And so I think it was clear to Milosevic after
about a month that NATO had the staying power. And this of course must have been a vital factor in getting him to
realize that sooner or later he would have to meet the conditions of the international community. I think that was the
first point.
I think the second point was that Milosevic did not succeed in his aim of eliminating the Kosovo Liberation Army
as a fighting force. He often boasted that he had done that or was about to do it, but the Kosovo Liberation Army stayed
in the field right until the end. And of course there were Serb casualties which Milosevic had to take into account.
Thirdly, I think the turning point came after about a month -- maybe a little bit longer -- when the reality of
the Kosovo war started to come home to the people of Yugoslavia. Milosevic had done his best to shroud Kosovo in a veil
of secrecy so that nothing was shown on Serb TV, nothing was written in newspapers about what was going on there. The
atrocities certainly, the persecution of the Albanians, but also the casualties that the Serb armed forces were taking.
And then when there were some desertions from the Yugoslav army, when Milosevic could no longer hide the reality of what
was going on, the response in many cities was clear: demonstrations, petitions, citizens councils, protests. And I think
Milosevic began to realize that the opposition to his role, which we now see on the streets of Yugoslavia every day, was
far from finished. And then ultimately we had too the fact that the Russians as the crisis went on were more and more
prepared to work constructively with the United States, with the NATO allies, behind a common diplomatic platform to end
the war, and therefore it was not only NATO which was united against Milosevic, but ultimately also the entire
international community. And I pay tribute of course to Viktor Chernomyrdin, the Russian envoy, to Martti Ahtisaari, the
Finnish president, who together went to Belgrade and finally persuaded Milosevic that it was time to settle should he
wish to avoid further damage -- and unnecessary damage -- to his country.
I also, if I may be complete, have to pay tribute to the NATO pilots who conducted this campaign. We did not
lose any pilots during the actual air operations, although we lost two planes. And it must have been extremely
depressing for Milosevic every day to be told by his generals that over the last 24 hours, and despite all of their best
attempts to shoot down NATO aircraft they had not been able to do so. The training of the pilots, their dedication,
their professionalism, were really I think beyond the parallel. I think they have to take a fair share of the credit as
well.
MS. LILLY: We'd like to create the affiliation of Mr. Ramon Izberto (ph). He is with GMA TV in Manilla. And go
ahead please with your next question.
Q Okay, thanks again. Right now, going back to the present, Kosovo is virtually an international protectorate,
and of course the United Nations is there with its special representative, NATO of course is there with KFOR, and you
also have the European Union and the Russians as a distinct factor as well. Isn't this still a conglomeration of so many
international bodies with all their own respective interests and their own respective agenda a recipe for the kind of
disarray that plagued international agencies in Bosnia earlier?
MR. SHEA: No, I don't believe so, because again I think we learned from our experiences here, and I believe that
in Bosnia we have learned how to cooperate effectively among the international institutions, on how to come up with a
rational division of labor, which means that we each contribute what we do best in a coordinated, synchronized way.
Secondly, I think that in Kosovo we are avoiding the gap or the time lag between the military implementation of
peace and the start-up of the civilian implementation. I agree that in Bosnia unfortunately this was rather slow. But in
Kosovo it is happening much faster. Already the U.N. administrator, Werner Kuchnia (ph), as arrived in Pristina, but he
has already been preceded by an acting special representative, Mr. Vieria de Mello, who has been doing sterling work. So
all of the organizations are now set up and running together. You now have a rational scheme which gives a different
slice of the cake if you like to different organizations, but under the effective coordination of Mr. Kuchnia (ph). And
the international community, as we were talking about earlier, is quite fast in coming up with pledges of support. There
will be a donors conference here in Brussels in just ten days' time, around the 27th, 28th of July, to actually pledge
the money for initial reconstruction.
And also I think there is a significant difference with Bosnia in that there is no ethnic opposition to the
return of refugees. I agree that there are tensions between the Serbs and the Albanians as a result of what has happened
-- not simply over the last year but over the last decade in Kosovo. But there are not these mono-ethnic dictatorships
that unfortunately have characterized Bosnia that prevent refugees going back to minority areas, and which have still
brought about a situation in Bosnia where four years after the Dayton peace agreements the majority of the refugees have
still not been able to return. So I think Kosovo is a slightly easier issue in that respect.
So I believe that these institutions will work harmoniously together.
Q Mr. Shea, you mentioned earlier that the refugees are now returning in large numbers. How is it on the ground?
How do you prevent the returning groups from the natural tensions which understandably arise from breaking out into
conflict?
MR. SHEA: Well, obviously KFOR cannot be on every street corner 24 hours a day and stop every incident, no more
than the best trained, best equipped, best manned police force in the world can prevent every instance of mugging on the
streets of a city. So I think we have to be realistic.
On the other hand, what KFOR has been able to do is to deter major acts of violence, like riots or armed clashes
between groups which could lead to significant loss of life -- atrocities, massacres and so on -- even if as I say we
can't prevent every individual act of looting or house burning.
It's very important in Kosovo to establish an international police force. Policemen are better than soldiers in
apprehending criminals and deterring crime by being present on the streets. They are better trained, better equipped
than soldiers are to deal with petty offenses. Soldiers are not trained to be policemen, even if we have some experience
in Bosnia and we are to some degree providing law and order at the moment in Kosovo. But getting the U.N. policemen in
is really a priority at the moment -- 3,000 are required -- about 1,300 have been pledged. The first policemen have
already arrived from Bosnia, about a hundred. Next week the first contingents from overseas for the U.N. police are due
to arrive, and that is going to be a critical function. They will first of all of course patrol very much with KFOR
behind them. But as they become more accustomed, and as of course law and order takes hold, they can then start
patrolling without a military protection.
There is also another aspect here which is extremely important, which is not lose any time, as unfortunately we
did do in Bosnia in reforming the judiciary. We need judges that are impartial, that are trained judges, we need courts.
We need judicial systems, lawyers, both for the prosecution and the defense, so that when we arrest a criminal there is
somebody we can hand him over to to ensure that the charges are level, that there is a fair trial, an that justice is
done. And that of course will also deter actions. To the extent that criminals escape with impunity, they are more
likely to commit acts than if they know there is a functioning judiciary to which they are going to be answerable. So
law and order, police, judiciary, border guards to try to guard against illicit gangs coming into Kosovo from
surrounding countries with the intention of looting -- that these things, although not eliminated immediately begin to
decline as time goes by.
Q Mr. Shea, you mentioned about restoring the criminal justice system there. What about the war criminals that
have been identified already in the course of the conflict? What is being done right now to pursue them? And doesn't
this pose complications for efforts to reconcile the communities in Kosovo?
MR. SHEA: Not at all. For reconciliation it is essential that all criminals face justice, because until they do
so the sense of vengeance, the sense of unrequited justice is extremely strong, as we found in Bosnia. When war
criminals receive their just desserts people feel that some kind of retribution is unnecessary, because those
responsible have faded their crimes, and then reconciliation can take place. So I can assure you no matter how difficult
it is we have a duty to do our utmost to make sure that those who are responsible for these appalling acts do face
justice. It is not only morally right, but it is also politically wise in that it does foster reconciliation. The
Albanian community which suffered must know that those responsible brought to justice, and the Serb community has to
also realize that terrible acts were committed in its name.
But to the extent that an Albanian sees a military commander face justice, that Albanian is best likely to blame
the entire Serb community for what was done ultimately by a very small -- and let us hope unrepresentative minority --
of thugs and war criminals.
Now, at the moment I grant you it's not easy to arrest many of these people, because they have not stayed behind
in Kosovo; they have gone to Yugoslavia. And President Milosevic, who is an indicted war criminal himself, has a very
poor record when it comes to cooperating with the International Criminal Tribunal and handing over the indicted war
criminals in Yugoslavia that were indicted by the tribunal for earlier crimes committed in Vukovar in Croatia at the
beginning of the Yugoslav war.
But two things. First of all, the International Criminal Tribunal has no statute of limitations, which means to
say that these indictments do not expire over time. Secondly, let us hope -- and I believe what we can also be confident
of -- that Yugoslavia will not remain a dictatorship forever -- hopefully not for much longer. Democracy will come. And
hopefully a democratic government in Belgrade, seeking the support of the international community, wanting to be
reintegrated back into the European and Euro-Atlantic family of nations, would be willing to hand over the indicted war
criminals on its territory. The tribunal is not tuberous. If you look at Bosnia there is now a situation in which over
50 percent of all the war criminals indicted for crimes in Bosnia have been in The Hague. And 16 of them, incidentally,
have been detained by NATO soldiers in Bosnia. So this is a justice which does work, and therefore I think it's only a
question of time before these war criminals will go to The Hague. If I were an indicted war criminal, I would certainly
not be sleeping on my two ears.
MS. LILLY: Thank you, Manila. We are very short of time, so we are going to return to Wellington now. And please
ask a very brief question, and Mr. Shea, give us a very brief answer. Thank you.
Q It's David Dickens here with the last very brief question. Looking to the future, Milosevic has started four
wars. He's lost them all. What will NATO do if he starts another one in Montenegro?
MR. SHEA: Well, Jude, thanks for the hint to give an uncharacteristically short answer. I'll try to do this now.
NATO heads of state and government meeting in Washington for their summit at the end of April made crystal clear -- and
in their declaration to Milosevic -- that if he tries to disrupt or to undermine the democratically-elected government
of President Djukanovic in Montenegro he will face severe consequences. We haven't spelled these out -- I don't think we
need to. Milosevic has seen through our intervention in Kosovo that we really do back up our fine words with actions,
and hopefully that will be a deterrent to him. Anyway, given the demonstrations in many Serb cities at the moment, and
which show no signs fortunately of going away, he seems to have enough trouble on his plate at home for the time being
to keep him occupied.
MS. LILLY: And with that I must say goodbye. Thank you very much, Mr. Shea, for taking the time to share your
insights with us today. I also would sincerely like to thank all of our international guests and audiences for joining
us today. For Worldnet, I'm Judlyne Lilly.
END